DÆDALUS

OPULATION

PREDICTION

CONFLICT

EXISTENTIALISM

Daniel Bell
Stanley Cavell
Lawrence S. Finkelstein
Kurt Rudolf Fischer
Roger Fisher
William E. Griffith
Hudson Hoagland
Jean Mayer
Heinz Politzer
Kenneth N. Waltz

Upsala College
Library
East Orange, N. J.



PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOARD OF EDITORS

Raymond Aron, John E. Burchard, Clarence Faust,
Karl von Frisch, Etienne Gilson, Gerald Holton, Clark Kerr,
R. M. MacIver, Archibald MacLeish, J. Robert Oppenheimer,
Paul B. Sears, Harlow Shapley, Paul Tillich, George Wald

Stephen R. Graubard, *Editor of the Academy and of* Dædalus
Geno A. Ballotti, *Managing Editor*
Elizabeth W. Miller, *Assistant Editor*
Marianne Dolan, *Publications Assistant*
Elizabeth A. Means, *Editorial Assistant*
Nancy W. Williamson, *Editorial Assistant*

EDITORIAL OFFICE: *Dædalus*, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 7 Linden Street, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. All communications to the Editor should be sent to that address.

SUBSCRIPTION OFFICE: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 280 Newton Street, Brookline Station, Boston, Massachusetts 02106.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: *Dædalus* is published quarterly. Subscription rate in the United States, $5.50 a year; foreign, $6.00; single copies (regular current issue), $1.50 domestic, $1.75 foreign; for a back issue add $0.25. Double issue: $3.00 domestic, $3.50 foreign; for a back order add $0.50.

Subscription orders should be sent to the Subscription Office.

Published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Printed in the United States of America

Publication Office: 2901 Byrdhill Road, Richmond, Virginia

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 12-30299

Second-class postage paid at Richmond, Virginia

Copyright © 1964 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DÆDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Contents

811 Preface to the Issue "Population, Prediction, Conflict, Existentialism"

POPULATION

812 HUDSON HOAGLAND
Mechanisms of Population Control

830 JEAN MAYER
Food and Population: The Wrong Problem?

PREDICTION

845 DANIEL BELL
Twelve Modes of Prediction—A Preliminary Sorting of Approaches in the Social Sciences

CONFLICT

881 KENNETH N. WALTZ
The Stability of a Bipolar World

910 ROGER FISHER
Perceiving the World through Bipolar Glasses

916 WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH
Eppuor Si Muove

920 ROGER FISHER
Fractionating Conflict

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

942 LAWRENCE S. FINKELSTEIN
Comments on "Fractionating Conflict"

EXISTENTIALISM

946 STANLEY CAVELL
Existentialism and Analytical Philosophy

975 HEINZ POLITZER
The Trial Against the Court

998 KURT RUDOLF FISCHER
The Existentialism of Nietzsche's Zarathustra

1017 Notes on Contributors

1020 Recent Issues of *Dædalus*

SUMMER 1964

ISSUED AS VOL. 93, NO. 3, OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Preface to the Issue "Population, Prediction, Conflict, Existentialism"

THIS issue of *Dædalus* treats four disparate though not entirely unrelated themes. Our purpose has been to recur to subjects which have engaged the attention of the Academy in recent years, and which promise to concern us increasingly in the future. Several of the papers originated in symposia and meetings organized by the Academy; all reflect interests which are instant in the Academy.

It is appropriate for the issue to open with an essay on population control written by the Academy's recent President, Dr. Hudson Hoagland, who has done much to give the topic a priority among the Academy's scientific concerns. A second essay in this section, by Dr. Jean Mayer, on food and population, advances a thesis which will doubtless provoke controversy, but which may well win increasing acceptance as the full effects of population growth are felt in highly industrialized societies.

Daniel Bell, in his essay, "Twelve Modes of Prediction," suggests that the function of prediction is "to reduce uncertainty," and that its ultimate aim is "to widen the spheres of moral choice." These objectives are as important for studies involving population as they are for the no less complex issues raised by the possibility of military conflict in an atomic age. The Academy's contributions to the study of conflict resolution are long-standing. The articles by Kenneth Waltz and Roger Fisher are intended to stimulate dialogue on the subject. Since each offers a point of view which will invite disagreement, it has been thought useful to publish certain first responses to them.

The last three articles, by Stanley Cavell, Heinz Politzer, and Kurt Fischer, owe much to a University of California symposium last autumn, on the subject of "Existentialism in Modern Thought and Literature." The Academy's concern with the range of problems suggested by this theme is evident in much earlier publication in *Dædalus*.

S.R.G.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HUDSON HOAGLAND

Mechanisms of Population Control

It is impossible for the thoughtful man to escape a certain ambivalence of response to the social impact of most great scientific discoveries. The unlocking of nuclear energy promises enormous potential benefits as a source of industrial power and as a servant of the medical sciences. But the rapid multiplication of nuclear bombs in the arsenals of growing numbers of nation states, uncontrolled by enforceable world law, may render man an extinct species. All organisms must adapt to the environments or perish. After Hiroshima, the notable change in our environment is that it now contains nuclear weapons, which have made obsolete not only traditional views of national sovereignty but traditional concepts of how the security of nations can be protected. The hope for man is that he can change his ways of thinking to cope with this new environment before it destroys him.

There are of course many other examples of antithetical applications of science. The automobile and the airplane are of great convenience in transportation, but the automobile kills 40,000 Americans a year, and the airplane overhead may be an enemy bomber. The knife is a tool that can be used as well for murder as for surgery, and most drugs of value in medicine are harmful and even lethal when used inappropriately.

It is especially ironic that the humane practices of medicine and

This is an expansion of a shorter paper by the author entitled "Cybernetics of Population Control," presented at a seminar in May, 1963, on Human Fertility and Population Problems, held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The original paper was published in March, 1964, in the *Proceedings* of this seminar (Schenkman Publishing Company, Cambridge, Mass.). It was also published in the February, 1964, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, and we are indebted to both of these publications for their permission to use much of the original text.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public health, dedicated to reducing physical suffering and prolonging healthful lives, should be the primary cause of a major social disease. This disease is the unprecedented increase in the world population, especially in economically underdeveloped countries least able to afford the increased burden. Prior to World War II, during nearly 100 years following Pasteur and the development of bacteriology and immunology, the European population growth rate accelerated as a result of the conquest of infectious diseases and the improvement in public health measures, which reduced death rates. Since World War II western medicine has administered its sophisticated techniques in underdeveloped countries. Medical missionaries, using relatively inexpensive insecticides, antibiotics, inoculations, and vaccinations applied to masses of people, have drastically reduced the death rate, leaving the birth rate, always large, either unchanged or somewhat increased as a result of improvements in health and longevity. This beneficent process has greatly increased populations in the poverty-stricken countries of Asia, the Near East, Africa, and Latin America, which now contain, according to Kingsley Davis, 69 per cent of the world's adults and, through marked decreases in infant mortality, 80 per cent of its children.[1]

In most of the underdeveloped countries, the death rate has dropped at a record rate. Davis has pointed out that on the island of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, within an 8-year period after the war, life expectancy increased from 31 to 51 years, a gain that took Sweden 130 years to achieve. In Taiwan, within two decades, the life expectancy increased from 43 to 63 years. This 20-year gain in life expectancy took 80 years to effectuate in the white population of the United States. These figures are typical of what has happened in most underdeveloped countries. In many countries the population is increasing at the rate of over 3 per cent per year, which will result in a doubling in 23 years. The world population as a whole is increasing at 2 per cent per year, a rate at which it will double in about 35 years. Oncoming generations of poverty-stricken, economically unproductive young people will increase the birth rate further as they come of age. Already this generation in some places is hungrier and more illiterate than that of its parents, and has fewer job opportunities. This is bad news in those countries with rising expectations, which now contain two-thirds of the world's people, such as China, India, Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, and various Latin American countries, where the average per capita income is less than $100 per year. The increasing numbers of the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unproductive make increasingly difficult the accumulation of developmental capital, since most local produce must be consumed to maintain the growing population.

There are only two solutions to the disease of overpopulation. One is to increase death rates, and the other is to decrease birth rates. So far we have manipulated death control by decreasing death rates and so increasing the population. No one that I know of advocates reversing this process, although a nuclear war would certainly do so, and such a war is made increasingly likely by runaway populations. The alternative solution is birth control and family limitation on a rational basis. Man is the only animal that can deliberately direct and control his own evolution. It will be interesting to see which of these two variables, death or birth, he will manipulate. It must be one or the other, since a 2 per cent growth rate will result in one square yard of land area per person 600 years hence, an obvious absurdity.

We may learn something relevant to our problem from a consideration of how animals regulate and control their population problems. Many organisms possess remarkable methods of population control as contrasted with the conscious devices available to man.

In multiplying cultures of micro-organisms the growth rate accelerates exponentially; but as toxic metabolic products, such as acids or alcohol, accumulate, the rate declines and the curve describing numbers of organisms as a function of time ultimately flattens off. These S-shaped growth curves for bacteria and yeasts have been described by equations aimed at elucidating the dynamics of such population growths. Human populations, when relatively isolated by geography, social habits, and cultural factors, also display S-shaped growth curves; in other words, they reach asymptotic levels as a result of Malthusian brakes such as infectious diseases, war and famine, or, more hopefully, by migration or by rational family planning and birth control. The motivation for family planning has historically been a desire for better economic and educational advantages for small families desirous of upward social mobility. It is this factor that is primarily responsible for the small present growth rates of about a half of one per cent in the most advanced industrial nations of Europe, rather than the Malthusian factors active in more primitive societies.

There are many studies on the regulation of insect populations. It has been shown that the fruit fly, *Drosophila*, above certain pop-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ulation densities decreases its egg laying, and to an amount proportional to the density. Many investigations have been made of flour beetles. Below a fixed number of grams of flour per beetle, cannibalism occurs in some species, egg production drops off, and in one species crowding results in females puncturing and destroying some of the eggs they have produced. Frequency of copulation also declines with crowding. There are some species of flour beetles with glands that produce a gas, the release of which is increased with crowding. This gas is lethal to larvae and acts as an antaphrodisiac at high densities of population. Flour contaminated with beetle excrement inhibits egg production of one species of beetle investigated, and the mixing of this contaminated flour with fresh flour decreases the rate of population growth, which is entirely reversible in the presence of fresh flour. In these cases, the food supply is ample.

Among populations of mammals other than man, it was long thought that food and predators were the controlling factors in limiting populations of hares, lemmings and other rodents as well as of deer, caribou, and other forms. The predators might be lynxes, wolves, foxes, and birds of prey, or micro-organisms producing epidemic diseases. It was thought, for example, that the four-year cycles of build-up and decline of lemming populations terminating in their suicidal migrations were due to an increase in predators accompanying population growth, which ultimately caused the panic and decline. But the migrations and deaths appear now not to be caused by the predators. Rather, the predators appear to multiply in response to the multiplying prey. Similarly, for well over a century various observers have reported repetitive wide cyclic variations in the number of fox and lynx pelts taken by trappers in our northern woods. These predators increase in number following cyclic increases in their prey. Lionesses have been reported to bear larger litters, two to four cubs, in environs of plentiful game. When game is scarce, there are only one or two cubs per litter. While the lemming cycles have not been studied as systematically as those of some other species, it seems likely that these four-year fluctuations in population densities are determined by factors now known to regulate population cycles in other mammalian species, and I should now like to say something about these factors.

In past years the snowshoe hare population of Minnesota has been studied extensively. These populations rise and fall through cycles of several years' duration. There is a period of build-up, followed by a dying off. Why do these marked oscillations in numbers

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of hares occur? It was observed that when the animals died off there was usually plenty of food—they had not starved. There were no evidences of an excessive number of predators. Furthermore, the bodies showed no sign that any specific epidemic had killed them. To quote from a 1939 study of the dead animals: "This syndrome was characterized primarily by fatty degeneration and atrophy of the liver with a coincident striking decrease in liver glycogen and a hypoglycemia preceding death. Petechial or ecchmotic brain hemorrhages, and congestion and hemorrhage of the adrenals, thyroid, and kidneys were frequent findings in a smaller number of animals. The hares characteristically died in convulsive seizures with sudden onset, running movements, hindleg extension, retraction of the head and neck, and sudden leaps with clonic seizures upon alighting. Other animals were typically lethargic or comatose."[2] The adrenals were hypertrophied in some cases and atrophied in others. Signs of liver disease, hypertension, atherosclerosis and adrenal deterioration were typical of what one finds following Hans Selye's acute syndrome resulting from overactivity of the pituitary-adrenal axis.

Since effects of social stress have been found to limit populations of birds and mammals, a brief discussion of its operation is in order. Elsewhere I have defined stress as follows:[3] Any external situation threatening the organism may function as a stress. Situations calling for flight or fight, with their concomitant psychological and physiological expressions of fear and anger, are stressful. Especially in man the processes of inhibiting fight or flight may themselves result in stressful anxiety states. Psychological stress may result from the intensification of our instinctual drives and of the control of these drives to meet the demands of society. Such stresses may be chronic and produce far-reaching disturbances of a psychosomatic nature, including neuroses, in susceptible individuals. The balancing of one's needs and satisfaction in terms of learned inhibitions and prohibitions occasions stresses of this sort. The same stress situation may have quite different significance, psychologically, for different organisms in terms of their life histories and past conditionings, and therefore attempts to objectify and standardize such stresses meet with difficulty.

The physiologist has a variety of measures of how stress may disturb the body's regulation of the internal fluid environment of its tissues. The maintenance of constancy in this internal environment of blood and lymph is of great importance for proper functioning of the body. Blood and urinary measurements of certain

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

endocrine systems brought into play by stress are particularly useful response indices, and have been used extensively in our laboratories as well as elsewhere. The quantitative analyses of adrenalin, secreted primarily by the medulla of the adrenal gland, and noradrenalin, a neurohumor primarily released at certain synapses and nerve endings of the autonomic nervous system, reflect defense responses especially to acute stress. Blood and urine measurements of the steroid hormones from the adrenal cortex and their metabolites have been used more widely than any other indices in recent years in studies of stress responses in mammals, including man. The adrenal cortex is activated by the pituitary adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH), which, in turn, is released in increased amounts by action of the hypothalamus following bodily damage or threats. The adrenocortical hormones have ubiquitous actions on many tissues involved in response to stress and the maintenance of homeostasis.

Hans Selye has developed the concept of the general adaptation syndrome, which he defines as the characteristic emergency reaction or general stress responses of an animal, developing through three stages: (1) the alarm reaction, in which adaptation is attempted; (2) the stage of resistance, in which adaptation is optimal; and (3) the stage of exhaustion, in which adaptation fails. These various phases of the general adaptation syndrome may be studied in terms of the type of changes in constituents of body fluids, especially those involving activity of the adrenal cortex. In animals, the studies may include determinations, before and after stress, of adrenal size, adrenal ascorbic acid, and adrenal cholesterol as indices of adrenocortical function. Selye has concluded that many diseases are primarily a result of failure of the bodily mechanisms for adaptation to meet chronic stress situations adequately. He considers that disturbed patterns of endocrine secretion following the prolonged application of stressors may result in various chronic diseases and he thus speaks of the diseases of adaptation resulting from prolonged stress.[4]

Prolonged stressor actions may produce anxiety and chronic behavioral disturbances in man and in experimental animals. The role of life stresses as contributory agents to hypertension, arthritis, ulcers, skin disorders, asthma, and other allergic manifestations has been investigated by many biochemical, physiological, psychological, and psychiatric procedures. Experimentally induced states in animals, closely resembling the neuroses and psychosomatic disturbances seen in man, have been regularly brought about by frustrating

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conditioned reflex techniques, in themselves mild procedures but productive of highly abnormal and crippling behavior when carried on at regular intervals over periods of time. Life stressors producing neurotic behavior in man are very varied and may be difficult to define or to measure. In the biosciences, stresses for the most part are not directly identifiable, but are measured by the strains they produce as reflected in the above indices, especially those reflecting activity of the adrenal cortex.

In studies of rodents it has been found that, after the severe stress of winter crowding in burrows, there was much fighting among the males, sex drives were at a low ebb, the young were often eaten, and the females produced premature births. Susceptibility to non-specific infections was also found, another by-product of excessive production of adrenal corticoids. After the numbers of such a colony are depleted through the effects of the stress syndrome, the colony then tends to build up again, going through repeated cycles of growth and decline.

There are many other examples. About forty years ago, a pair of deer was put on a small island of about 150 acres in Chesapeake Bay. The deer were kept well supplied with food. The colony grew until it reached a density of about one deer per acre. Then the animals began to die off, and this in spite of adequate food and care. When these dead animals were examined, marked evidence was found that the adrenal stress syndrome had been in operation. Studies made of the crowding of animals in the Philadelphia Zoo disclosed that in some species there was a ten-fold increase in atherosclerosis under conditions of severe crowding, as well as many other symptoms characteristic of stress. John Christian of the Naval Medical Research Institute made population studies in relation to the crowding of mice. In his 1950 paper in the *Journal of Mammalogy* entitled "The Adreno-pituitary System and Population Cycles in Mammals," he wrote in part: "We now have a working hypothesis for the die-off terminating a cycle. Exhaustion of the adreno-pituitary systems resulting from increased stresses inherent in a high population, especially in winter, plus the late winter demands of the reproductive system, due to increased light or other factors, precipitates population-wide death with the symptoms of adrenal insufficiency and hypoglycemic convulsions."[5]

John Calhoun at the National Institute of Health has studied effects of crowding on rats, and I should like to describe his work in some detail. He investigated colonies of rats kept in pens at critical

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

levels of crowding, and under these circumstances observed high infant mortality, high abortion rates, failures of mothers to build nests. The young were often scattered about and eaten. When the rats were examined, there was also evidence of the stress syndrome, and Calhoun has spoken, most appropriately, of what he calls "pathological togetherness." He has reviewed this work in an article entitled "Population Density and Social Pathology," published in the *Scientific American*, in February, 1962.

Calhoun confined wild Norway rats in a one-quarter-acre enclosure with plenty of food and water. At the end of 27 months the population stabilized itself at 150 adults. From the very low adult mortality rate in uncrowded conditions, one would have expected a population of 5000, not 150 rats. But infant mortality was extremely high. The stress from social interaction disrupted maternal behavior so that only a few of the young survived. Calhoun later studied groups of domesticated white rats confined indoors in observation rooms under better controlled conditions. Six different populations were examined. Each group was allowed to increase to twice the number that his earlier experience indicated could occupy the allotted space with only moderate stress. Pathological behavior was most marked in the females: pregnancies were often not full term; there were many abortions and many maternal deaths; the mothers often could not nurse or care for their young. Among the males there was much sexual deviation, homosexual behavior and cannibalism, and abnormal behavior ranging from frenetic overactivity to pathological withdrawal, in which some males emerged from their nests only to eat and drink. Patterns of social behavior were thus badly deranged at twice normal crowding.

The experiments took place in four interconnecting pens, each 6 x 6 feet in area. Each was a complete dwelling unit, with a drinking fountain, a food hopper, and an elevated artificial burrow, which was reached by a winding ramp that held five nest boxes. One of these storied rat apartment houses was located in each of the four pens. There was comfortable space in the colony for 12 adult rats in each pen, the size of group in which rats were normally found to thrive. The setup should thus have been able to support 48 rats comfortably without overcrowding. At the stabilized number of 80 to 100, double the comfortable population, which they were allowed to reach by breeding, an equal distribution of the animals would have found 20 to 25 adults in each pen, but the animals did not dispose themselves in this way.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Biasing factors were introduced in the following fashion. Ramps were arranged enabling the animals to get from one pen to another and so traverse the entire four pens in the room. However, the two end pens, numbers 1 and 4, each had only one ramp connecting them with pens 2 and 3 respectively, while the middle pens had two ramps each, one ramp connecting in each direction. The rats had to make a complete traverse of the pens to go from one of the end pens to the other. This arrangement of ramps immediately weighted the probabilities in favor of a higher density in the two middle pens, since pens 2 and 3 could be reached by two ramps, whereas pens 1 and 4 by only one ramp each. With the passage of time strange aspects of the behavior of the group skewed the distribution in an unexpected way. As a result there developed an unexpected arrangement of the sex ratios of the animals in the various pens. The females distributed themselves about equally in the four pens, but the male population was concentrated almost overwhelmingly in the middle pens, the reason for this being the status struggle which takes place among the males. Shortly after six months of age each male enters into a round robin of fights that eventually fixes his position in the social hierarchy. These fights took place in all of the pens, both the middle and the end pens; but in the end pens, during the period when the social hierarchy was being established, it became possible for a single dominant male to take over the area as his territory.

Calhoun describes how this came about. The subordinate males in all pens adopted the habit of arising early in order to be able to eat and drink in peace. Rats generally eat in the course of their normal wanderings, and the subordinate residents of the end pens, having been defeated by the dominant males there, were likely to feed in one of the middle pens, where they as yet had not had to fight for status. When, after feeding, they wanted to return to their original quarters, they met with difficulty. By this time the dominant male in the end pen would have awakened and would engage the subordinates in fights as they tried to come down the single ramp to the pen. For a while the subordinate would continue his efforts to return to his home pen, but after a succession of defeats he would become so conditioned that he would not even make the attempt. In essence, Calhoun points out that the dominant male established his domination in the end pens and his control over a harem of females, not by driving the other males out, but by preventing their return over the one lead ramp. While the dominant male in an end pen slept a good part of the time, he made his sleeping quarters at

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the base of the ramp. He was therefore on perpetual guard, awakening as soon as another male appeared at the head of the ramp. He usually had only to open his eyes for the invader to wheel around and return to the adjoining pen. Since there were two ramps for pens 2 and 3, no one male could thus dominate both means of access. The dominant males in pens 1 or 4 would sleep calmly through all the comings and goings of his harem, seemingly not even hearing them. His behavior during his waking hours reflected his dominant status. He would move about in a casual and deliberate fashion, occasionally inspecting the burrow and nests of his harem. But he rarely entered a burrow, as did some other males in the middle pens merely to ferret out the females. A territorial male might tolerate other males in his domain provided they were phlegmatic and made themselves scarce. Most of the time these subordinate males hid in the burrows with the adult females, and only came out onto the floor to eat and drink; they never tried to engage in sex activity with the females.

In the end pens, where population density was thus kept low, the mortality rate among infants and females was also low. Of the various social environments that developed during the course of the experiments, the breed pens—as the two end pens were called—were the only healthy ones, at least in terms of group survival. The harem females generally made good mothers and protected their pups from harm. In the middle pens the pregnancy rates of the females were the same as those in the end pens, but a very much lower percentage of their pregnancies terminated in live births. In one series of experiments 99 per cent of the young born in pens 2 and 3 perished before weaning, and in others of the six experiments somewhere between 80 and 95 per cent perished.

The females that lived in the densely populated middle pens became progressively less adapted to building adequate nests, and eventually stopped building them at all. Normally rats of both sexes build nests, the females doing so most vigorously around the time of parturition. It is an undertaking that involves repeated periods of sustained activity, with the searching out of appropriate materials, such as strips of paper, and transporting the strips to a nest, which they arrange in cup-like form. In the crowded middle pens, however, the ability of the females to persist in this activity was greatly impaired. The females began merely to pile the strips in heaps, sometimes trampling them into a pad that showed little sign of cup formation. Later they brought fewer and fewer strips to the nesting

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

site, and in the midst of transporting a bit of material often dropped it and engaged in some other activity occasioned by contact and interaction with other rats met on the way. In the extreme disruption of their behavior during the later months of the population's history, they built no nests at all, but would bear their litters on the sawdust in the burrow box. The females also lost the ability to transport their litters from one place to another, a task they would normally accomplish with skill. If they did try to move a litter, they would drop individuals and scatter them about on the floor. The infants thus abandoned throughout the pens were seldom nursed. They would die where they were dropped and be eaten by the adults. In the middle pens, when a female came into heat, she would be relentessly pursued by all of the males until she was exhausted, with the result that, within a relatively short time, 25 per cent of the females in the crowded pens died; in contrast, only 15 per cent of the adult males died over the same period in the middle pens. In the end brood pens, however, this sort of thing did not happen. The females there would retire to bear their young in nests they made in a normal fashion, and were protected from the excessive attention of other males by the territorial male.

In the middle pens, a great deal of fighting among the males went on, with now one and now another assuming the dominant position. After a while, most of the males in the middle pens gave up the struggle and simply retired, making themselves as scarce as possible and spending a lot of their time sleeping. In contrast, in pens 1 and 4 one male predominated and peace reigned. These dominant males took care of the females and of the juveniles, never bothering them in any way.

Among the sub-dominant males there was much abnormal behavior. For instance, there was a group of homosexuals. They were really pan-sexual animals, and apparently could not discriminate between sex partners. They made sexual advances indiscriminately to males, juveniles, and females that were not in oestrus. Frequently attacked by their more dominant associates, they very rarely contended for status.

Another type of male emerged in the crowded pens. This was essentially a very passive type, that moved a good deal like a somnambulist, ignoring the other rats of both sexes, and ignored by all of them. Even when the females were in oestrus, these passive animals made no advances to them, and only very rarely did other males approach them for any kind of play. They appeared to be

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

healthy, attractive and sleek, but they were simply zombies in their conduct as far as the other rats were concerned.

The strangest of all of the abnormal male types described by Calhoun were what he called the probers. These animals, which always lived in the middle pens, took no part at all in the status struggle. Nevertheless, they were the most active of all the males in the experimental population, and persisted in their activities in spite of attacks by the dominant animals. In addition to being hyperactive, the probers were hypersexual, and in time many of them became cannibalistic. They constantly chased females about, entering their nests, having intercourse with them in the nest, a thing that normal rats would never do. These probers conducted their pursuits of oestrus females in a very abnormal manner, abandoning all courtship ritual, which is characteristic of mating rats.

In these experiments by John Calhoun we see the development of serious pathology directly attributable to overcrowding at only twice the number of rats per unit area normally required for a healthy society. It is tempting to draw a comparison of city slums with the crowded middle pens and of prosperous suburbs with the orderly end pens, far-fetched though it may be.

We are, however, justified in asking to what extent the stress syndrome may be a limiting factor in reducing the growth rate of human populations. As far as I know, there are no adequate data on which to base an answer. Studies from a number of laboratories, including our own, have demonstrated that the pituitary adrenal system responds under stress in a way similar to that of other mammals. There is direct evidence that inmates of concentration camps experienced acute forms of the stress syndrome that may have accounted for many deaths. Concentration camps would be more appropriate sources of comparison to highly congested animal populations than city slums, since in crowded cities even the very poor do have some mobility. They can escape from their immediate congestion onto the streets and associate with other members of the population. The high incidence of street gangs and juvenile delinquency is especially characteristic of overcrowded city areas and constitutes a form of social pathology. Several studies have also indicated a higher incidence of schizophrenia and of other psychotic and neurotic behavior in congested urban areas than in more spacious surroundings, but other factors may be involved here. The increased incidence of atherosclerosis and other cardiovascular

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pathology associated with urban living and its competitive stresses may also be enhanced by crowding, although direct evidence for this effect of population density is lacking. In underdeveloped countries with high birth rates and recently lowered death rates, resulting in population growth rates of 2 to 4 per cent per year, any possible decrease occasioned by the stress syndrome would be obliterated through the action of medical and public health measures that are enhancing life expectancies and would mask any small reduction in life expectancies resulting from stress.

There is a large literature on the social behavior of animals in relation to population density. Of especial importance is a book by V. C. Wynne-Edwards entitled *Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior,*[6] some of whose conclusions I should like to summarize.

In nature, when food supplies are fortuitously removed or fail to materialize, a local overpopulation emergency results; among highly mobile flying animals, such as insects and birds, this can be immediately relieved by emigration. The social hierarchy and code of behavior to which the animal subscribes act as devices to force out whatever surplus of animals exists. The exiles may be condemned to perish, or under other circumstances, they may set up new communities in other localities. In the cold boreal and arctic regions, most of the erupting species are birds. Many birds are adapted to exploit intermittent or undependable crops of food, and are to a large extent nomadic in their search for regions where supplies are temporarily plentiful. Two distinct biological functions appear to be served by emigration. One is that of a safety valve to give immediate relief to overpopulation; the other is a pioneering function to expand and replenish the range of the species as a whole, and provide for gene exchange. Emigration of the safety valve kind is associated with stress and with quickly deteriorating economic conditions (locusts). On the other hand, providing pioneers can be afforded only when conditions are good. In more variable environments, both functions tend to become important and to be exercised on a large scale. The individuals expelled are in either case usually the junior fraction of the hierarchy.

In this connection I am reminded of human colonizing activities —the Greek city states that sent young people off to colonize the Mediterranean area, Italy, Sicily, and Africa, and the lands around the Aegean and the Black Sea. It was the younger sons of British families and the emigrants of Portugal, Spain, and France who estab-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lished colonies in the western hemisphere, thereby relieving population pressures at home. Like many animal colonies, Australia was originally colonized by a group very low in the British pecking order, namely, prisoners. Ireland is an especially interesting case. In 1670 Ireland had a population of approximately a million people. By 1845 this had increased to eight million. The Irish were heavily dependent upon one crop, the potato, which was grown on small plots sufficient to feed a family. Over a period of six years (1848-1854), a blight destroyed the potato crop. Nearly a million persons starved and another million emigrated. Agriculture reforms were introduced, the small plots being consolidated for purposes of diverse crop farming, and ultimogeniture was established. But the population continued to fall, until it is now about four million, only half of what it was before the potato famine. The reasons for this decline were continued emigration, and a social change characterized by very late marriages, or often no marriage at all. The pattern is for the youngest son to maintain the farm, care for his parents, and usually not marry while they are alive. The result is that population growth in Ireland is low despite the influence of the Catholic Church.

To revert to animal societies, Wynne-Edwards points out that the same general social machinery that controls safety valve emigrations is involved in regulating such seasonal redispersions of animals as the annual two-way migrations of birds. Among other investigations of mortality promoted by stress, the white stork has been intensively studied. Nestling mortality is often very heavy under crowded conditions; individual chicks may be deliberately killed and sometimes eaten by one of their parents, usually the father. This is most likely to happen where the parents are beginners or young adults, and presumably of lower status in the pecking hierarchy. The killing off of the young in prolific breeding conditions is characteristic of a great many birds that have been investigated, as well as of many mammals, and is a direct result of social stress. Both the killing of the young and cannibalism are known to occur quite widely in mammals: for instance, in rodents, lions, and also in primitive man. Cases of cannibalism are found in fish, spider crabs, spiders, and fratricide in inset larvae of various types. *In all cases experimentally investigated, the mortality is found to be density dependent and to cease below a certain critical population density.*

Mortality from predation, which has also been examined, ap-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pears to be density dependent to the extent that the prey cooperates by making its surplus members especially vulnerable to predators. As mentioned earlier, the density elements in predation seem to arise first on the side of the prey and not on that of the predators. Because of lowered resistance to infective agents following prolonged stress, disease as a form of predation may effectively reduce excessive population. In this case a surplus of individuals predisposed to injury by their dominant fellows naturally experiences a variable amount of uncontrolled mortality, which tends to fall most heavily on the young, as yet unprotected by acquired immunity from bacterial and viral infections. Social stress can lead to casualties at all ages, both through direct and mortal combat and through stress-induced disease. The victim of severe stress is likely to develop physiological disorders affecting many organs, especially the lymphatic apparatus, and including the spleen and thymus, the nervous system, circulatory, digestive and generative organs, the endocrine glands. As we have seen, the effect of stress is especially notable in the adrenal cortex, which serves an intermediary role between the stressor and the organs responding to adrenal cortical hormones. Social stress is sometimes partly physical, as when the exercise of peck-order rights leads to the infliction of wounds, or the withholding of food and shelter. But, as Wynne-Edwards points out, it may also be largely mental, as in man, who in his more unsophisticated states may die from the conviction that he has been bewitched. Instances are known of birds, mammals, and amphibians similarly dying from non-specific injuries apparently induced by social stress.

And now, what about man? What can we do about the world population explosion? We can, of course, do nothing and wait for the stress syndrome or for some new virus to do its work. We can leave our destruction to some trigger-happy dictator with a suitable stock pile of nuclear weapons, or, finally, we can decide on an optimal population for the world and, by education and such social pressure as tax bonuses for small families, try to see that it is not exceeded.

Psychological prejudice, indifference, and downright hostility are the major blocks to planned population limitation. We know many methods of birth control: coitus interruptus, jellies, douches, diaphragms, condums, surgical procedures, and "the pill," and ongoing research will give us more and better methods, but none is of value if people refuse its use. Among the very poor and

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

illiterate, cost and the difficulties of use of contraceptives demand massive government aid, financial, social and educational. Prudery and politics, myth, superstition and tradition have so far rendered birth control ineffective in the very countries most in need of it.

There are certain factors that specifically inhibit human population growth. One of these is a rise in the social, economic, and educational level of the people. Thus birth rates in the United States, with the exception of the postwar baby boom, have, in general, fluctuated inversely with economic conditions. Davis has pointed out that in all of the industrialized countries of Europe economic growth always outpaces population growth, thus repeatedly demonstrating that population pressure on the means of subsistence does not operate to lower populations as has often been thought. Other things being equal, the richer the nation the slower the population growth, an observation sharply divergent from the claim that the population explosion is good for business. The decline in birth rates attendant on opulence results from a desire for upward social mobility on the part of parents, who know that their incomes will go further to advance the welfare of a small family and will make possible a better education for a few children and higher standard of living for themselves than for a big family. Within a single country and at a given time, one can see this principle in operation. Thus, in northern industrial Italy, the birth rate is low compared to that in the poor agricultural regions of the south, and this despite the influence of the Catholic Church and cash bonuses paid by the Italian government to encourage large families.

Decrease in birth rates with opulence has led some to the erroneous conclusion that an increase in food supplies decreases birth rates. It has therefore been argued that all we need to do to control the population explosion is to feed people well, as if there were an inverse correlation between food intake and fertility. As a matter of fact, the opposite appears to be the case. We have already pointed out that predatory animals increase in numbers and may have larger litters in the presence of ample prey. This fact has been established for a number of species, although its basis is obscure. A parallel situation also appears to exist for man. William Langer has presented an interesting and well documented discussion of what he calls "Europe's Initial Population Explosion."[7] Before the mid-eighteenth century Europe's population increases were slow and spasmodic. He points out that a population of 140 million in 1750 rose to 188 million in 1800 and to 266 million by 1850. A

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

careful consideration of death rates demonstrates that they did not decrease significantly over this period. The increase appears to be due to fertility increases, and the question is why?

Langer points out that historically it has been established that there are correlations between harvest conditions and marriage and birth rates. In Sweden, where careful statistics go back to the seventeenth century, the annual excess of births over deaths in the eighteenth century was only 2 per thousand after a poor crop, but 6.5 after an average harvest, and 8.4 after a bumper crop. As late as the mid-nineteenth century high wheat prices resulting from scarcity were reflected in low marriage rates and to some extent in low birth rates.

Langer attributes the European population increase between 1750 and 1850 to the introduction of potato culture. The potato, introduced from South America via Spain in the late sixteenth century, within a hundred years had spread widely over Europe. It furnished a food yield per acre of two to four times that of grain, and an acre of even poor soil could feed a large family. Langer points out that under the feudal system the seigneur frequently denied marriage to able young people he had selected for special service, and guild masters also blocked or delayed marriages of apprentices and artisans. Thus during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries marriages were late and few compared to a later period after the old regime had broken down, with a resulting increase in marriages and birth rates.

Potato cultivation contributed to the decline of great feudal estates. It facilitated early marriages and made possible the nourishment of larger families. Thus in Ireland, with no industrial revolution and no war and no change in patterns of famine or disease and despite terrible poverty, the population increased from 3,200,000 in 1754 to 8,174,000 in 1846, just before the potato famine, the disastrous consequences of which we have seen. These figures do not include some 1,500,000 who migrated before the famine.

Thus both human and animal populations tend to increase with increasing food supplies, other things being equal. On the other hand, human populations decrease their growth rates with opulence, for in the opulent society economic and social advantages other than food make for small families and usually constitute more effective agents for reducing birth rates than improved food supplies are in increasing them.

Grenville Clark has argued that the population explosion prob-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ably cannot be controlled until the world has accepted universal and complete disarmament under world law, and devotes a substantial part of the 120 billion dollars now being spent on weaponry to raising the living standards of have-not peoples. He bases his view on the often demonstrated fact that birth control procedures are used extensively only by literate and prosperous people, with hope and ambition for bettering their own lots and those of their children. The take-off point for family planning and limitation requires a critical level of education and prosperity not now found in the very poor countries.

The completely gloomy view would be that if we do not manage to disarm within a decade or two we may solve the population problem by nuclear extermination. In any case, the two major problems of our time—nuclear war and the population explosion—are closely linked together. The physical sciences and the medical sciences have given mankind these two world-wide challenges never dreamed of by previous generations. Only by fundamental changes in our ways of thinking can they be solved.

References

1. Kingsley Davis, "Population," *Scientific American,* 209:3 (September, 1963), 62-71.
2. This quotation is from an unusually interesting review by Edward S. Deevey, *American Scientist,* 48 (September, 1960), 415-430. He does not, however, cite the original paper containing this quotation.
3. Hudson Hoagland, "Stress," *McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 180-182.
4. H. Selye, *The Physiology of Stress and Pathology of Exposure to Stress* (Montreal: Acta, Inc., 1950); *Fifth Annual Report on Stress* (New York: MD Publications, 1956); "Stress and Mental Illness," *Lancet,* 275 (1958), 205-208.
5. John J. Christian, "The Adreno-pituitary System and Population Cycles in Mammals," *Journal of Mammalogy* 31:3 (1950), 247-259.
6. V. C. Wynne-Edwards, *Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior* (New York: Hafner Press, 1962).
7. William L. Langer, "Europe's Initial Population Explosion," *American Historical Review,* LXIX, 1 (October, 1963) 1-7.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JEAN MAYER

Food and Population: The Wrong Problem?

I

THE problem of population control as such is not new, although it has recently acquired new and dangerous dimensions. In all early treatments of the subject, considerations of population policy were not closely linked to economic concerns and in particular to the availability of food. Plato, who undertook nothing less than the projection of an ideal city-state, in estimating, in the *Laws*, the numbers needed for the various functions of citizenship, arrived at the figure of 5,040 citizens as the desirable size, adequate to "furnish numbers for war and peace, for all contracts and dealings, including taxes and divisions of the land." It has been estimated that, with dependents and slaves, the total population of this city-state comprised about 60,000 persons. In *The Republic*, Plato further developed his concepts of population control, and in particular, described his well-known eugenics proposal for public hymeneals of licensed breeders. At all times, his preoccupation is with the quality of man and of the state; the availability of food and other resources is not considered. Aristotle similarly believes that the efficient government of city-states would be impossible if cities were too large. He was concerned with certain of the economic consequences of overpopulation, though not specifically with food. In the *Politics*, he warns that: "A neglect of an effective birth control policy is a never-failing source of poverty, which is in turn the parent of revolution and crime," and advised couples with an excessive number of children to abort succeeding pregnancies "before sense and life have begun."

Plato and Aristotle did not go unchallenged. The Pythagoreans, in particular Hippocrates, opposed abortion. The Hippocratic oath contains the pledge: "I will not give a woman an abortive remedy."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Of greater subsequent importance, the Romans almost as a body disapproved of the Greek views on population. They were not so much concerned with the quality of man and the excellence of the state as with the size of the legions and the expansion of the Empire. Cicero, in particular, in *De Re Publica,* waxes indignant at Plato for his ideas on birth control. Rome taxed celibacy and rewarded large families. Roman ideas, incidentally, were very similar to those of Confucius and his followers, also citizens of a large and expanding empire, and equally convinced that a numerous and expanding population should be promoted by wise rulers. The economic consequences of large populations were essentially ignored by the Romans; Confucius dealt with them by enunciating the rather intriguing formula: "Let the producers be many and the consumers few."

The Hebrews and the Fathers of the Church were similarly uninterested in the economic implications of population growth. Biblical and early Christian writers can, indeed, hardly be considered to have had a population policy, though their concepts of family life and of the dignity of man are as basic now as they were milleniums ago. For them, man was neither a political nor an economic unit; he had intrinsic worth as a son of God. "The Lord God formed man out of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life and man became a living being." Later God said, "Let us make Mankind in our image and likeness. . . . Be fruitful and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it." Later, Onan is killed by the Lord for having practiced coitus interruptus, and children are repeatedly designated as the gift of God, with large families particularly blessed. The prescriptions of Saint Paul are somewhat more complex: while he states that women can merit eternal salvation through bearing children if they continue to be faithful, holy, and modest, he praises virginity as more blessed than marriage, and dedicated widowhood as preferred above remarriage. The position of the Church against abortion hardens in the third century, when Saint Hippolytus opposes Pope Calixtus I for showing too much leniency towards the abortionists, and reiterates the Christian position that the fetus is a person and not, as in Roman law, a part of the mother. It is only with Tertullian, citizen of a crowded and decaying Empire, that the possible economic consequences of overpopulation are clearly stated. In *De Anima* he writes: "The scourges of pestilence, famine, wars and earth quakes have come to be regarded as a blessing to over-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crowded nations, since they served to prune away the luxuriant growth of the human race." Tertullian is echoed 1300 years later by Botero, a 16th century Italian writer, who holds that man's productive powers are inferior to his reproductive powers, which do not diminish automatically when population increases. For this reason, the population of the world must be constantly checked by war and epidemics. Food limitation indirectly thus limits the population of the earth, which already holds as many people as it can hold. From Botero onward, concepts of optimum population size become indissolubly linked to economic considerations, and, it may be added, to economic considerations of the lowest order. Population limitation is advocated by those writers, foremost among whom is Malthus, who feel they can demonstrate that population will inevitably rise to the very margin of food production capacity, with misery and vice the only consequence. The examples chosen are often unfortunate in the light of hindsight: Malthus bases his prediction on an examination of the United States of the late eighteenth century. Lord Raffles in 1804 is appalled at the fact that Java may in time contain as many as four million people, clearly, he feels, a number representing the limit of agricultural possibilities. On the other side, mercantilist writers and rulers once again see an increase in population as a guarantee of ample manpower for production and for war, and as a test of good government. Through the nineteenth century the debate continues. Malthusians see the solution of economic problems due to overpopulation in continence and in more poverty—specifically, the repeal of the poor laws. The belief in the inevitability of starvation and the desirability of a laissez faire policy was in no small measure responsible for government inaction during the Irish famine. At the other end of the spectrum, Marx and Engels opposed Malthus as a peculiarly vicious and obsolete defender of capitalism. "Overpopulation" was a bourgeois invention, designed to justify the poverty of the working classes. Improved production and distribution, not restriction of births, was the answer. A socialistic economy could thrive under all conditions of population growth, while an economy based on scarcity and high prices required birth control to mitigate its glaring deficiencies. Oddly enough, a number of modern Catholic philosophers have held a viewpoint not very different from that of Karl Marx.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, three profound revolutions have taken place: a technological revolution, which promises to

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accelerate food production still faster; a demographic explosion, which is also accelerating and places the problem of population in an even more dramatic context; and changes in human attitudes, for which Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland has coined the felicitous expression, "the revolution of rising expectations." It is the contention of this writer that nothing is more dangerous for the cause of formulating a sound policy of population control than to approach the problem in nineteenth century terms; by continuing to link the need for population control to the likelihood that food supply will be increasingly limited, the elaboration of birth control programs of sufficient magnitude will be held up for many years, perhaps many generations. We shall see that in contemporary terms, it may well be that the controversy between Plato and Cicero makes more sense than that between the neo-Malthusians and the neo-Marxists.

II

That the magnitude of the population problem has increased drastically in recent years is well publicized. Scholars have estimated that after hundreds of thousands of years of slow growth, the population of the world reached the quarter billion mark some time around the beginning of this era. It had doubled again, to 500 millions, by 1650. Two centuries later, it had reached the billion mark. The next doubling took 80 years, with a two billion population reached in 1930. It would appear that the world is on its way to the next doubling, to 4 billion in 45 years, by 1975, and a population of 8 billion may well be reached within the following 30 to 35 years unless rates of growth are drastically decreased. The present growth rate would lead to a population of 500 billion by 2200, and give the surface of all continents a population density equal to that of Washington, D. C., at present!

This increase has been due historically, not to an increase in birth rate, but to a decrease in death rates. Around 1700, life expectancy at birth of European populations was about 33 years, and had increased little in the previous three to four hundred years. By 1950, life expectancy in Western and Central Europe and in the United States had increased to 66-69 years, an increase of over 100 per cent. This decrease in mortality rates is no longer confined to populations of European stocks. In 1946, the death rate of the Moslem population of Algeria was higher than that of Sweden in

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1775. In 1954, in spite of generalized guerrilla war on its territory, the death rate of this population was lower than that of Sweden in 1875. A similar telescoping of the drop in death rates is going on all over the world.

From a demographic point of view, it must be noted that a drop in the death rate, with birth rate unchanged, not only results in an increase in the rate of population growth, but also produces an acceleration in the rate of growth itself: a decline in age-specific mortality rates in ages prior to the end of the childbearing age has the same demographic effect as an increase in the birth rate. In the United States, 97 out of every 100 newborn white females reach the age of 20, 91 reach the age of 50. In Guatemala, only 70 newborn females reach the age of 20, 49 that of 50. If, within the next decade, the death rate in Guatemala fell to somewhere near the 1950 United States level—a not unlikely development—this alone would increase the number of women reaching the beginning of the childbearing period by 36 per cent, the end of the childbearing period by 85 per cent. Generally speaking, because of the high proportion of young people in underdeveloped countries—a country like Costa Rica has twice the proportion of people under 15 that Sweden has—this drop in the death rate in the pre-childbearing period has now and will have in the next few years a gigantic effect on the birth rate. Brazil had 52 million people in 1950 and 71 million in 1960. If present rates prevail, it should have 240 million by the year 2000, or 14 times the 1900 population. With a drop in mortality in the younger age groups, the increase could be even more spectacular.

The significance of demographic trends even in this country are not generally appreciated. The United States, with a population of 193 millions, has at present one-sixteenth of the earth's population on one-sixteenth of the land area. Though a number of underdeveloped areas are piling up population faster than we do, we are accumulating about 3 million people per year, the most rapid increase in our history. The *rate* of growth seems unimpressive: 1.63 per cent per year for 1961, for example. During that same year, Western European countries grew at average rates of 0.50 to 0.75 per cent, but Asia and Latin America grew at a 2.5 per cent rate. This 1.63 per cent of 190 millions is over 3 millions; if the rate persists for 100 years, it will bring the population of the United States to one billion. Furthermore, what most of us have tended to ignore is that the so-called baby boom of the postwar

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

era followed a period of depression and very low birth rates: from 1920 to 1933 the birth rate had fallen steadily from 27.7 per 1000 in 1920 to 18.4 in 1933. The absolute decline in births was less steep, because the numerical base of women of childbearing age was still growing. When the birth rate started rising in the early forties, the increase was applied to the still large number of women born between 1916 and 1924. Since 1945, the baby boom that has been so publicized has actually been taking place on the basis of the shrinking group of women of childbearing age born since 1924. As of 1963, the last of the undersize groups had entered the reproducing age. In 1964, the girls born in the big postwar year of 1946 are 18. From now on birth rates must fall by a substantial amount to keep the number of births constant at 4-1/2 millions, 50 per cent above the 3 million figure we have come to consider a "boom" figure. But there is no evidence that birth rates are falling. The *crude* birth rate, or number of births per 1000 people, appears to be declining, but this is because the denominator includes a large and increasing number of children born since 1946. A better way to measure fertility rates is to observe rates for each age group and then compute an age-standardized general fertility rate based upon women of childbearing age only. If one does this for 1950 to 1960 for the United States, one notes a rise in fertility, barely checked since 1960. The sober fact is that, in this country, there were 32 million women 15 to 44 years of age in 1940 and 34 million in 1950, 36 million in 1960. There will be 43 million in 1970 and 54 million in 1980. These are not projective figures; the girls are here, now. Incidentally, even if the age standardized national fertility rate fell immediately to its historical minimum of the thirties and stayed there—an unlikely event—the population of the United States would still reach about 420 millions in one hundred years. The reader will, I trust, give me credit for not minimizing the problem of total population either at home or for the world at large.

III

With this picture of ever increasing numbers of people, the first reaction among a portion of the public is that we are running out of *space,* that the "population density" is becoming dangerously high. This concept of "population density"—number of people per unit surface—has underlain the concept of "overpopulation" in the past. It is not very useful, except in situations where the pri-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mary resources are extractive, such as mining, the most primitive types of agriculture (independent of industry for fertilizers, machines, etc., and hence essentially dependent on area), and forestry. It also presupposes that there is no industry to absorb surplus manpower. It is a concept of dubious value where non-extractive industries are dominant and where trade is possible. The high density band from Boston to Washington has an area of 14,000 square miles, an aggregate population of over 28 million (or over 2000 persons per square mile), and very limited natural resources. The median family income is $6,600, or $1,000 more than for the United States as a whole. Can this area be said to be overpopulated from a *material* standpoint? To those who object that this area is part of a larger and less densely populated whole, one might point to prosperous Holland, or Belgium, or even Hong Kong, which, although trade with its hinterland is very meagre (imports from mainland China represent only 17 per cent of total imports), not only houses 3.1 million people on 398 square miles (12,700 per square mile), but has shown an unexcelled increase in national product of 7 to 10 per cent per year—a doubling of real output within 10 years. The minute one argues that population density should be preserved, although perhaps in a more sophisticated form, such as density with respect to capital, one is dealing with a much more complex concept, which may lead one to the possibility that some sparsely settled countries need rapid increases in population—preferably through immigration—for optimal use of resources. The mental image of population density entertained by most people is, in any case, complicated by esthetic and social considerations, and "high density" is more likely to be ascribed to Calcutta than to Paris, to Costa Rica than to Denmark.

This leads us to the second and most popular concept: that overpopulation can best be appraised with respect to food resources and that the present rate of increase of the world's population is rapidly carrying us to the brink of or to actual starvation. It is my contention that this is not happening. Furthermore, I do not consider that my belief, which I will now endeavor to justify, makes me an "optimist" as compared to the legions of conservationists, social scientists, etc., who have embraced a Malthusian "pessimism." If anything, this view makes me even more pessimistic about our chances to control at any early date the world's population: limitation by famine or threat of famine is perhaps the worst method of limitation, but it would work.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

World War II was not a Malthusian check: in spite of the horrendous numbers of soldiers and civilians killed, in spite of the massive genocide perpetrated by the Nazis, food production was decreased much more than population: by 1945 intake per capita was 16 per cent lower than the 1934-1938 average. The creation of the Food and Agriculture Organization, a specialized United Nations Agency which, during its first years, was endowed with particularly articulate spokesmen, dramatized the worldwide concern over the food situation. The difficulties inherent in getting agriculture going while industry and means of communication were not yet rebuilt led to a generalized feeling of pessimism: cereals, oils, meat, dairy herds were, in succession, the object of great attention, the conclusion being in each case that pre-war levels of production and consumption were not going to be reached for years. The chaotic state of international trade accentuated shortages, which UNRRA and various emergency agreements attempted to cope with on an ad hoc basis. And yet very quickly the situation improved. The oil shortage vanished first; while the gigantic ground nut scheme of the British government, which was supposed to mitigate it, was taking off to a very slow start, the reappearance in the channels of trade of adequate amounts of fats and oils eliminated the motivation for the scheme itself. United States production of cereals and animal products, which had grown during the war in spite of lack of abundant manpower and the diversion of the chemical industry to military purposes, had to be slowed down as surpluses started accumulating, and, with their appearance, the threat of a collapse of agricultural prices loomed. By 1952-1953, the worldwide rate of per capita production of food had overtaken pre-war rates. Since then, the average rate of increase in the production of food for the world at large has been 3 per cent per year while the population has increased on the average 1.7 per cent. In document No. 8148, the Department of State estimates that if individual consumption levels remained at the 1955-1957 level, the world at large would show by 1975 an annual surplus of 40 million tons of wheat and 70 million tons of rice. (This estimate is based on the postulate that there will be no increase in rice production in Europe and North America, and no increase in wheat production in North America). Actually, this slight but steady gain of food production over popu-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lation is part of a secular trend. E. S. and W. S. Woytinski, in their monumental *World Population and Production,* estimate that since 1850 the increase in output has been more rapid than the increase in population.

This writer is a nutritionist who has worked in poor countries in Asia and Africa; he is, therefore, well aware of the widespread character of malnutrition. Caloric undernutrition is still found in many parts of the world, and not always as a result of war or civil disorder, great natural catastrophes such as earthquakes or flood, invasion of insects or other parasites and abnormally prolonged droughts; protein deficiency—kwashiorkor where it occurs without accompanying caloric deprivation, marasmus when both caloric and protein intakes are inadequate—is encountered in varying degrees of prevalence among the young children of most countries of Asia and Africa and in many of Central and South America. Vitamin A deficiency is perhaps underestimated as a threat to the life—and the sight—of children of most of the same areas where protein deficiency is also seen. Riboflavin deficiency, thiamine deficiency—beri-beri in its various forms—and a number of other deficiencies are still very much with us. Still, there is no evidence that the situation is getting worse. The food balance sheets on which postwar pessimism was based are imperfect instruments: when this writer was nutrition officer of FAO, he spent considerable time attempting to gauge such unknowns as figures for wasted food at the retail level and within families; that portion of the food supply which does not move within the channels of trade—the amount of food grown by the farmer for his family is very inaccurately known, particularly as regards fruits and vegetables, which tend to be underestimated. The nutritional standards against which available supplies are gauged are themselves being refined. As the results of additional experimental and clinical work become available, it is realized that a number of such standards—those for protein and calcium among others—were probably unnecessarily high. Even without such reevaluation, the evolution of food balance sheets—the only instrument we have to judge the race between food and population—make it apparent that most regions do show the same slow increase of per capita supplies exhibited by the world at large. It must be recognized, of course, that many of the worst nutritional scourges of mankind have been historically due as much to ignorance and to callousness as to lack of nutrients as such. Thousands of children die of protein deficiency in areas

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

where the proteins which would save them do in fact exist and are often consumed in sufficient amounts in the very households where infants and toddlers die for their lack: faulty understanding of the child's needs may be the main cause of his being denied some of the food consumed by his father and older siblings. As for man's inhumanity to man and its contribution to starvation, it could be illustrated by thousands of examples: from cereals being shipped from Ireland under the protection of naval guns during the famine to stocks being withheld during the Congo famine to keep prices up.

Certainly, as far as food is concerned, ours is not one world. The United States government rents twenty million acres from our farmers so that they will not grow food on them. A recent study made at Iowa State University suggests that sixty-two and a half million acres ought to be similarly retired so that surpluses will not continue to be created in relation to the present market. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Argentina and France have been, or are at present, involved in similar efforts to restrict production.

Nor is this idling of food production restricted to highly developed countries. A recent study estimates that Ghanaan farmers work only an average of two hours a day in the cocoa area, the wealthiest agricultural area of the country.

It is fair to say that in most areas of the world, the race between food and population would be more favorable to the development of adequate nutrition if the rate of population growth was decreased. But I believe that there is no ground for stating in 1964 that the nutritional state of the world is getting worse. It is not. And I believe that improvement in communication, availability of surpluses in certain countries, the existence of solid international organizations and the gradual improvement in international morality make large-scale famines—such as the Irish or the Bengali famine—less likely to occur in this era: except, perhaps, in Red China because of its alienation from the two richest blocs of countries. (It appears, moreover, that the food situation in China has improved noticeably in the past two years, making the recurrence of famine there more remote.)

V

The present, bad as it is, is no worse than the past and probably somewhat better. But what of the future? In absolute numbers,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the increase in population is likely to accelerate for some time. Can the food supply keep up? My contention is that, for better or for worse, it can and will.

First, let us consider conventional agriculture. FAO's figures indicate that 3.4 billion acres are at present under cultivation. This represents less than 11 per cent of the total land area of the world. A number of experts—Prasolov, Shantz, Zimmermann—estimate the area which can eventually be made arable at from 13 to 17 billion acres. Colin Clark, the director of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute of Oxford, uses the figure of 19 billion acres, but counts double-cropped tropical lands twice. (He considers, incidentally, that if the land were farmed as well as the Dutch farmers work their acres today, it would support 28 billion people on a Dutch diet; if Japanese standards of farming and nutrition were used, this area would support 95 billion people.)

The biggest potential increase of food production does not, however, come from the extension of the area under cultivation, but from the increase in the use of fertilizers. The phenomenal increase in food production in this country has actually been performed with a reduction in acreage farmed. By pre-World War I standards of cultivation, it took one-and-one-half acres to support an American. If such standards prevailed today, we would need to add at least 40 million acres to our farm area every ten years, or the equivalent of an additional Iowa every decade. In fact, we use the alternative—fertilizers. One ton of nitrogen is the equivalent of fourteen acres of good farmland. The use of between two and three hundred thousand tons of nitrogen (and corresponding amounts of other necessary elements) per decade has in fact obviated the need to discover another Iowa. Neither is our use of fertilizers as intensive as it is in Japan (where it is well over twice that employed here) or in Western Europe. (Incidentally, in spite of its already high standards of cultivation, Japan is still increasing its agricultural production at a rate of 3 per cent per year.) India, Africa, and most of Latin America use only an infinitesimal fraction of Japanese or Western amounts of fertilizer or use none at all. Garst has estimated that an expenditure of ten dollars an acre for fertilizers per year would alone add 50 to 100 per cent to the low yields in underdeveloped countries. Applying this investment to an area of 1.5 billion acres would be equivalent to adding at least 750,000,000 acres to the crop areas of these countries, the equivalent of a continent bigger than North America. It is interest-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing to note that this primacy of fertilizers was recognized relatively late. In this country, the recognition dates back only to World War II, and has accelerated since the Korean conflict. In Japan, it also dates back to 1950 or thereabout. And the leaders of the U.S.S.R. only last year realized that a large scale increase in fertilizer output would be easier and more rewarding than the extension of cultivation to the "virgin lands."

There are many other advances in agriculture which have yet to be applied on a large scale. The identification of necessary trace elements and their incorporation into fertilizers and feeds have opened vast areas to cultivation and husbandry in Australia and elsewhere. Selective breeding of plants and animals has permitted the development of species with superior hardiness and increased yields, in some cases multiplied them by a large factor. In the greater part of the world such work has hardly begun. Advances in animal health and nutrition have permitted the mass production of milk and eggs in indoor conditioners on a scale which was unimaginable a few years ago—the city of Los Angeles is now an important and efficient dairy area. In some large installations, computers programmed to calculate the cheapest method of providing a diet of known energy and known content in ten essential amino acids, total protein, and other nutrients, automatically set the controls which will mix basic staples providing the cheapest adequate poultry diet as they are informed of the latest commodity prices. Herbicides increase yields, pesticides prevent losses from rodents, insects, and fungi—in many underdeveloped countries one-quarter of the crops is lost before it reaches the consumer. Certain methods of preservation of foods by radiation have just been approved by the Food and Drug Administration. Control of weather by seeding clouds for rain, speeding cloud formation by heating lakes by atomic energy, desalinization of brackish water by various methods are entering the realm of practical feasibility.

Powerful though these methods of "classical" agriculture are, I believe that they will, within the lifetime of most present inhabitants of this planet, be left far behind as methods of food production. The general public is still unaware of some new developments, their promise, and the extent of the means likely to be expended in the next decade in bringing the results of research to practical application. Large scale manufacture of food from petrochemicals started during World War II, when the Germans manufactured synthetic fats to feed forced labor groups. These fats did

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not conform to desirable standards of taste or safety (they contained a high proportion of branched chain fatty acids not normally found in nature and probably not fully metabolized, and retained a petroleum-like odor). After the war, interest in "synthetic" fats persisted for a while during the years when it appeared that a shortage of natural fats was likely to be protracted. During the fifties, little or no work was done in this field, but recently a number of the largest international oil companies have again become actively interested, and pilot plants are now in operation. Fatty acids, triglycerides (the constituents of our common oils and fats), and fully metabolizable simpler compounds, such as 1, 3-butanediol, may soon be manufactured at very low cost for human food and animal feeds. While the promise of abundant and cheap atomic power, widely heralded for the morrow in the more immediate postwar period, has shown itself slow to be realized, abundant and cheap atomic power is coming, and it may well be that oil will be increasingly a raw material for food and plastics rather than a fuel.

As a potential source of food production, photosynthesis can be used much more efficiently in algae than in higher plants. With proper mineral fertilization and with the proper rate of removal of the finished products, one square meter may serve to support algae production sufficient to feed a man. And for a large proportion the calories produced—as much as one half—are derived from protein; vitamins are also produced into the bargain. Several universities are working with a number of species, chlorella in particular, and again large industrial firms are yearly becoming more interested. The problems entailed in passing from the theoretically feasible to the economically feasible are formidable, but their solution is likely to be hastened for an unexpected reason. Interplanetary travel of long duration and the organization of distant stations require not only recycling of oxygen and waste water; they necessitate the fabrication of food and its integration into the recycling of oxygen, water, and excreta. Over the next two decades, an increasing fraction of the several billion dollars which the United States and the Soviet Union will spend every year for space travel is going to be channelled into life support systems. The money spent in the aggregate on new methods of food production will probably, during that period, dwarf the cost of the Manhattan Project. In many ways, we may have in space exploration what William James called "the moral equivalent of war."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We will probably also have in it the technological equivalent of war—without the corresponding losses in men and in resources. The usable "fall-out" of such research is likely to be enormous. Certainly if economical harnessing of photosynthesis—through biological units or directly—can be realized under the hostile interplanetary, lunar, or martian conditions, it should become relatively easy to put it into effect on earth. All this is no longer science fiction. It is as much of a reality as the federal income tax. Obviously, a breakthrough in this field could for centuries altogether remove food as a limiting factor to population growth.

VI

I hope I have said enough to show how dangerous it may turn out to be for the population problem to have been linked so closely to food as a number of writers have done. These have generally been conservationists and social scientists rather than agricultural or nutritional scientists, concerned—rightly—with the effects of crowding which they had observed. At the same time, not sure that the public and governments would agree with them that there was cause for concern—and action—based on these grounds, they have turned to the threat of a worldwide shortage of food as an easily understood, imperative reason for large scale limitation of births. Had they consulted nutritionists, agriculturists, and chemists, they might have chosen a more appropriate battle ground. For if we can feed an ever-increasing number of people—even if we feed them as badly as many of our contemporaries are fed—their argument fails. And yet there is a need for the establishment as soon as possible of a sound population policy for the world at large.

There is of course, another good reason for not tying population control to food: it is that this tie eliminates from contention rich countries—and in particular surplus countries such as ours. Our population is increasing faster than it ever has; our major nutrition problem is overweight, our major agricultural problem is our ever-mounting excess production. Does anyone seriously believe this means that we have no population problem? Our housing problems, our traffic problem, the insufficiency of the number of our hospitals, of community recreation facilities, our pollution problems are all facets of our population problem. I may add that in this country we compound the population problem by the migratory habits of our people: from rural farm areas to urban areas

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and especially to "metropolitan" areas (212 such areas now have 84 per cent of our population), from low income areas to high income areas; from the East and Midwest to the South and Southwest; from all areas to the Pacific Coast; from the center of cities to suburbs which soon form gigantic conurbations, with circumstances everywhere pushing our Negroes into the deteriorating centers of large cities. All this has occurred without any master plan, and with public services continuously lagging behind both growth and migrations.

Let us conclude with one specific example: 4 million students were enrolled in U. S. colleges and graduate schools in 1960. The Bureau of the Census estimates that 6 million will seek admission or continued enrollment in 1965, 8 in 1970, 10 in 1975, 12 in 1980. No one questions our ability to feed these youngsters. But are we as a nation at all prepared for a tripling of the size of our colleges and universities in 15 years? We need a population policy and we need it soon, for the United States as well as for the world at large, not because we cannot step up food production, but because we believe, like Plato and Aristotle, in trying for excellence rather than in rejoicing in numbers. Excellent human subjects will not be produced without abundance of cultural as well as material resources. We are likely to run out of copper before we run out of food, of paper before we run out of copper. We are short even in this country now of housing, of hospitals, and of educational institutions. Needs are, of course, infinitely more acute in most other areas of the world. Is it not more sensible to focus on these unmet needs, which are present for all to see, than to argue from inaccurate projections which furthermore do not support the unnecessary argument?

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DANIEL BELL

Twelve Modes of Prediction—A Preliminary Sorting of Approaches in the Social Sciences

IN THE *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (1830–1842), perhaps the last individual attempt to write a synoptic account of human knowledge, August Comte cited as an example of the inherently unknowable, the chemical composition of the distant stars and the question of whether there were "organized beings living on their surface."[1] Within two decades, Gustave Kirchoff applied spectrum analysis to the stars and provided that very knowledge which Comte had declared to be impossible. And, as space probes reach Mars and Venus, we shall be in a position to answer the second question of the nature of the forms of life, if any, on the solar planets.

Few persons today would declare with confidence that something is unknowable. So secure is the dominion of science that the obverse attitude rules: today we feel that there are no inherent secrets in the universe, and that all is open; and this is one of the significant changes in the modern moral temper. And yet, every generation now feels that the foundation of its knowledge is inadequate and that the social forms as we know them are bound to change. We expect that science and technology will rework the map of society and no one any longer challenges their claims. One

This paper is not—could any be?—an exhaustive or even comprehensive survey of modes of prediction in human affairs. It was written originally for the *Futuribles* project, sponsored by the Ford Foundation, and published in French under the title "Douze Modes de Prevision." The *Futuribles* project, under the direction of Bertrand de Jouvenel, is an effort to stimulate interest and work in the field of "social conjecture." After a year, it had published about fifty studies, and this paper was intended as a stocktaking venture, i.e. on the basis of the *Futuribles* papers and other work to undertake, as the sub-title suggests, a preliminary sorting of approaches in the social sciences.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the hallmarks of "modernity" is the awareness of change and the struggling effort to control the direction and pace of change.

The problem of any science is to understand the sources of change. And in this respect social science is fairly recent. The great intellectual barrier was that men always thought they knew the sources of change, which were also the sources of power, namely the personal will of kings, lawgivers and prophets, those who governed states, drafted laws, and established or reinforced religious beliefs. But only gradually did men realize that behind these visible sets of acts were such intangible nets as customs, institutions, and cultures, which subtly constrained and set the boundaries of social action. At the same time came the slow realization that there were "social forces" which generated change, whether they be impersonal processes such as demographic pressures (increased size and density of populations), technology, and science, or conscious strivings such as the demands of disadvantaged groups for equality or social mobility.

It is the modern *hubris* that we can effect the conscious transformation of society. What stands in our favor is that knowledge is cumulative. And, within the open community of science, it is self-corrective. We know more of economics than the "Political Arithmetick" of Sir William Petty, who started us out with "Number, Weight and Measure." We have clearer conceptual distinctions than Herbert Spencer and his primitive efforts at establishing social differentiation. We have more complex statistical tools than Pearson or Galton. What is more important, perhaps, is that we have a better appreciation of method. For what method allows us to do is to reformulate insight into consistent explanation. More than two thousand years ago, Plato wrote: ". . . it is in sleep that the wild beast in our nature stands up and walks about naked, and there is no conceivable folly or shame or crime, however unnatural, not excepting incest or parricide, of which such a nature may not be guilty. In all of us, even in good men, there is a latent wild beast which peers out in sleep."[2] Yet it was only in *The Interpretation of Dreams* that such wisdom was assimilated into a coherent theory which explained not only the existence of such impulses but the mechanisms of control through the idea of wishes and repressions.

In this emphasis on method, the function of conjecture is not prediction but explanation.[3] Prediction can be derived from experience, such as a farmer's expectation of crop production, without knowledge of the reasons why. Only with adequate explanation—an

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

understanding of the relevant variables—can one seek to control or transform a situation. Conjecture, in this sense, stipulates a set of future predicates whose appearance should be explainable from theory. Prediction without explanation is insight, experience, or luck.

In this sense, too, the function of prediction is to reduce uncertainty. By stipulating, and thus testing, a hypothesis, one is able to verify the relevant factors which account for a predicted or observed change. For this reason, in distinguishing different kinds of prediction in the social sciences, I am ruling out historical theories of rhythms, periodizations and cycles—in most instances, recurrence is not really identity but, at best, analogy—wherein the investigator seeks for the Pythagorean number which rules the wheel of history or imposes a diachronic pattern on the rise and fall of civilizations.[4]

In sorting out the different modes of prediction, I shall not be concerned with the relevant methodological tests of adequacy. The sorting is an effort to illustrate the *range* of approaches in the art of conjecture. The different modes are not "equal" to each other in the level of generality or scope of comprehension. Inevitably there are some overlaps, and a stricter reading might show that one mode subsumes some of the others. But to the extent that one can sort out a distinct number of types, the next step would be to order them in some logical classification and specify which mode of conjecture would be appropriate to what kind of problem.

* * *

1. *Social Physics*

The Comtean quest for "social laws" in which some basic regularities of human behavior or some major variables such as mass, pressure, gravitational velocity could be synthesized into a set of formulas akin to Newtonian or the later statistical mechanics of Willard Gibbs finds few serious adherents in the social sciences today. Yet one such model, Marx's "laws of motion" of capitalism, has been one of the most influential ideological doctrines of the past century (in but three years we celebrate the centennial of *Das Kapital*), and to the extent that it is still an element in the Bolshevik belief-system, it is a factor in assessing Communist policy.

Questions of politics apart, the Marxian model is still one of the most comprehensive efforts to create a large-scale system of prediction based on the interaction of a few crucial variables. Granted

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the model has not worked, its "logic" is worth explication. Marx began, one may recall, with the components of value as constant capital, variable capital, and surplus value (c+v+s), and from these, two ratios become central. One is the rate of surplus value, $s/v = s'$, and the other is the organic composition of capital, the relationship of labor to materials and machinery, $c/c+v = q$. These two are the primary variables from which the crucial variable, the rate of profit, is derived: $p = s'(1-q)$.

The "law of the falling rate of profit," which Marx derives from these equations, is the key to the system. Each capitalist, trying to increase his own profit, substitutes more constant for variable capital and ends by killing off the total of profits. Out of this tendency, Marx derives the corollary social consequencies: the reserve army of the unemployed, the impoverishment of labor, the centralization (trustification) of capital, a deepening series of crises, the intensification of exploitation, sharpening class struggle, etc.

One can point out, as Paul Samuelson has,[5] that the model rests on the difficult assumption of fixed coefficients and single techniques, and that modern tools such as linear programming can allow the substitution, analytically, of many alternative techniques in working out adequate production functions (i.e. the combination of units of labor and capital). Or one can argue the empirical point, as Strachey and others have, that the economic system is not autonomous and that a regulating agency, the State, can readjust the "equations" in response to political pressures.

The crucial element in the Marxian model, which defines it as "social physics", is that these actions took place independent of the will of any single individual or, in the long run, of any groups of individuals. The interesting question remains whether such comprehensive, dynamic models are possible, even in the simplified versions such as Marx employed, and what would be the central variables that one would select to describe social and political interaction.

A different kind of "law," which has attracted increasing attention in recent years, is that of "logistics curves," which various authors have fitted to different time-series. The most startling of these are the laws of "exponential growth" or the "doubling rates" of different social phenomena.

The late Louis Ridenour has pointed out that the holdings of university libraries have doubled every eleven years since 1870,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that long-distance telephone calls have doubled every seven-and-a-half years, that since Nellie Bly went around the world in 1889 the time for circumventing the globe decreased exponentially between 1889 and 1928 by a factor of two every quarter-century, and since the introduction of aircraft the rate of change has markedly increased. Derek Price has shown that the number of journals in science has increased by a factor of ten every half-century since 1790, and the number of abstracting journals has followed precisely the same law, multiplying by a factor of ten every half-century. At a certain point in these growths, "critical magnitudes" are reached and logistic curves react to "ceiling conditions" in different ways.[6]

Ridenour, in fitting a number of such curves, has argued that the process of growth and saturation in social change follows the so-called "autocatalytic" processes of chemistry and biology. Price has sought to identify more differentiated modes of "reaction." He writes: ". . . growths that have long been exponential seem not to relish the idea of being flattened. Before they reach a midpoint they begin to twist and turn, and, like impost spirits, change their shapes and definitions so as not to be exterminated against that terrible ceiling. Or in less anthropomorphic terms, the cybernetic phenomenon of hunting sets in and the curve begins to oscillate wildly. . . . [One] finds two variants of the traditional logistic curve that are more frequent than the plain S-shaped ogive." One variant is the phenomenon, first recognized by Gerald Holton,[6] of "escalation," in which growth curves "pick up" from earlier, related curves in repeated sequence. The other variant is one of violent fluctuation with a logarithmic decline to a stable maximum or to zero. This leads Price to conclude: "All the apparently exponential laws of growth must ultimately be logistic, and this implies a period of crisis extending on either side of the date of midpoint for about a generation. The outcome of the battle at the point of no return is complete reorganization or violent fluctuation or death of the variable."[7]

If Ridenour's equations hold true and Price's generalizations regarding the "midpoints" of exponential curves are valid, one has here a powerful means of identifying processes of social change and making predictions about the outcomes.

And yet, the history of earlier, similar efforts to find underlying "laws" of variegated social phenomena should give us pause. In the late 1930s, the Harvard philologist George Kingsley Zipf reported remarkable regularities in such diverse phenomena as the distribu-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of cities by size, the relation of rank order to frequency of word occurrences, the distribution of the frequencies of publication of scientists, and many others. Zipf tried to bring all these under the roof of a single mathematical relationship, the harmonic law, and devised a pseudo-explanation which he dubbed the "law of least effort." Fifteen years or so later, Herbert Simon was able to show that the similarity of these statistical distributions was not due to any overriding law but was a consequence of the similarity in the structure of the underlying probability mechanisms.[8]

Yet this corrective effort has given us an interesting tool of prediction. For in the construction of such probability models we encounter stochastic processes,[9] where the sequences of outcomes are uncertain and where we are forced to build "conjecturing" into the structure of the model. The development of stochastic reasoning, using probabilistic models, should allow us to do better estimating in problems involving frequency distributions, as well as those involving future outcomes involving the choice of further information.

Some recent efforts to create a "social physics" devolve from the work of the mathematical biologist Nicholas Rashevsky. One of his students, Anatol Rapoport, has written a book, *Fights, Games, and Debates*[10] which sets up mathematical models for mass action and descriptive models for conflict situations. One section of the book deals with arms races, and the equations that are developed seek to describe the development of actual arms races in the same way that the equations of thermodynamics are meant to describe the actual behavior of gases. One intention of the new social physics is to set up general probabilistic laws governing behavior in game-like situations.

One older tradition of social physics is worth mentioning: the efforts, initiated originally by Robert Park, to explain (and predict) the growth of cities and other aspects of social ecology (the spatial distribution of units) as a product of impersonal forces such as competition or technology rather than willed or planned volitional efforts. Among geographers and some sociologists, this effort to create a so-called "biotic" or sub-social framework continues.[11]

2. *Trends and Forecasts*

The most familiar form of prediction involves some form of extrapolation from time-series either as straight-line projections, cycli-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cal turns, or alternative models based on some definition of upper and lower limits. One can say that this mode of prediction differs from "social physics" in that the latter seeks some general principle, or attempts to create a closed system; trend analysis takes some selected area and seeks to make a more limited prediction, *ceteris paribus.*

The three major kinds of trend analysis have been economic forecasting, demography, and technological change. The assumptions of economic forecasting itself would require a long paper,[12] so I restrict myself to the other two.

Demographic prediction, in the large, has always been under the long shadow of Thomas Malthus.[13] While the exact relationship between the arithmetical growth rate of food supply and the geometrical tendency of population increase is now suspect, the neo-Malthusians still hold to the general view that the present is in some way an exceptional period and that at some point, either fifty or a hundred years from now, the world "will have begun to go back," as Sir Charles Darwin has put it, "into . . . its normal state, the state in which natural selection operates by producing too many people, so that the excess simply cannot survive."[14]

Sir Charles has made some specific estimates. He feels that by A.D. 2000 the world population will be four billion. He cites the fact that between 1947 and 1953 agriculture production increased by 8 per cent but the world's population by 11 per cent, "so that the world was hungrier at the end than at the beginning. And in fifty years, the four billion will be hungrier than the two and a half billion in 1950."

Leaving aside the question of the definition of hunger, the basic assumptions are threefold: that human population has followed the availability of food supply so consistently that the human animal is responding to biological conditions in no different manner than other animals; that improvements in technology cannot keep pace with the rise of populations; that the voluntary limitations on birth cannot be accepted by the whole of humanity, so that those who limited births would be swallowed up by the others who did not. Each of these is open to question in some manner. As to the first, while this may be true of primitive societies, it is less so of modern industrial countries where the standard of living becomes more controlling of the number of births; the second is still an open question; the third raises vital political questions most notably today about the role of China and secondarily of India in the desires of their gov-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ernments to control or expand population in these countries and the checks thereon.

What this does point up is that demographic prediction, involving individual and aggregate decisions, the role of custom and the adaptation to standard of living, the influence of education and new class styles, the relationship to economic development and the political role of government, is one of the areas where systematic scrutiny of the conditions of prediction would yield importont results.

The area of "technological trends" could lead us very easily, and temptingly, into the alluring field of science fiction. Here one's imagination could quickly climb William James's "faith ladder" and turn possibilities into probabilities and probabilities into certainties. While one would assume that the prediction of invention should be fairly easy, since the antecedent conditions are highly structured, the interesting thing is that a review of such predictions finds them to be singularly inept.[15] Reality, it seems, is more recalcitrant than the imagination.

As S. Lilley writes: "The moral for forecasters is: Do not predict individual inventions in detail—that is usually a waste of time." The correct method, he argues, is twofold: extrapolation of present trends, and predictions in the form possibilities. "The predictor need not be concerned with how a technical problem is to be solved, but only whether it will be solved or not." This is based on the principle of "equivalent invention" enunciated by S. L. Gilfallen. Gilfallen, writing in 1937, cites the problem of flying in fog. There were twenty-five means suggested of solving it. To predict which means would be the most successful was hazardous; but one could predict that the problem was solvable. "The point is that we are not concerned with the prediction of inventions, only with their effects. And the fact that there are almost always many possible inventions that could lead to the same desired effect enormously increases the chances of successful prediction," Lilley concludes.

The methods of political forecasting—the work of the Gallup organization, the University of Michigan surveys, the Columbia University studies under Paul Lazarsfeld, the work of *Demoskopie* in Germany and *Sondages* in France—would require a separate paper. Strictly speaking, this is not trend analysis, though past trends may be important in such crucial questions as how to allocate "undecided"

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

voters. At bottom the success of the forecast is a function of the accuracy of the sample and the reduction of interviewer bias. Certain presumed disqualifying effects, such as the poll itself creating a "bandwagon," can be discounted. The success of *ex post facto* explanation is a function of the "process analysis" (i.e. the selection of relevant determinants such as the mass media, or personal influence) employed.[16]

One form of trend analysis is beautifully illustrated in the *Futuribles* paper of Colin Clark. It might be described as setting forth the "conditions of fit."[17] Professor Clark takes as a problem the statement of M. Manshold, the vice-president of the European Economic Community, that for economic equilibrium to be attained in Europe, some eight million persons within the Common Market area dependent on agriculture have to be transferred to other sectors. Clark seeks to establish the rates of transfer which might obtain for each country. He does this by computing two formulas; one, on the production side, deals with the number of persons necessary in the agricultural sector to support the food demands in the country (thus in France, in 1957–58 one agricultural worker provided food for ten non-agricultural workers; in New Zealand, the ratio was one to sixty-two); on the demand side, he calculates the rate at which demand per head for any food product may be expected to increase, based on population growth, income rise, and the elasticity of demand for particular products. At the intersects of the two curves one can chart the rates of reduction of agricultural workers for each country.

Since there is a long history of experience on the nature of income elasticities in the demand for products, Clark has been able to work out his formulas with some exactitude. The theoretical foundation, on the demand side, derives from the observations made less than a hundred years ago by the German statistician Christian Engel: as national incomes rise, a smaller proportion of the increment is spent for food. On the production, or supply, side, one can calculate the increased yields per acre on the basis of the amount of fertilizer, and the types of farming used.

In the Common Market countries, the reduction of eight million persons dependent on agriculture means the transfer of *one-third* of the farm population to other areas. Professor Clark computes, on the basis of rates of change obtaining since 1950, this change will be achieved in ten years in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. In Italy, where the size of the agricultural population before

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1950 had not changed for more than fifty years, the new methods of farming, combined with the rising national income, and reduced marginal increases for food, the agricultural labor force has been declining at a gross rate of 2 per cent per annum, or, if a reduction of one-third in the labor force is the target, it would take thirty years to reach that figure in Italy.

It is rare to have social change pinpointed over time with the exactness that Clark attempts. Since the politics, as well as the economics, of these countries will be affected by these population transfers, it would be useful to have a sociologist or a political scientist "overlay" Clark's predictions with some similar statement of expected social consequences (e.g. how will the voting patterns in these countries change as a result of the reduction of an agricultural labor force by a third, in ten or thirty years). Clark has set up an "independent variable" (a product, it is true, of more general causes). It would be fascinating to see if the dependent consequences could be charted as well.

3. *Structural Certainties*

In his *Essai sur l'Art de la Conjecture,* Bertrand de Jouvenel describes an *order of events* that are legally prescribed and traditionally reinforced, which he calls "les certitudes structurelles." This type of ordering differs logically from trends, because it does not describe processes or time-series that are derivable from aggregate behavior, or which may be immanent, but which are based on custom and law.

M. de Jouvenel's example is an interesting one. He describes the problem of a Democrat in 1962 who might like to succeed President Kennedy. He knows that there will be a president of the United States, that elections will take place on the second Tuesday of November in 1964 and 1968, that unless he has a physical accident, John F. Kennedy will be the Democratic candidate, since the party customarily designates the existing office holder. But Kennedy will not be a candidate in 1968 (assuming his re-election in 1964) because a constitutional amendment forbids a third successive term.

Of course M. de Jouvenel, like all of us, had no way of knowing that a physical accident would prevent John F. Kennedy from filling out his term. Yet the "structural certainties" remain. In this instance it is now taken for granted that Lyndon Johnson will be renominated

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in 1964, and, because he filled out less than half of his predecessor's term, he might well be a candidate for re-election in 1968 as well.

M. de Jouvenel had taken this "prosaic" set of facts to illustrate that much of human behavior can be predicted because of such structural certainties. Yet the concept is useful because it is one of the ways of ranking the stability of different kinds of political and social systems. (What are the structural certainties in the Brazilian political system?) This concept is analogous to what sociologists call "institutionalized behavior," and in any established social system, the chief problem is to define the prescribed norms, the modes of conformity, and the limits of legitimate deviation from such institutional norms which are allowed by the system.[18]

4. *The Operational Code* (or Les Règles de la Jeu)

Structural certainties (or institutionalized behavior) are based on a known or open mode of conduct, the rules of which are prescribed and reinforced by legal or moral sanction, and this allows one type of prediction. But there is another form of conduct which is usually implicit, rather than explicit, often unrealized even by the actors, and which has to be inferred and explicated by an analyst. This form is the "operational code" or what might be called the "do's and don't's" of conduct, the implicit rules of the game.

In some instances, such as Machiavelli's *The Prince,* these are normative prescriptions for a ruler. But in other cases these are efforts to discern an underlying pattern of behavior, which is either an adaptive mechanism (or rules of strategy) for a political group, or simply a series of adjustments which permit political survival.

One pioneer in this type of analysis, and prediction, is Nathan Leites. In several books on the Soviet Union and on France, he has sought to codify rules.[19] In the case of the Soviet Union, Leites has sought to establish the basic mode of Bolshevik conduct, which he derives from various maxims and precepts of Communist patristic writings; but he roots this, equally, in some psychoanalytic hypotheses regarding Bolshevik character structure. In his study of France, he has sought to delineate the "rules of the game" as observed in parliamentary behavior.

In an analogous but broader fashion, there have been attempts to establish the "national style" of a country. The national style, or the characteristic way of response, is a compound of the values and national character of a country. It is the distinctive way of meeting

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the problems of order and adaptation, of conflict and consensus, of individual ends and communal welfare, that confront any country. It has been observed, for example, that the American "style" is one that stresses action and achievement, is fundamentally optimistic, believes that life is tractable, the environment manipulable, and that all political problems can be "solved." This does not assume a distribution of such traits among all the persons in the country in any mechanical notion of national character; but it does assume that there is a characteristic way of responding to problems, which is typified in the leadership; and to this extent it can serve as a rough guide to political action.[20]

5. *The Operational System*

The "operational code" is an attempt to infer styles of conduct derived from psychological hypotheses or the value patterns of social groups or countries. The "operational system," an older form of analysis, is an effort to specify the underlying source of "renewable power" in a society regardless of the momentary fluctuations of office. Here, too, as in the case of "social physics," the most direct effort derives from Marx, and the classic analysis of this "model" in his *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.[21]

Louis Bonaparte, in Marx's analysis, is an "adventurer" representing no class or social group, although basing himself on the Society of December 10th and the *Lumpenproletariat*.[22] To maintain power, he has to play off one group against another, representing himself at first for the peasantry, and then against them, for the workers, and then against them. Industry and trade prosper in hothouse fashion under the strong government. But the Bonapartist *Lumpenproletariat* is to enrich itself. "This contradictory task of the man explains the contradictions of his government, the confused groping hither and thither which seeks now to win, now to humiliate first one class and then another and arrays all of them uniformly against him, whose practical uncertainty forms a highly comical contrast to the imperious categorical style of the government decrees, a style which is copied obsequiously from the Uncle."

The executive authority has made itself an independent power. But underneath there is still a class system. "Bonaparte feels it to be his mission to safeguard 'civil order.' But the strength of this civil order lies in the middle class. He looks on himself, therefore, as the representative of the middle class and issues decrees in this sense.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nevertheless, he is somebody solely due to the fact that he has broken the political power of this middle class and daily breaks it anew. Consequently, he looks on himself as the adversary of the political and literary power of the middle class. *But by protecting its material power, he generates its political power anew.*"[23]

The point here is that a renewable means of power provides continuity for a social system. Whether the specific historical analysis is right or wrong, methodologically, it does sensitize us to look for the institutional sources of power and to specify levels of analysis. Where a system is established (say, property in land), it is "neutral" as to "who" has power. As Schumpeter has said, the rise and fall of social classes is the rise and fall of families, but the *mode of defining classes* may remain a constant. In specifying levels of analysis, we can try to see what kind of political efforts seek to change the system itself, and which are changes *within* a system.

One of the problems of modern political analysis is that *many* "operational systems" coexist as modes of power.[24] In western democratic countries there is property, transferred through inheritance; technical skill, acquired by education; and political entrepreneurship, whose base is a mass mobilization; and each of these systems provides competing or overlapping routes to power. Yet the identification of such systems and the specification of the levels of analysis is a necessary condition for political prediction.

6. *Structural Requisites*

The idea of structural requisites focuses not on any underlying system but on the minimal set of concerns any government faces and it tries to identify "strains" or problems on the basis of the government's ability to manage those concerns. The list of what constitutes an invariant set of functions for any political system and the kinds of structures necessary to facilitate performance have varied with different authors. But what the approach does seek is a comprehensive typology which, in the words of one of these system-builders, Gabriel Almond, could allow the political analyst to "make precise comparisons relating the elements of the three sets—functions, structures, and styles—in the form of a series of probability statements."[25]

In the formulation by Almond, the product of the three sets would yield a matrix with several hundred cells, and an effort to sample frequencies over time by performances of these three sets would create a stupendous problem. Yet the effort to create a typol-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ogy is the first necessary step for distinguishing different kinds of political problems.[26]

Au fond, what this approach suggests is what the anthropologist Alexander Goldenweiser once called "the principle of limited possibilities." Goldenweiser was trying to "mediate" the argument between anthropologists on the question of diffusion or independent invention of techniques. Methodologically, he argued that the "relatively fixed features which determined the conditions of effective use" of an object indicated a necessary convergence of forms.[27] (One might say, analogously, that Pareto's *Tratto* of General Sociology is based on the same principle. In it, Pareto disregards the manifest political content of doctrines and seeks to establish a limited number of basic residues, derivations and sentiments, and in the combination of these to establish the basic political forms possible in society.)

Most of these theoretical efforts, if they ever come to fruition, would produce vast sociological "input-out" tables; but a rougher and readier use, implicitly, of the principle of limited possibilities indicates some of its predictive value. Thus, in 1954, Barrington Moore analyzed Soviet society in these terms.[28] According to Moore, the recruitment to a ruling group could be handled through *traditional* (inheritance or nepotism), *rational-technical* (skill), or *political* (party loyalty) criteria. The use of any one criterion limits the range of workable alternatives for the solution of problems requisite to the system. Industrialization requires high technical criteria, but the nature of the power struggle dictates that top jobs should go to trusted individuals, while the traditional modes of clique groups serve to protect individuals from the competition of those selected by the other two criteria. By setting up these three "ideal types" Moore posited a number of alternative combinations as predictors of the future direction of Soviet society. One important consequence of this simplified model was the prediction that terror had gone too far and that some new means of rationalization had to be found.

In a different sense, the principle of limited possibilities, by concentrating on the constraints in a system, indicates the limits of change. Edward F. Denison has argued that the institutional economic arrangements in the United States make it difficult to achieve a 5 or even 4 per cent growth rate as hoped for by both President Kennedy and Governor Rockefeller. By analyzing patterns of investment, sources of capital, tax policies, habits of consumption, etc., Denison argues that an upper limit of 3 per cent a year can be

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reached. Any other efforts would require some drastic changes in the institutional structure of the society with losses of different kinds of economic choice.[29]

7. *The Overriding Problem*

Leicester Webb's essay, "Political Future of Pakistan,"[30] provides an interesting illustration of political analysis and prediction which is pitched on the identification of a single overriding problem.

While pointing to the obvious problems of unifying a state whose territorial divisions are a thousand miles apart, whose two units speak different languages, whose population is 85 per cent illiterate and which lacks a viable political system, Webb finds that the chief problem which must be solved, before any efforts can be made to deal with the others, is the problem of a social solidarity which could be the foundation for a national identity.

The question of national identity has been singled out by Lucian Pye, for example, as the overriding problem in the creation of a viable political system in Burma.[31] Where Pye, though, locates the Burmese problem in the general set of cultural ambiguities (e.g. the contradiction of gentleness and violence in the culture), the Webb essay is more focused in that it points to a fundamental dilemma in Pakistan: the effort to use religious sentiments to create a secular state.

The unity of Pakistan lies in its adherence to Islam, yet Islamic thought, and the retrograde attitudes of the sect leaders, hinders the creation of a meaningful political entity. The anomaly, says Webb, is that Pakistan is a "religiously-based state . . . at loggerheads with its religious leaders." From the first, President Ayub has been conscious of this dilemma. In his public addresses he returns again and again to the theme: Pakistan needs an ideology; that ideology must be Islamic. But his two roles are in conflict. As the restorer of order and political innovator, he is of necessity a secularizer; as a solidarity maker he must appeal to religious sentiments. The answer, says Webb, is that there has to be a radical readjustment of Muslim religious thought to bring its precepts in line with new secular needs; and for this reason "Ayub is a religious as well as a political reformer."

In his paper, Webb indicates the steps that Ayub has to take to break the power of the local sect leaders and to create his own political institutions. There is a clear set of stipulations by which

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one can judge whether these steps can be taken, and to this extent the paper serves admirably as a means of predicting the course of Pakistan's political development.

The question whether in any society there is a single overriding problem is largely an empirical one. Yet methodologically it is useful to try and see if such a single problem might emerge, if not in the present, then in the future. In her book *New Nations,* Lucy Mair establishes a proposition that "the world of technology is one of large political units" and thus raises the question whether some of the new states "are big enough to stand on their own feet."[32] In his absorbing study of the breakdown of the Weimar Republic,[33] Professor Karl D. Bracher sets up a model (applicable, he feels, to the political breakdown of a number of democratic states) in which the turning point comes when the established regime confesses that some basic problem seems to be "insoluble." In Weimar Germany, Professor Bracher feels that the insoluble problem was unemployment, giving rise to a sense of despair in the regime and a loss of faith in the political system. One could argue that Algeria was one such problem for France in recent years. Or the failure of the Belgians to create an administrative machinery (as the British did in Pakistan, India, Nigeria, etc.) was the cardinal problem in the Congo.

8. *The Prime Mover*

In Marxian theory, again, the mode of production was the determinant, directly or indirectly, of the political, legal, and ideological forms of the society. There were always two difficulties with the theory. One was the difficulty of any monistic theory—that in explaining everything, it really explains nothing. The other was the ambiguity of the phrase "mode of production." At various times, Marx would talk of the forces of production, the techniques of production, the social relations, etc., but meanings shifted markedly. A number of writers felt that if the term had any meaning, it could only apply to technology. At one point, I identified fourteen different variables that could be included under "mode of production" if one wanted to use it analytically. Yet the general idea of the mode of production has had a powerful influence as the idea of a prime mover of history or prime determinant of social structure.

For analytical reasons, if not always for historical or empirical ones, there may be situations in which a single powerful force can be taken as the independent variable and a whole series of ancillary

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changes predicted as a consequence of changes in this independent variable. This is the method, for example, that Herman Kahn has adopted in his book *On Thermonuclear War* and in an unpublished study, "Deterrence and Defense in the Sixties and Seventies."[34]

As Kahn writes: "In a sense we are adopting an almost Marxian view of the world, with military technology replacing the special role that Marx assigned to the means of production as the major determinant of behavior, and with conflicts between nations replacing the class struggle."

It is not, of course, that other elements do not enter; surely political decision is the most decisive and is relatively autonomous, though one can say, after Skybolt, that missile technology has replaced steel production as the indicator of a strength among nations. But for purposes of analysis of future changes in a society, one may want to take a major determinant or prime mover and trace out its effects. The chief point that Kahn is making is that since 1945 there have been three major revolutions in the art of war, with consequent effects on the economy and political strategies of the two major duelists and their allies. By a "revolution" Kahn means a big change, such as the introduction of new sources of energy or a quantum jump in destructive power from a kiloton to a megaton—changes significant enough to render a prevailing strategic doctrine obsolete. "The year 1951," he writes, "is typical of the new era in which there is the introduction, full procurement, obsolescence, and phasing out of complete weapons systems without their ever having been used in war."

In the "mobilized societies" of the West, military technology, in its impact on the economic budget, in its stimulus of research and development, in its absorption of scientists, in the way it constrains certain political decisions (e.g. the need for overseas bases as a consequence of a weapons system), is in many respects a prime mover and can be studied with profit. Kahn has provided one model by setting up three hypothetical technologies for 1965, 1969 and 1973 (he was writing in 1961), and seeking to assess the alternative strategies and problems created by these changes. It is conjecture as a high art.

One can, for example, in examining the emerging states, look to social mobility as a major determinant of the domestic politics of the countries. One may feel that David Apter, for one, has gone too far in saying, "Assuming that no one is ever truly satisfied with the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system of social stratification other than conservatives, we find that *the* basic motive of politics then is a striving motive to expand mobility opportunities, either for some special group or for large segments of the society."[35] But one of the most fruitful perspectives adopted by modern sociology is to chart "mobility opportunities" as an index of political change in a society. Modernity, as Edward Shils once remarked, is the entry of masses *into* society. The extension of citizenship rights, the degree of participation, equality of opportunity—the conditions of unhindered social mobility—are a useful framework to organize the problems of political change.[36]

9. *Sequential Development*

Few persons today believe in a theory of social evolution in which each society passes through defined stages in moving from a simple to a complex state. Yet the phrases "economic development," "political development," and even "social development" do suggest that societies go through some sequential phases as they confront greater tasks and have to create specialized mechanisms to handle them.

Are there some ordered steps that one can identify, at least as an ideal type? In the construction of the theory of industrial society one notices the lineaments of such a theory. One source, clearly, is Emile Durkheim's *The Division of Labor in Society.* In accounting for the change from "mechanical" to "organic" solidarity, Durkheim posited a number of steps. Population increases give rise to certain densities. This leads, under certain conditions, to increased interaction and thereby to competition. Social units in competition (e.g. cities, or occupational guilds) can either engage in a war to the death or begin to differentiate into specialized and complementary units. The distinguishing aspect of modern society for Durkheim is the role of the division of labor in creating a more differentiated society.

Talcott Parsons, the American sociologist, has taken Durkheim's theory and tried to account for western institutional development in terms of a theory of structural differentiation.[37] Economic development is only possible when there is a separation of the household and the firm. Within the firm there goes on a renewed process of differentiation, separating planning from operations, later ownership from control, etc. In the society, functions such as education, recreation, and welfare that were once lodged within the family begin to

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be taken over by specialized agencies. In the political arena one finds differentiation in the rise of bureaucracy, etc.

To some extent, one can argue, such a theory overlaps the concept of "structural requisites." There are two differences. One is in perspective. The idea of structural requisites is from the viewpoint of the government, i.e. the minimal concerns of any government. The second is that a theory of structural differentiation implies some ordered sequence in the creation of more complex and more specialized agencies for the handling of tasks.

In the new states one has a great laboratory for predicting and testing such hypotheses. In many of these countries, basic functions of the society are concentrated in family and village groups. The onset of industrialization means a transfer of such functions to new and more specialized agencies. Can one say that logically or sociologically such development can be plotted?[38]

10. *Accounting Schemes*

By accounting schemes, I mean those efforts to sum up in a single case, or nation, or relatively closed social system, a "trial balance" which arrays all the major factors that play a role within that unit.[39]

The *Futuribles* essay of Professor Edmund R. Leach, "The Political Future of Burma," affords an illustration of this method.[40] Leach begins with the proposition that the existing situation in Burma ("or for that matter in any other country") may, in principle, be analyzed as the sum of a series of independent factors, *a, b, c, . . . n.* Social development is then seen as a series of progressions of a' through a to a'', and b' through b to b'', etc. But not all factors progress at the same pace, and a profile of the country at time II will have some but not all the factors of the country at time I.

In constructing a future profile of the country, some factors which are designated as constant could be predicted with a high degree of certainty; other factors are designated as probable, and still others as pure speculation. If one takes the speculations as a range of alternative possibilities and combines each with the constants, one would have a series of delimited conjectures ordered on some scale of probabilities.

In his empirical analysis, Leach distinguishes four groups of factors:

A. Factors with a high degree of built-in stability which, for any short-run historical period, can be treated as constant. These include,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for Burma, climate and topography, language, religion, the bureaucratic structure of the internal administration, and certain culturally-defined expectations.

B. Factors which are subject to more or less linear change, either in increase or decrease. Such rates of change are not immutable, but they do tend to be relatively stable over defined periods. This would include size of population and labor force, the state of communications (roads, railways, waterways), educational level of the population, numbers of trained personnel, capital resources available for investment.

C. Factors which are cyclical. Here the idea of a cycle becomes ambiguous. In business cycle theory one assumes a regularity of peaks and downturns, either long-wave (Kondratieff or Juglar) cycles or short-run cycles, based on an identification of specific determinants (rate of innovations, demand for money, etc.). In politics, the idea of a cycle is more a metaphor. This seems to be the case in Leach's examples: foreign policy ("the allies of yesterday are the enemies of today and the friends of tomorrow"); ruling types (using Pareto's metaphors of the "lions" and the "foxes," Leach assumes an alternation of "the politicians" and "the men of decisions"); age of government ("the longer an administration has been in office, the less vigorous its action"); age in government ("young men are vigorous, radical; old men incline to caution and conservatism"). Is there, here, truly a cycle?

D. Factors which are wholly fortuitous and unpredictable. These include, in Leach's itemization: the short-term objectives of active politicians; the coercive pressures of foreign powers; natural calamities, including international wars.

The historian, says Leach, tends to emphasize factors of the fourth class. But it may be, he says, that these day-to-day actions have only a "superficial and transient influence upon longer-term developmental sequences." Just as Durkheim sought to predict the rates of suicide in various systems, by seeking general causes (e.g. degree of cohesion) which were independent of any individual case, in a comparable way, says Leach, "those who seek to make political predictions can and should ignore completely the whole class of short-term political events." And Leach seeks to justify such exclusion on the ground that, seen over a pattern of decades, it is the "long-term developmental sequences" which matter, while the day-to-day events are of minor significance.

Two broad methodological questions can be raised. Can one dis-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

miss so easily the role of decisions, or what historians call turning points? The annexation of upper Burma by the British in 1885 and the consequent destruction of the existing governmental system down to the village level do not fall, as a factor, under the other classes. It was not wholly fortuitous, yet it was external to, and decisively transformed, the system. One can say that such classes of events, because they are outside the system, cannot be taken into account. But if this is so, then a crucial problem in the area of prediction has no place in the accounting scheme. One would have to exclude, therefore, from the possibility of prediction such events as the occurrence of the October Revolution (many people expected February), the rise of Tito, and similar turning points in the history of the countries of Europe.

Secondly, do we want to stop at an "inventory of factors"? Do we not need to specify in some way the skein of relationships so that we know not only classes of factors but their functional dependencies as well? In what way does a joint family system (a constant?) act to constrain certain types of economic development? Under what conditions do the constants change? Is there an ordering principle which can specify the relationship between the groupings as classes of functional relationships?

11. *Alternative Futures: the writing of "fictions"*

One of the simplest and oldest ways of conceiving, if not predicting, the future was to envisage the possibilities open to man and then create a fiction which in extreme form men call "utopia." (In a somewhat different and systematic sense, the construction of fictions was used by Jeremy Bentham to enlarge the mode of abstractions available to speculative minds, and, quite independently, more than a half-century later, Hans Vahinger was to elaborate this method in his famous book, *The Philosophy of "As If."* The "as if" was a construct, or fiction, which served a heuristic function. It allowed us to simplify our assumptions.[41])

In recent years, the writing of "alternative futures" has been a systematic technique of Rand and former Rand theorists, particularly Herman Kahn. (Curiously, and quite independently, apparently, of Bentham and Vahinger, they have called their fictions "scenarios.") What these theorists do is to sketch a paradigm ("an explicitly structured set of assumptions, definitions, typologies, conjectures, analyses, and questions")[42] and then construct a number of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

explicitly "alternative futures" which might come into being under stated conditions. Thus the alternative futures become guides to policy makers in sketching their own responses to the possible worlds that may emerge in the next decade.

The writing of a "scenario" is not itself a prediction: it is an explication of possibilities. What it is, in effect, is the step beyond the "accounting scheme" in the construction of a number of plausible profiles, and the explication of the assumptions which underlie each of these alternatives.

Herman Kahn, for example, has sketched a number of alternative world futures for the 1970s.[43] He has constructed what he has called Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta worlds and indicated the kinds of international orders or equilibria which might obtain in each. Working from an "accounting scheme" of constants, relatively predictable sequential developments, constraints, and the like, he tries to assess current political factors (e.g. a degree of U.S.-Soviet detente, the strains in NATO, etc.), the present and future military technology, and possible political factors, and then sketch the alternative results.

His Alpha world is one of arms control agreements; the U.S.S.R., Europe, Japan, and the U.S. relaxed and ideologically slack, China maintaining only a defensive military posture, etc. In a variant, Alpha-1, Japan has become the implicit guarantor of South Korea, Formosa, Malaysia and India, and Western Europe is united. In Alpha-2, there is a strong Franco-German Europe, and a rearmed Japan is tending to neutralism. But the basic condition is one of high stability and peace.

The Beta worlds are one of defined structural strains. For example: the U.S.S.R. is losing dominance over the world communist movement; Peking has a low-grade nuclear force; E.E.C. pursues moderately exclusionist trade policies, Japan, Germany and France have independent nuclear deterrents, the *Tiers Monde* develops hysterical and aggressive political movements, etc.

The Gamma worlds, of extensive multipolarity, see the break-up of the old alliances: China, France, Germany, Japan, and India develop or procure nuclear weapons, E.E.C. does not develop into a political community, middle-sized countries are on the verge of becoming nuclear powers because of the development of cheap fission (i.e. atom), though not yet expensive fusion (e.g. hydrogen) bombs.

In these projections, few sophisticated techniques (game

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

theory, systems analysis, cost-effectiveness ratios) are employed to sketch the future worlds. But what we do have is a systematic identification of relevant factors, and the combination of these, to create a coherent fiction or a set of alternative futures. And, to the extent that these alternative futures are realistic possibilities, one has a surer foundation for policy formulations to meet the various contingencies.

A different kind of experiment in conjecture is attempted by the writer in a forthcoming book, *The Post-Industrial Society.* It is, in essence, not a forecast, but a dissection of the recent past—the "prophetic past," in Chesterton's phrase—in order to identify the structural trends and structural possibilities in the society and to create an "as if" about the future. The study deals with the new role of military technology as constitutive of political decisions, the rise of scientists as a new constituency in the political process, the creation of a new "intellectual technology" (a short-hand term I use for cybernetics, decision theory, simulation, and other intellectual techniques that allow us a new way of dealing with the planning process) and other elements of structural change in the society. These changes are then projected forty years as an "as if" in order to see their impact on the composition of the labor force, class structure, elite groups, and the like. Clearly *that* world, forty years hence, will not materialize, for there are many unforeseen and "uncontrollable" variables (particularly the political weights of the new nations and their own commitments) which will shape the reality of that time. But if the "as if," as a rational projection of structural possibilities in the society, does have some heuristic validity, by comparing that model with the reality, one might then be able to gain a clearer sense of the actual agencies of social change that were operative in that time.

12. *Decision Theory*

One includes in decision theory a wide assortment of new techniques: linear programming, utility preference theory, game theory, simulation, etc. Strictly speaking, decision theory is not predictive because it is normative: it seeks to specify probable outcomes if one or another choice is made. The problem, then, is its adequacy as a tool for the policy-maker. M. de Jouvenel has indicated one of the problems in game theory, the problem of agreement on relative values (the assignment of utilities).[44] Any

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adequate discussion would have to go far beyond the length of this paper. The singular point to be noted, however, is that any concern with prediction eventually must explore in detail the formalization procedures of decision theory and seek to assess in what way they are useful in the art of conjecture.

In the political realm—where one seeks to assess the intentions as well as capabilities of one's opponents—where does one begin? One technique worth exploring—though not strictly within mathematical decision theory—is "political gaming" or "simulation." In effect, these are political mock wars. One can, using the Rand technique, set up actual teams and allow them to work out a political game as armies work out a war game under simulated conditions of diplomatic negotiations, or one can, with a computer, simulate various situations and work out the alternative strategies and likely outcomes under hypothecated conditions. As with any formalization technique, the added knowledge comes from a specification of the likely variables and an awareness of the range of outcomes, rather than from new "wisdom".[45]

Most of the difficulties of politics—unlike probability situations, which are based on repeated experiments—is that decisions often have a "once-in-a-lifetime" consequence. A crucial question, therefore, is whether probabilistic methods can be used for political decision-making. In practice, one does this roughly by asking a number of "experts" and then weighing their advice. Is it possible, as L. J. Savage, for example, believes, that one can take expert opinion as a form of experiment and calculate *a priori* probabilities as a result?

But it is at this point that one runs the risk of the rationalist fallacy of believing that there is a true optimal path for any decision. One of the most heartening developments is the recognition of the "existentialist" element which has entered into modern utility theory, itself the foundation of so much of the work of rational prediction. It used to be that in choosing a strategy in a "game against nature" (i.e. uncontrolled situations), one could follow a maximin path (i.e. go for broke) or a minimax route (i.e. seek to cut one's losses). Now a third strategy has appeared: one can choose, depending on temperament and values, a maximin or a minimax throw, but then, statistically one can hedge one's bet by an added probability which has been termed so neatly, "the criterion of regret." Now clearly, the man who invented that has learned the lessons of love and politics.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

Why does one seek to predict? This is an era in which society has become "future-oriented" in all dimensions: a government has to anticipate future problems; an enterprise has to plan for future needs; an individual is forced to think of long-range career choices. And all of these are regarded as possible of doing. The government of the United States, for example, makes national estimates in which the intentions and capabilities of opponents are evaluated, and policy is formulated on the basis of these short-run and long-run estimates. Business firms now make regular five-year budgets and even twenty-year projections to anticipate future capital needs, market and product changes, plant location, and the like. Individuals at an early age begin to consider occupational choices and plan for university and later career life. If none of us can wholly predict the future, what we do in these actions, in the felicitous phrase used by Dennis Gabor, is seek to "invent the future."[46]

In the light of all this, what is remarkable is how little effort has been made, intellectually, to deal with the problems of conjecture. In few of the cases are there genuine predictions of the order: these are the changes that I think will take place; these are the reasons why I think these changes will occur, etc. Most of the works analyzed above seek to specify the problems which countries confront, but only rarely is the further effort made such as: if the problems are solved this way, then the following might happen; or: these are the probabilities that the problem will be handled in this fashion. Yet one should not derogate such efforts. The correct identification of relevant problems is obviously the first step in the conjecture about the future; it is easier to make because it tends to be an extrapolation of the present.

I would like to put forth some problem areas for future investigation which, on the basis of the works surveyed, seem most promising. These are simply some suggestions, necessarily brief, of the productive leads derived from the works analyzed. (Necessarily, too, I cannot within the limits of space and competence detail the scope of these proposals; what I can do is to argue briefly their rationale.)

* * * *

1. *The Planning Process*

A future-oriented society necessarily commits itself more and more to the idea of planning. This is the chief means of inventing

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the future. Most of the new states that have come onto the world scene in the last decade have ambitious planning schemes; most of the older societies, to some degree or other, are engaged in planning.

One plans, of course, for different ends; one plans in different ways (from centralized administrative to "indicative" planning); one uses different techniques (input-output schemes, systems analysis, shadow prices, simulation). One plans proportions between economic sectors; one does physical planning, as in the layout of cities; one plans for "guided mobility," i.e. the planned transfer from farms to cities. In all these instances, there is an attempt to direct human actions with different kinds of coercions, manipulations, persuasions and cooperations.

Can we, with full awareness of the problem of choosing between conflicting values, each of which may be cherished, find some way of choosing the *best* planning process that is consonant with our belief in liberty? The function of planning is not only to set forth goals and alternatives and means of achieving these. Equally important, and usually neglected, are the specification of costs and benefits, the reallocation of burdens, and the probable consequences of different kinds of actions. The true function of the planning process is not to designate the most appropriate means for given ends, but to predict the possible consequences to explicate the values of a society and make people aware of the costs of achieving these.[47]

Surprisingly, there are few studies extant of the planning process. There are some theoretical studies of how nations should plan and the principles of city planning,[48] but few critical studies of how nations and groups actually plan and what can be done to improve both methods and procedures.

* * * *

2. *The Standardization of Social Indicators*

Over the past decades, economists have developed different series of indicators to anticipate and evaluate trends in the economy. There may be differences in the conclusions drawn from time-series, but by and large there is a consensus of what should be observed.

One need not recapitulate here the obvious difficulties in establishing social and political indicators. Some of the difficulty arises from a failure to agree on what should be observed. Most

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the writing on the new states, for example, concentrates on such general concepts as "modernization" or "political development" or "new elites," the dimensions, let alone the indicators, of the concept are still to be formulated.[49] But one of the consistent themes of the recent writings in modern sociology (cf. Aron, Parsons) is that "industrial society" produces a series of common effects, has an "internal logic" in its creation of a new occupational structure, and with the rise of affluence creates new, presumably common attitudes, despite differences in traditional culture. And the work of Inkeles, Lerner, Pye, and others indicates that the break with tradition, the new patterns of urbanization, the exposure to the mass media and education all tend to create common patterns of thought in the new states.

The function of indicators is not to replace analysis or to act as predictors, but to allow comparisons over time within a country, and between countries, and more important, to allow one to *anticipate* certain likely occurences.[50] It is only when the indicators and the concepts are relatively precise that we could hope that indicators would be predictive of specific events.

In rough ways, we tend to use certain indicators as predictive of events. We say that rising unemployment rates presage a swing to radical groups in voting, that migration rates may be coupled with crime and divorce rates, etc. But clearly the present need is for some coherent effort to create sets of social indicators dealing with social and political change.

Some beginning attempts have already been made. Some studies have shown that in the early stages of economic development demographic indicators (mortality data particularly) are quite predictive of rates of economic growth.[51] Daniel Lerner, in his study of the Middle East, has used such items as literacy, exposure to mass media, and urbanization as indicators of modernization.[52] In an ambitious effort, Karl Deutsch has sought to create an inventory of basic trends in international politics, and to set up some indicators for social mobilization. (By social mobilization, Deutsch specifies a cluster of variables to indicate the entry of persons into a political system.)[53] Almond and his students have sought through opinion polls and other devices to trace the process whereby individuals in a number of countries move from being "subjects" to becoming "citizens," and to chart some rate of absorption.[54] Alex Inkeles and his associates are now engaged in an effort to trace the impact of industrialization on peasants entering the indus-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trial process in a variety of different countries and to set up indicators of attitude change.[55]

Clearly any useful construction of alternative futures will depend upon the success of the compilation of such indicators.

* * * *

3. *Models of Political Structures*

The most difficult of all proposals is the heart of the social science enterprise itself, the construction of models of political systems.

The creation of a model allows us to do two (of a large number of) things. It may allow us to understand the "value-relevance" of a statement; it may allow us to see whether a predicted change is one which simply affects the actors in a system (e.g. a shift of power between groups), or affects the nature of a system itself. To illustrate the two points:

1) From the standpoint of a Mohammedan, all Christians are alike. The involved theological disputes between Catholics and Protestants may have little meaning for him because both are "children of Jesus." To a Catholic, the differences between a "hard-shell Baptist" and a Quaker may have little relevance for him since both are "enthusiasts." In a similar fashion, to a confirmed Marxist, the difference between a Democrat and a Republican in the American political system has little meaning since both are capitalists. But to understand any analysis or criticism, one has to identify the standpoint from which it is made. One function of a model, therefore, is to indicate the value-relevance and level of analysis from the standpoint of the observer.

2) The analysis of power in a society can only be carried on adequately if one has a scheme to identify the relevant actors, the arena, the orientations of the actors, and their relationship to the underlying system which defines the politics of the society. By a system, I mean here the basis of renewable power independent of any momentary group of actors. Most of political analysis today, I would argue, concentrates on the "intermediate" sectors (e.g. parties, interest groups, the formal structure) or, as in the case of Soviet politics, through Kremlinology to deal with the "small units" (what I have called only half-jokingly the "small c's") of politics,[56] but rarely is there an attempt to specify, as a Marxist analysis does, the underlying system of renewable power.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There are few operating models of political systems, on the descriptive or the analytical level, extant. Gabriel Almond and his associates have sought to establish a framework of concepts which would lead to the creation of such a model. Many years earlier, Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan set forth comprehensive definitions of power, but they did not seek to combine these into a system. C. Wright Mills created a mechanistic image of a "power elite." Maurice Duverger, in his book *Political Parties*, at a lesser level has put forth a useful typology. Most recently, Raymond Aron, in his magisterial book, *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations*, has formulated certain models of diplomatic systems. But we still lack any comprehensive analyses of different systems of power.[57]

But here, in this entreaty, one comes full circle. For in the preoccupation with prediction one risks the hubris of the historicist mode of thought which sees the future as "pre-viewed" in some "cunning of reason" or other determinist vision of human affairs. And this is false. One seeks "pre-vision" as much to "halt" a future as help it to come into being, for the function of prediction is not, as often stated, to aid social control, but to widen the spheres of moral choice. Without that normative commitment the social sciences become a mere technology rather than humanistic discipline.

References

1. *The Positive Philosophy of August Comte,* ed. Harriet Martineau (New York: Calvin Blanchard, 1856), pp. 132-133.

2. See *The Republic,* Book IX, No. 571, in *The Dialogues of Plato,* Jowett edition (New York: Random House, 1937), p. 829.

3. As Michael Polanyi has written: "Prediction is not a regular attribute of scientific propositions. Kepler's laws and Darwinian theory predicted nothing. At any rate, successful prediction does not fundamentally change the status of a scientific proposition. It only adds a number of observations, the predicted observations, to our series of measurements. . . ." See *The Logic of Liberty* (London: Routledge, 1951), p. 16.

4. Thus Arnold Toynbee, in tracing western history back to 1494, identifies five great war-and-peace cycles, but one is confounded by the question of what is war (subversion, guerilla forays, rebellions) and what is peace.

5. For one of the most succinct analyses from the basis of modern economic theory, see Paul A. Samuelson, "Wages and Interest: A Modern Dissection of Marxian Economic Models," *American Economic Review* (December 1957), pp. 884-912.

6. Ridenour's discussion, one of the most provocative of recent times, can be

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

found in Ridenour, Shaw and Hill, *Bibliography in an Age of Science* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951). Derek Price's analyses can be found in two small volumes, *Science Since Babylon* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961) and *Little Science, Big Science* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). A seminal source for many of these discussions is the work of Gerald Holton, particularly "Scientific Research and Scholarship: Notes Towards the Design of Proper Scales," *Dædalus,* (March 1962), pp. 362-399.

7. These quotations are from *Little Science, Big Science,* pp. 24, 25, 30.

8. See Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 97, 145–164.

9. The following description by Paul Levy explains the concept: "The idea of a stochastic process is, at least for a determinist, tied to that of the existence of hidden parameters which do not intervene in the description of the apparent present state of the system studied and which nevertheless influence its future evolution. Our ignorance of their values forces us to speak for the future only of a set of possible evolutions, and in certain cases we can define in that set a law of probability incessantly modified by the knowledge of new data." Cited in Luciene Félix, *The Modern Aspect of Mathematics* (New York: Science Editions, 1961), pp. 132–133.

10. Published by The University of Michigan Press in 1960.

11. A representative work is Amos Hawley, *Human Ecology* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1950). For a formal treatment of systems of local communities, regions, and societies, see Rutledge Vining, "A Description of Certain Spatial Aspects of an Economic System," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* III (January 1955), pp. 147–195. A recent, imaginative effort to use the ecological approach in a holistic way is Clifford Geertz's *Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1963).

12. Recently the U. S. Congressional Committee on the Joint Economic Report conducted hearings on the methods employed by different economic forecasters (e.g. *Fortune,* McGraw-Hill, and others) to make their forecasts.

13. I leave aside here the problem of the failures of short-run predictions or stages theory as involving many complicated considerations. But a study of why many of these predictions went wrong would be fruitful. For example, Frank Notestein posited a stages theory which powerfully influenced David Riesman in the formulation of the theory of character change in the latter's *The Lonely Crowd.* The Notestein theory, metaphorically, is an S-shaped curve. The bottom horizontal line represents traditional societies with high birth rates but also high death rates; a second stage, that of transitional growth (the sigmoid rise), is one of population explosion because of a rapidly declining death rate; the third stage is one of incipient population decline based on a new stabilization of low birth rate and low death rate. Riesman associated the traditional type with the first society, the inner-directed type with the second, and the other-directed

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

type with the third. But the stages theory has been proven wrong. Both France and the United States, for example, have recently resumed a steady population rise, but for how long, it is difficult to say. For the original Notestein formulation, see Frank Notestein, "Population—The Long View," in *Food for the World,* ed. T. W. Schultz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945). For Riesman's discussion of his abandonment of the Notestein hypothesis as the basis for his own theory see "The Lonely Crowd: A Reconsideration in 1960," in *Culture and Social Character,* eds. S. M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 419–458.

14. See Sir Charles Darwin, "Forecasting the Future," in *Frontiers in Science,* ed. Edward Hutchings, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1958), p. 116. See, too, in the same volume, the retort by Fred Hoyle.

15. For a balanced assessment of this problem, see S. Lilley, "Can Prediction Become a Science?" in *Discovery* (November 1946), reprinted in *The Sociology of Science,* ed. Bernard Barber and Walter Hirsch (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962). A quick review of different kinds of trend predictions can be found in Hornell Hart, "Predicting Future Trends," in *Technology and Social Change,* ed. Allen, Hart, *et al.* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), ch. 19.

16. Of the vast literature on the subject, two reviews are of use: G. Dupeux, "Electoral Behaviour," *Current Sociology* (1954–1955), pp. 318–344, and S. M. Lipset, P. F. Lazarsfeld, *et al.,* "The Psychology of Voting," in *Handbook of Social Psychology,* ed. Gardner Lindzey (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954). The discussion of "bandwagon effects" in relation to election predictions can be found in Simon, *op. cit.,* ch. 5; the discussion of process analysis in Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), especially ch. 13.

17. Colin Clark, "Apropos the Eight Million of M. Manshold," *Futuribles* papers, Paris, no. 18.

18. A classic essay in this field is Robert Merton's "Social Structure and Anomie" which seeks to specify under what conditions deviations from such norms or structural certainties obtain. See *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), ch. IV.

19. See *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951); *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954); also, Nathan Leites with Constantin Melnik, *The House Without Windows: France Selects a President* (Evaston: Row Peterson, 1958), and *On the Game of Politics in France* (Stanford: Stanford, 1959). For a detailed discussion of the validity of this approach, see my essay "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior," in *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960).

20. There have been many efforts to identify an American "style." See, for example, the essay by W. W. Rostow in *The American Style,* ed. Elting Morison (New York: Harper, 1958), pp. 246–313; D. W. Brogan, "The Illusion of American Omnipotence," *Harper's* (December 1952); Daniel

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bell, "The National Style and the Radical Right," *Partisan Review* (Fall 1962); Talcott Parsons and Winston White, "The Link Between Character and Society," in *Culture and Social Character* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), ch. 6. A fruitful comparison of aspects of British and American patterns can be found in Edward A. Shils, *The Torment of Secrecy* (Glencoe: The Free Press), ch. 2. For a denial of direct links between cultural values and social structure, see E. R. Leach, *The Political System of Highland Burma* (London: School of Economics and Political Science, 1954).

21. In Karl Marx, *Selected Work,* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1935) II.

22. It is difficult to resist Marx's description, an extraordinary piece of political analysis and poetic rhetoric: "This society dates from the year 1849. On the pretext of founding a benevolent society, the *Lumpenproletariat* of Paris had been organized into secret sections, each section led by Bonapartist agents, with a Bonapartist general at the head of the whole. Alongside decayed *roués* with doubtful means of subsistence and of doubtful origin, alongside ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jail-birds, escaped galley-slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, *lazzaroni,* pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, *maquereaux,* brothel keepers, porters, *literati,* organ-grinders, rag-pickers, knife-grinders, tinkers, beggars, in short the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass thrown hither and thither which the French term *la Bohème;* from this kindred element, Bonaparte formed the basis of the Society of December 10. A 'benevolent society'—in so far as, like Bonaparte, all of its members felt the need of benefiting themselves at the expense of the working nation." And more of the same! *Ibid.,* pp. 369–370.

23. *Ibid.,* p. 423. Emphasis added.

24. The changes in the features of modern capitalist society is the central point of Professor Postan's essay, "The Economic and Social System in 1970," *Futuribles,* I, ed. Bertrand de Jouvenel (Geneva: Droz, 1963). In concentrating on the changing character of ownership of capital, he is tracing out a major reorganization of the "operational system."

25. See Almond and Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 59. The introduction by Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," proposes a set of definitions for the "common properties of political systems." A more condensed effort, but almost as comprehensive, is the article by David Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXIV, 3 (November 1958), pp. 221–237. One of the earliest and still one of the most interesting efforts to specify the common requisites of any social system is the essay by Aberle, Cohen, *et al.,* "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society," *Ethics,* LX, 2 (January 1950) 100–111.

26. One such typology, on which Almond bases part of his system, is that of Professor Edward Shils, from *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1962).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

27. "In many technologically indifferent features the range of variability is unlimited: but the requirements of effective use impose limitations, more or less stringent, on the variability of other features—there is a narrowing of the range if the object is to function as intended. . . . What is so patent in technology applies equally to other aspects of culture, where, however, the operation of the principle is less readily discernible." Alexander Goldenweiser, "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," in *History, Psychology and Culture* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1933), p. 47.

28. See *Terror and Progress USSR* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

29. Edward F. Denison, *The Sources of Economic Growth in the U. S.*, Committee for Economic Development, 1963.

30. In *Futuribles,* I (Geneva: Droz, 1963), pp. 295–319.

31. Lucien Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

32. Lucy Mair, *New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

33. See K. D. Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimar Republik* (Stuttgart: Ring Verlag, 1957).

34. Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), especially chs. IX, X, and "Deterrence and Defense in the Sixties and Seventies," *Progress Report for a Study of Crises and Arms Control,* Hudson Institute (unpublished), ch. II.

35. Apter, *op. cit.,* p. 221.

36. This perspective is central to Professor T. H. Marshall's *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950). It has been used by S. M. Lipset to account for variations in the degree of radicalism in western societies (see *Political Man,* [New York: Doubleday, 1960] chs. 2, 3) and by Reinhard Bendix and Stein Rokkan to create comparative models of political development in the West. See "The Extension of National Citizenship to the Lower Classes: A Comparative Perspective," paper for the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, September, 1962.

37. See Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), especially chs. 2 and 3.

38. In an unpublished paper, William Kornhauser, a sociologist at Berkeley, has sought to identify four stages of "political development" which new states have to consolidate in order to achieve "political competence" or the achievement of their defined goals. These four are: national identity, integration of authority, participation or mobilization of the population, constitutionalism. Such tags are largely amorphous in themselves, and without a comprehensive description of each of the concepts one risks a disservice to Professor Kornhauser. I call attention to it here to indicate that

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serious thinking about the nature of "sequential development" is taking place among the students of the "new societies."
One should point out that M. de Jouvenel's essay on *The Evolution of the Forms of Government,* though reflecting on past history, does have, in its sketch of the rise and extension of bureaucracy, the basis of a sequential theory. One might say, too, that the concept of "value added," which M. de Jouvenel has called attention to from economic theory, could be the basis of social speculation. One such effort to explain "collective behavior" and particularly revolution is Neil Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963). Professor Smelser writes: "As the value-added process develops, it allows for progressively fewer outcomes other than the one we wish to explain. This logic of value added can be applied to episodes of collective behavior such as the panic or the reform movement. Many determinants or necessary conditions must be present for any kind of collective episode to occur. These determinants must combine, however, in a definite pattern. Furthermore, as they combine, the determination of the type of episode in question becomes increasingly specific and alternative behaviours are ruled out as possibilities" (p. 14).

39. In using the phrase "accounting scheme," I am following the conventional language of bookkeeping (comptabilité). However, a more restricted use of the phrase is employed by Paul F. Lazarsfeld to deal with causal inferences of single decisions. He is attempting, in effect, a methodology for the historian, the clinical psychologist, or the market researcher, who has to account for the most relevant combination of factors in the making of a single decision. For a short statement of Professor Lazarsfeld's intentions, see Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 387–391. An elaboration of this mode of "reason analysis" can be found in Hans Zeisel's *Say It With Figures* (New York: Harper, 1957), ch. 6.

40. In *Futuribles,* I., *op. cit.,* pp. 121–154.

41. C. K. Ogden, *Bentham's Theory of Fictions* (London: Kegan, Paul, 1932); Hans Vahinger, *The Philosophy of "As If"* (London: Kegan, Paul, undated).

42. For the role of paradigms in social research, see R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 13–16, 50–60.

43. Herman Kahn, "Alternative World Futures," paper HI-342-B IV, Hudson Institute, April, 1964.

44. See *Essai sur l'Art de la Conjecture,* (Paris: SEDEIS), pp. 92–94.

45. On the techniques of political gaming, see Herbert Goldhamer and Hans Speier, "Some Observations on Political Gaming," *World Politics* (October 1959). Harold Guetzkow has edited two volumes on simulation: *Simulation in Social Science: Readings;* and *Simulation in International Relations,* both published by Prentice-Hall, 1962, 1963. A useful volume on decision

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

theory which argues that one can verify ethical judgments is C. West Churchman, *Prediction and Optimal Decision* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961).

46. When individuals and, more particularly, organized movements are committed to rigid invention such as Bolshevik theory, the results can be disastrous. One of the sorriest records of prediction is that of the Bolsheviks. In the 1920s they predicted that the next struggle would be between Great Britain and the United States (as the two largest imperial powers); in the 1930s, that Hitler could not last and that the Communists would succeed him; in the 1940s that the West could not go to war against Hitler; in the early 1950s, that the western economies would stagnate, etc.

47. One of the most interesting studies in recent years, in this regard, is Alexander Erlich's *The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924–1928* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). The reconstruction of this debate makes it clear that the Soviet path was not "inevitable" and that various persons, including those who argued for a course of intensive industrialization, were well aware of the risks and consequences, including the resistance of the peasantry.

48. There is a large and useful literature on planned "organizational change," growing out of the work of such groups as the Tavistock Institute in London, the Institute of Social Research at the University of Michigan, and similar groups.

49. For a useful discussion on the general nature of indicators in relation to concepts, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research" in *Evidence and Inference,* ed. Daniel Lerner (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), 31 pp.

50. For an enlightening discussion of the need for indicators and their role in anticipations, see the document "Space Efforts and Society," a Document of the Committee on Space Efforts and the Society of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Boston, January 1963).
In this context, the term anticipation is broader than prediction. Say the authors: "The distinction we would make is that between a reasonably precise knowledge of the probability of a given event happening and a sufficient awareness that something of a general sort might happen, that if it does happen we are not caught by surprise. In planning it is often possible to make provision for handling some consequence even though it can be foreseen only in very general terms." There is another distinction worth emphasizing. Prediction places primary emphasis on the probability of something's happening and is less concerned with the importance of events. Anticipation seeks to weigh the relative importance of likely occurrences.

51. For a representative effort along this line, see Philip Hauser, "Demographic Indicators of Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol. 7 (January 1959).

52. See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), especially ch. II.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

53. See Karl Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," *American Political Science Review* (March 1960); and "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *Ibid.* (September 1961), pp. 463–515.

54. The results of these studies in Germany, Italy, Mexico, Great Britain, and the United States are summed up in the volume *The Civic Culture,* by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

55. This work is going on in Chile, Nigeria and Pakistan. A preliminary statement can be found in Alex Inkeles, "Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception and Value," *The American Journal of Sociology,* LXVI, 1 (July 1960), 1–31.

56. One of the things that has struck me over the years is the way small groups of individuals who have, at an early age, formed a circle or club, move out into the larger political arena. This is a familiar phenomenon in literary or art movements; yet it is equally true in politics. One thinks of the Galileo circle in Hungary in 1919 (for a description, see the essay by Paul Ignotus in the *Essays in Honor of Michael Polayni*), of the Thakins in Burma, of the "young Turks," who have thus given a cognomen to the phenomenon, etc. While the phenomenon is readily understood as important for political analysis, one finds few studies of the process at all. In thinking about these groups, I was struck by the linguistic singularity (in English) that most of the words describing them begin with a small "c." Thus:

clique	club	circle	cabal	cadre
crowd	clan	camarilla	claque	council
curia	church	cortes	cells	caucus
condominium	cenacle			
committee	conspiracies			
condottieri	college			
coteries	cults			

All of which may well be one other illustration of a "Yule distribution" statistically in linguistics.

57. The best recent effort to create a typology of the new States is the monograph by Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States.* This study charts the alternative courses of political development (e.g. tutelary democracy, modernizing oligarchies), but does not specify the bases of power, or the social systems of renewable power. The beautiful simplicity of the Marxist scheme is that it took a single variable, wealth in property, or the means of production, as the basis of power. We lack some organizing concepts which will allow us to group the multiple bases of power which now exist in the world into a comprehensive classification, or a system-set.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KENNETH N. WALTZ

The Stability of a Bipolar World

THERE is a conventional wisdom, accumulated over the centuries, upon which statesmen and students often draw as they face problems in international politics. One part of the conventional wisdom is now often forgotten. Many in Europe, and some in America, have come to regard an alliance as unsatisfactory if the members of it are grossly unequal in power. "Real partnership," one hears said in a variety of ways, "is possible only between equals."[1] If this is true, an addendum should read: Only unreal partnerships among states have lasted beyond the moment of pressing danger. Where states in association have been near equals, some have voluntarily abdicated the leadership to others, or the alliance has become paralyzed by stalemate and indecision, or it has simply dissolved. One may observe that those who are less than equal are often dissatisfied without thereby concluding that equality in all things is good. As Machiavelli and Bismarck well knew, an alliance requires an alliance leader; and leadership can be most easily maintained where the leader is superior in power. Some may think of these two exemplars as unworthy; even so, where the unworthy were wise, their wisdom should be revived.

A second theorem of the conventional wisdom is still widely accepted. It reads: A world of many powers is more stable than a bipolar world, with stability measured by the peacefulness of adjustment within the international system and by the durability of the system itself. While the first element of the conventional wisdom might well be revived, the second should be radically revised.

Pessimism about the possibility of achieving stability in a two-power world was reinforced after the war by contemplation of the character of the two major contenders. The Soviet Union, led by a possibly psychotic Stalin, and the United States, flaccid, iso-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lationist by tradition, and untutored in the ways of international relations, might well have been thought unsuited to the task of finding a route to survival. How could either reconcile itself to coexistence when ideological differences were great and antithetical interests provided constant occasion for conflict? Yet the bipolar world of the postwar period has shown a remarkable stability. Measuring time from the termination of war, 1964 corresponds to 1937. Despite all of the changes in the nineteen years since 1945 that might have shaken the world into another great war, 1964 somehow looks and feels safer than 1937. Is this true only because we now know that 1937 preceded the holocaust by just two years? Or is it the terror of nuclear weapons that has kept the world from major war? Or is the stability of the postwar world intimately related to its bipolar pattern?

Stability Within a Bipolar System

Within a bipolar world, four factors conjoined encourage the limitation of violence in the relations of states. First, with only two world powers there are no peripheries. The United States is the obsessing danger for the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union for us, since each can damage the other to an extent that no other state can match. Any event in the world that involves the fortunes of the Soviet Union or the United States automatically elicits the interest of the other. Truman, at the time of the Korean invasion, could not very well echo Chamberlain's words in the Czechoslovakian crisis and claim that the Koreans were a people far away in the east of Asia of whom Americans knew nothing. We had to know about them or quickly find out. In the 1930's, France lay between England and Germany. England could believe, and we could too, that their frontier and ours lay on the Rhine. After World War II, no third power could lie between the United States and the Soviet Union, for none existed. The statement that peace is indivisible was controversial, indeed untrue, when it was made by Litvinov in the 1930's. It became a truism in the 1950's. Any possibility of maintaining a general peace required a willingness to fight small wars. With the competition both serious and intense, a loss to one could easily appear as a gain to the other, a conclusion that follows from the very condition of a two-power competition. Political action has corresponded to this assumption. Communist guerrillas operating in Greece prompted the Truman doctrine. The tightening of Soviet

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

control over the states of Eastern Europe led to the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Defense Treaty, and these in turn gave rise to the Cominform and the Warsaw Pact. The plan to form a West German government produced the Berlin blockade. Our response in a two-power world was geared to Soviet action, and theirs to ours, which produced an increasingly solid bipolar balance.

Not only are there no peripheries in a bipolar world but also, as a second consideration, the range of factors included in the competition is extended as the intensity of the competition increases. Increased intensity is expressed in a reluctance to accept small territorial losses, as in Korea, the Formosa Strait, and Indo-China. Extension of range is apparent wherever one looks. Vice President Nixon hailed the Supreme Court's desegregation decision as our greatest victory in the cold war. When it became increasingly clear that the Soviet economy was growing at a rate that far exceeded our own, many began to worry that falling behind in the economic race would lead to our losing the cold war without a shot being fired. Disarmament negotiations have most often been taken as an opportunity for propaganda. As contrasted with the 1930's, there is now constant and effective concern lest military preparation fall below the level necessitated by the military efforts of the major antagonist. Changes between the wars affected different states differently, with adjustment to the varying ambitions and abilities of states dependent on cumbrous mechanisms of compensation and realignment. In a multipower balance, who is a danger to whom is often a most obscure matter: the incentive to regard all disequilibrating changes with concern and respond to them with whatever effort may be required is consequently weakened. In our present world changes may affect each of the two powers differently, and this means all the more that few changes in the national realm or in the world at large are likely to be thought irrelevant. Policy proceeds by imitation, with occasional attempts to outflank.

The third distinguishing factor in the bipolar balance, as we have thus far known it, is the nearly constant presence of pressure and the recurrence of crises. It would be folly to assert that repeated threats and recurring crises necessarily decrease danger and promote stability. It may be equally wrong to assert the opposite, as Khrushchev seems to appreciate. "They frighten us with war," he told the Bulgarians in May of 1962, "and we frighten them back bit by bit. They threaten us with nuclear arms and we tell them: 'Listen, now only fools can do this, because we have them too, and

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they are not smaller than yours but, we think, even better than yours. So why do you do foolish things and frighten us?' This is the situation, and this is why we consider the situation to be good."[2] Crises, born of a condition in which interests and ambitions conflict, are produced by the determination of one state to effect a change that another state chooses to resist. With the Berlin blockade, for example, as with Russia's emplacement of missiles in Cuba, the United States decided that to resist the change the Soviet Union sought to bring about was worth the cost of turning its action into a crisis. If the condition of conflict remains, the absence of crises becomes more disturbing than their recurrence. Rather a large crisis now than a small war later is an axiom that should precede the statement, often made, that to fight small wars in the present may be the means of avoiding large wars later.

Admittedly, crises also occur in a multipower world, but the dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definition of vital interests easily obscured. The skillful foreign policy, where many states are in balance, is designed to gain an advantage over one state without antagonizing others and frightening them into united action. Often in modern Europe, possible gains have seemed greater than likely losses. Statesmen could thus hope in crises to push an issue to the limit without causing all the potential opponents to unite. When possible enemies are several in number, unity of action among states is difficult to secure. One could therefore think —or hope desperately, as did Bethmann Hollweg and Adolph Hitler—that no united opposition would form.

In a bipolar world, on the other hand, attention is focused on crises by both of the major competitors, and especially by the defensive state. To move piecemeal and reap gains serially is difficult, for within a world in confusion there is one great certainty, namely, the knowledge of who will oppose whom. One's motto may still be, "push to the limit," but *limit* must be emphasized as heavily as *push*. Caution, moderation, and the management of crisis come to be of great and obvious importance.

Many argue, nonetheless, that caution in crises, and resulting bipolar stability, is accounted for by the existence of nuclear weapons, with the number of states involved comparatively inconsequent. That this is a doubtful deduction can be indicated by a consideration of how nuclear weapons may affect reactions to crises. In the postwar world, bipolarity preceded the construction of two opposing atomic weapons systems. The United States, with

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some success, substituted technological superiority for expenditure on a conventional military system as a deterrent to the Soviet Union during the years when we had first an atomic monopoly and then a decisive edge in quantity and quality of weapons. American military policy was not a matter of necessity but of preference based on a calculation of advantage. Some increase in expenditure and a different allocation of monies would have enabled the United States to deter the Soviet Union by posing credibly the threat that any Soviet attempt, say, to overwhelm West Germany would bring the United States into a large-scale conventional war.* For the Soviet Union, war against separate European states would have promised large gains; given the bipolar balance, no such war could be undertaken without the clear prospect of American entry. The Russians' appreciation of the situation is perhaps best illustrated by the structure of their military forces. The Soviet Union has concentrated heavily on medium-range bombers and missiles and, to our surprise, has built relatively few intercontinental weapons. The country of possibly aggressive intent has assumed a posture of passive deterrence vis-à-vis her major adversary, whom she quite sensibly does not want to fight. Against European and other lesser states, the Soviet Union has a considerable offensive capability.** Hence nuclear capabilities merely reinforce a condition that would exist in their absence: without nuclear technology both the United States and the Soviet Union have the ability to develop weapons of considerable destructive power. Even had the atom never been split, each

* The point has been made by Raymond Aron, among others. "Even if it had not had the bomb, would the United States have tolerated the expansion of the Soviet empire as far as the Atlantic? And would Stalin have been ready to face the risk of general war?" Raymond Aron, *The Century of Total War* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 151.

** Hanson W. Baldwin, from information supplied by Strategic Air Command headquarters, estimates that Russian intercontinental missiles are one-fourth to one-fifth as numerous as ours, though Russian warheads are larger. The Russians have one-sixth to one-twelfth the number of our long-range heavy bombs, with ours having a greater capability (*New York Times*, November 21, 1963). In medium range ballistic missiles Russia has been superior. A report of the Institute of Strategic Studies estimated that as of October, 1962, Russia had 700 such missiles, the West a total of 250 (*New York Times*, November 9, 1962). British sources tend to place Russian capabilities in the medium range higher than do American estimates. Cf. P. M. S. Blackett, "The Real Road to Disarmament: The Military Background to the Geneva Talks," *New Statesman* (March 2, 1962), pp. 295–300, with Hanson W. Baldwin, *New York Times*, November 26, 1961.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would lose heavily if it were to engage in a major war against the other.

If number of states is less important than the existence of nuclear power, then one must ask whether the world balance would continue to be stable were three or more states able to raise themselves to comparable levels of nuclear potency. For many reasons one doubts that the equilibrium would be so secure. Worries about accidents and triggering are widespread, but a still greater danger might well arise. The existence of a number of nuclear states would increase the temptation for the more virile of them to maneuver, with defensive states paralyzed by the possession of military forces the use of which would mean their own destruction. One would be back in the 1930's, with the addition of a new dimension of strength which would increase the pressures upon status quo powers to make piecemeal concessions.

Because bipolarity preceded a two-power nuclear competition, because in the absence of nuclear weapons destructive power would still be great, because the existence of a number of nuclear states would increase the range of difficult political choices, and finally, as will be discussed below, because nuclear weapons must first be seen as a product of great national capabilities rather than as their cause, one is led to the conclusion that nuclear weapons cannot by themselves be used to explain the stability—or the instability—of international systems.

Taken together, these three factors—the absence of peripheries, the range and intensity of competition, and the persistence of pressure and crisis—are among the most important characteristics of the period since World War II. The first three points combine to produce an intense competition in a wide arena with a great variety of means employed. The constancy of effort of the two major contenders, combined with a fourth factor, their preponderant power, have made for a remarkable ability to comprehend and absorb within the bipolar balance the revolutionary political, military, and economic changes that have occurred. The Soviet Union moved forward and was checked. Empires dissolved, and numerous new states appeared in the world. Strategic nuclear weapons systems came into the possession of four separate countries. Tactical nuclear weapons were developed and to some extent dispersed. The manned bomber gave way to the missile. Vulnerable missiles were hardened, made mobile, and hidden. A revolution in military technology occurred on an average of once every five years and at an accelerating

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pace.[3] Two "losses" of China, each a qualified loss but both traumatic, were accommodated without disastrously distorting—or even greatly affecting—the balance between America and Russia.

The effects of American-Soviet preponderance are complex. Its likely continuation and even its present existence are subjects of controversy. The stability of a system has to be defined in terms of its durability, as well as of the peacefulness of adjustment within it. In the pages that follow, some of the effects of preponderance will be indicated while the durability of the system is examined.

The End of the Bipolar Era?

In a bipolar world, by definition each of two states or two blocs overshadows all others. It may seem that to write in 1964 of bipolarity is merely to express nostalgia for an era already ending. Richard Rosecrance, referring to the period since the war, describes the world as "tripolar."[4] Walter Lippmann, in a number of columns written in late 1963 and early 1964, assesses the recent initiatives of France and Communist China, their ability to move contrary to the desires of the United States and the Soviet Union, as marking the end of the postwar world in which the two superpowers closely controlled the actions of even their major associates.* Hedley Bull, in a paper prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations in the fall of 1963, tentatively reaches the conclusion that between now and 1975 "the system of polarization of power will cease to be recognizable: that other states will count for so much in world politics that the two present great powers will find it difficult, even when cooperating, to dominate them."[5]

If power is identical with the ability to control, then those who are free are also strong; and the freedom of the weak would have to be taken as an indication of the weakness of those who have great material strength. But the weak and disorganized are often less amenable to control than those who are wealthy and well disciplined.** The powerful, out of their strength, influence and limit

* See, for example, Walter Lippmann, "NATO Crisis—and Solution: Don't Blame De Gaulle," *Boston Globe*, December 5, 1963, p. 26: "The paramount theme of this decade, as we know it thus far, is that we are emerging from a two-power world and entering one where there are many powers."

** Cf. Georg Simmel, "The Sociology of Conflict, II," *The American Journal of Sociology*, IX (March, 1904), 675: "when one opposes a diffused crowd of enemies, one may oftener gain isolated victories, but it is very hard to arrive at decisive results which definitely fix the relationships of the contestants."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

each other; the wealthy are hobbled by what they have to lose. The weak, on the other hand, bedevil the strong; the poor can more easily ignore their own interests. Such patterns endure and pervade the relations of men and of groups. United States Steel enjoys less freedom to vary the price of its products than do smaller producers. The United States government finds it easier to persuade large corporations and the great labor unions to cooperate in an anti-inflationary policy than to secure the compliance of small firms and independent unions. The political party in opposition is freer to speak irresponsibly than is the government. Power corrupts *and* renders its possessors responsible; the possession of wealth liberates *and* enslaves. That similar patterns are displayed in international relations is hardly surprising. It is not unusual to find that minor states have a considerable nuisance value in relation to states greatly their superiors in power. A Chiang Kai-shek, a Syngman Rhee, or a Mossadegh is often more difficult to deal with than rulers of states more nearly one's equal in power.

The influence and control of the two great powers has stopped short of domination in most places throughout the postwar period. The power of the United States and of the Soviet Union has been predominant but not absolute. To describe the world as bipolar does not mean that either power can exert a positive control everywhere in the world, but that each has global interests which it can care for unaided, though help may often be desirable. To say that bipolarity has, until recently, meant more than this is to misinterpret the history of the postwar world. Secretary Dulles, in the middle 1950's, inveighed against neutralism and described it as immoral. His judgment corresponded to a conviction frequently expressed in Communist statements. P. E. Vyshinsky, in a 1948 issue of *Problems of Philosophy*, declared that "the only determining criterion of revolutionary proletarian internationalism is: are you for or against the U.S.S.R., the motherland of the world proletariat?. . . The defense of the U.S.S.R., as of the socialist motherland of the world proletariat, is the holy duty of every honest man everywhere and not only of the citizens of the U.S.S.R."[6] The rejection of neutralism as an honorable position for other countries to take is another example of intensity of competition leading to an extension of its range. By coming to terms with neutralism, as both the United States and the Soviet Union have done, the superpowers have shown even their inability to extend their wills without limit.

Bearing in mind the above considerations, can we say whether

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the recent independent action of France and Communist China does in fact indicate the waning of bipolarity, or does it mean merely the loosening of bipolar blocs, with a bipolar relation between the United States and the Soviet Union continuing to dominate? By the assessment of those who themselves value increased independence, the latter would seem to be the case. The Earl of Home, when he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, thought he saw developing from the increased power of the Soviet Union and the United States a nuclear stalemate that would provide for the middle states a greater opportunity to maneuver.[7] De Gaulle, in a press conference famous for other reasons, included the statement that uncertainty about their use "does not in the least prevent the American nuclear weapons, which are the most powerful of all, from remaining the essential guarantee of world peace."[8] Communist China's calculation of international political and military forces may be highly similar. "Whatever happens," Chou En-lai has said recently, "the fraternal Chinese and Soviet peoples will stand together in any storm that breaks out in the world arena."[9] Ideological disputes between China and Russia are bitter; their policies conflict. But interests are more durable than the alliances in which they sometimes find expression. Even though the bonds of alliance are broken, the interest of the Soviet Union could not easily accommodate the destruction of China if that were to mean that Western power would be poised on the Siberian border.

That strategic stability produces or at least permits tactical instability is now a cliché of military analysis. The axiom, transferred to the political realm, remains true. Lesser states have often found their opportunity to exist in the interstices of the balance of power. The French and Chinese, in acting contrary to the wishes of their principal partners, have certainly caused them some pain. Diplomatic flurries have resulted and some changes have been produced, yet in a more important respect, France and China have demonstrated not their power but their impotence: their inability to affect the dominant relation in the world. The solidity of the bipolar balance permits middle states to act with impunity precisely because they know that their divergent actions will not measurably affect the strength of the Soviet Union or the United States, upon which their own security continues to rest. The decisions of Britain, France, and China to build nuclear establishments are further advertisements of weakness. Because American or Soviet military might provides adequate protection, the middle powers need not

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

participate in a military division of labor in a way that would contribute maximally to the military strength of their major associates.

The United States is inclined to exaggerate the amount of strength it can gain from maintaining a system of united alliances as opposed to bilateral arrangements. The exaggeration arises apparently from vague notions about the transferability of strength. Actually, as one should expect, the contribution of each ally is notable only where it believes that its interests require it to make an effort. In resisting the invasion of North Korean and, later, Chinese troops, roughly 90 per cent of the non-Korean forces were provided by the United States.[10] In South Vietnam at the present time the United States is the only foreign country engaged. British and French military units in West Germany, under strength and ill equipped, are of little use. Western Europe remains, to use the terminology of the 1930's, a direct consumer of security. The only really significant interest of the United States, as is nicely conveyed by Arnold Wolfers' dubbing us "the hub power,"[11] is that each country that may be threatened by Soviet encroachment be politically stable and thus able to resist subversion, be self-dependent and thus less of an expense to us, and be able at the outset of a possible military action to put up some kind of a defense.

On these points, the American interest in Western Europe is precisely the same as its interest in the economically underdeveloped countries. In the case of the European countries, however, losses are harder to sustain and there are advantages clearly to be gained by the United States where our interests and theirs overlap. It would be difficult to argue that the foreign-aid programs undertaken by Britain, France, and West Germany transcend a national purpose or have been enlarged in response to our insisting upon their duty to share the military and economic responsibilities that the United States has assumed. The protection of persons, property, and the pound sterling required Britain to resist Communist guerrillas in Malaya, which was after all still her dependency. In such a case, the bearing of a heavy burden by another country serves its interests and ours simultaneously. If anything, the possibility of a transfer of strength has decreased in the past fifteen years, along with a decline in usable military power in Britain. Britain had in her army 633,242 men in 1948; by 1962 she had 209,500, with further reductions anticipated. The comparable figures for France are 465,000 and 706,000.[12] France, with a system of conscription for a comparatively long term and at relatively low pay, has main-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tained military forces impressively large when measured as a percentage of her population.* As France takes the first steps along the route followed by England, her military planning runs parallel to the earlier English calculations; she will seek to cope with the pressures of large money requirements by making similar adjustments. According to present French plans, the total of men under arms is to be reduced by 40 per cent.**

To compensate for the loss of *influence* that once came from making a military contribution outside their own borders, the one country has tried and the other is now attempting to build nuclear establishments that supposedly promise them some measure of *independence.* The British effort remains dependent on American assistance, and the French effort to build an effective nuclear weapons system is in its infancy. The independence of recent French policy cannot have been grounded on a nuclear force that barely exists. It is, rather, a product of intelligence and political will exercised by President de Gaulle in a world in which bipolar stalemate provides the weak some opportunity to act. Independence of action by France and by the People's Republic of China is at once a product of loosening alliances—the lesser dependence of principals upon their associates—and a protest against it.

In the wake of the war, the countries of Western Europe derived a considerable influence from their weakness and our inability to let them succumb to internal difficulties or external pressures without thereby disadvantaging ourselves in relation to Russia. We were less free then because they were so dependent upon our support. The Soviet challenge made it important to recreate strength in Western Europe, a purpose that could best be achieved cooperatively. From about 1960 onward, the dependence of each of the nuclear giants upon its associates lessened. The earlier postwar pattern was one of interdependence with consequent influence for junior partners. More recently a lesser interdependence has permitted and produced assertions of independence, which must be understood in part as efforts to recapture influence once enjoyed.

* In 1960, 1.5% of total population for France; 1.01% for the United Kingdom; 1.39% for the United States. M. R. D. Foot, *Men in Uniform* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1961), pp. 162, 163.

** The reduction is figured from the level of military manpower in 1960. Ministre des Armées, Pierre Messmer, "Notre Politique Militaire," *Revue de Défense Nationale* (May, 1963), p. 754.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Durability of the Bipolar World

Bipolarity as a descriptive term remains appropriate as long as there is a great gap between the power of the two leading countries and the power of the next most considerable states. When one looks in this light at Communist China, he is likely to be mesmerized by the magic of numbers. Surely 750 million Chinese must enable their Communist government to do some things very damaging to the United States or the Soviet Union, or to both of them. When one considers the West European states, he may be struck by their rapid movement from economic and military dependence upon the United States to positions of some independence. It is natural to ask whether this is part of a trend that will continue, or simply a movement from nearly zero on the scale of independence to a threshold that can hardly be passed. It is easy to think that the trend will continue until, again in the words of Hedley Bull, "over the next decade the Soviet Union and the United States will find themselves still the principal powers in opposed systems of alliances, but, like Britain and Germany 1907–1914, aware that their allies are not irrevocably committed to their cause and able to cooperate themselves against their lesser allies on particular issues."[13] But this is an analogy that can mislead. The allies of Britain and of Germany were of an order of power, as measured by a combination of territory, population, and economic capability, similar to that of their principals. That many important changes have occurred in the past fifteen years is obvious. That the changes that have occurred and others that are likely will lift any present state to the level of Soviet or American capabilities is all but impossible.

In 1962, the gross national product of the Soviet Union was $260 billion, of the United States $555 billion, of West Germany $84 billion, and of Communist China roughly $50 billion. If one projects from these figures, the following picture emerges: the Soviet Union, at an assumed growth rate of 5 per cent, will have in the year 2004 a gross national product of $2,080 billion; the United States, at a growth rate of 3 per cent, will have by 2000 a gross national product of $2,220 billion; West Germany, if it grows at a sustained rate of 6 per cent yearly, will have by 1998 a gross national product of $672 billion, and Communist China, projected at 7 per cent, will have a gross national product in 2002 of $800 billion.* The growth rates assumed are unlikely to be those that

* To complete the picture, Britain in 1962 had a gross national product of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

actually prevail. The rates chosen are those that will narrow the gap between the greatest and the middle powers to the largest extent presently imaginable. Even on these bases, it becomes clear that the Soviet Union and the United States to the end of the millenium will remain the preponderant powers in the world unless two or more of the middle powers combine in a way that gives them the ability to concert their political and military actions on a sustained and reliable basis.

The gap that exists can be described in other ways which are more fragmentary but perhaps give a still sharper picture. The United States has been spending on its military establishment yearly an amount that is two-thirds or more of the entire West German or British or French gross national product. In 1962, the Europe of the Six plus Great Britain spent on defense less than a quarter of the military expenditure of the United States.[14] The United States spends more on military research and development than any of the three largest of the West European countries spends on its entire military establishment.

The country that would develop its own resources, military and other, in order to play an independent role in the world, faces a dreadful problem. It is understandably tempting for such countries to believe that by developing nuclear weapons systems, they can noticeably close the gap between themselves and the superpowers. The assumption that nuclear weapons will serve as the great equalizers appeared early and shows an impressive persistence. "The small country," Jacob Viner wrote in 1946, "will again be more than a cipher or a mere pawn in power-politics, provided it is big enough to produce atomic bombs."[15] Stanley Hoffmann, writing in the present year, reflects a similar thought in the following words: "True, the French nuclear program is expensive; but it is also true that conventional rearmament is not cheaper, and that a division of labor that would leave all nuclear weapons in United States hands and specialize Europe in conventional forces would earmark Europe for permanent dependence (both military and political) in the cold war and permanent decline in the international competition."[16]

$79 billion and France of $72 billion. Gross national product figures for all of the countries mentioned, except China, are from the *New York Times*, January 26, 1964, E8. The figure of $50 billion for China in 1962, though it is a figure that is widely given, is necessarily a crude estimate. As a close and convenient approximation, I have taken 3, 5, 6, and 7% as doubling in 24, 14, 12, and 10 years, respectively.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is difficult to know just what is meant by saying that "conventional rearmament is not cheaper" than a nuclear program, but it is clear that nuclear programs are very expensive indeed.* France and Britain now spend about 7 per cent of their gross national products on defense. If this were increased to the American level of approximately 10 per cent, or even if it were doubled, the defense spending of each country would remain comparatively small. The inability to spend large sums, taken together with the costs of research, development, production, and maintenance, leads one to the conclusion that the French government is betting that Kahn's revolution in military technology every five years will no longer take place. The French might then hope that Polaris submarines, with their missiles, would remain invulnerable. It is doubtful that they are truly invulnerable even now.

The point is a complicated one. By confusing the tracking mechanism of a hunter-killer submarine, an easy accomplishment, one submarine can escape from another. A Soviet submarine, however, may be able to meet and quietly destroy a French submarine as it comes out of port. It is unlikely that the French would in such an event say anything at all; surely they would not wish to draw attention to the loss of what might be one-third of their strategic nuclear system.** To prevent this, France could choose to operate her submarine fleet entirely from the Mediterranean, a sea from which the Soviet Union is militarily excluded. But limiting the direction from which missiles may come will make it easier for the Soviet Union to defend against them. Khrushchev's claim that the Soviet Union's rockets can hit a fly in the sky, which strikes Americans as an irrelevant boast, has an important implication for the country that would build a small nuclear force.[17] Missile defenses, almost useless against large numbers, may be highly successful against the approach of only a few missiles. Furthermore, a single command and control system can easily be obliterated. Middle powers will have to concentrate on a single system or a very small number of systems, and thus deny to themselves the invul-

* Albert Wohlstetter has estimated that the first one hundred Polaris missiles manufactured and operated for five peacetime years will cost three to five times as much as the cost of the first one hundred B-47s ("Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXIX [April, 1961], 364).

** France plans to have three nuclear submarines of sixteen missiles each, the first to be operating in 1969, the others following at two-year intervals (Messmer, "Notre Politique Militaire," p. 747).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nerability gained by the United States from dispersion of the weapons of any one system and the existence of multiple systems. Were military innovation to cease, a force such as that projected by France could gradually be built up to a level of military significance. If, however, a future French Polaris force should begin to look dangerous to the Soviet Union, the increased French capability would itself become an incentive for Russia to move faster. And if Russia does, so must we too. Far short of America or Russia using nuclear weapons for the surgical excision of any country's embryonic nuclear capability, the opportunity to develop a nuclear force to a level of usefulness exists, if it is present at all, only on sufferance of the two nuclear giants.

To look upon nuclear weapons systems as the great equalizers is to see them as causes of the increased power of states. It is more accurate and more useful to look upon them as the products of great scientific and economic capability. The railway age brought a great increase in military mobility, which the elder von Moltke brilliantly exploited in the wars for German unification. So long, however, as war power took the form of great masses of men and material, railways were not able to deliver the whole force of a nation to a front or concentrate it upon a point. Even in transporting a portion of a country's military power, railways were not able to cross the front. Thus in 1914, German armies *marched* through Belgium.[18] In World War II, the wedding of high explosives and air transport still did not make it possible to aggregate a nation's whole power and deliver it suddenly and decisively to designated military targets. World War II was won slowly and largely on the ground. Nuclear technology produced a change decisive in one respect. The power of a nation can now be distilled. Like the French chef who boils down a pig for three days until he has a pint of liquid that represents the very essence of pig, the country that produces nuclear warheads and the requisite delivery systems is distilling the power of a whole nation. But the power has to be there before it can be distilled. The stills of such countries as Britain, France, and Communist China are simply not large enough.

Nuclear weapons systems are not the great equalizers, but they are, rather, in all of their complexity and with all of their tremendous cost, outward signs of the Soviet and American ability to outstrip all others. If other countries should nevertheless be able to build nuclear systems capable of doing great damage on second strike to any attacker, they would then, as the Soviet Union and

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States now do, participate in a nuclear stand-off. Competition would shift to other means, which to some extent has already happened, and traditional criteria of power, including economic and military capability, would once again take on their old significance.

This is not to say that nuclear diffusion makes no difference. It is useful to consider briefly some of the possibilities. (1) A threat by Britain, France, or Communist China to use nuclear force in order to deter a conventional attack launched by a great nuclear power is a threat to do limited damage to the invading state at the risk of one's own annihilation. It is a radically different way of assuming the deterrent-defensive posture of Switzerland and should be interpreted as a move to bow out of the great-power picture. In part the desire for an independent nuclear deterrent derives, as the late Hugh Gaitskell put it, "from doubts about the readiness of the United States Government and the American citizens to risk the destruction of their cities on behalf of Europe."[19] The nuclear superiority enjoyed by America in the early 1950's created in Europe a fear that the United States would too easily succumb to a temptation to retaliate massively. The arrival of strategic stability has produced the opposite worry. In the words of a senior British general: "McNamara is practically telling the Soviets that the worst they need expect from an attack on West Germany is a conventional counterattack."[20] Behind the difference on strategy lies a divergence of interest. A policy of strategic nuclear threat makes the United States the primary target. A policy of controlled response would shift some of the danger as well as additional burdens to Europe. The countries of Europe, separate or united, have an incentive to adopt destabilizing military programs. Where Britain has led, France now follows. While it is understandable that lesser powers should, by threatening or using nuclear weapons, want to be able to decide when the United States or the Soviet Union should risk their own destruction, it is also easy to see that both the United States and the Soviet Union would resist such an outcome. The more badly a country may want to be able to trigger someone else's force, the more difficult it becomes to do so, which is another way of saying that the Soviet Union and the United States have something close to invulnerable second-strike systems.

(2) If a middle power were engaged in a conventional military action against a state of comparable or lesser size, the Soviet Union or the United States might threaten a nuclear strike in order to

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bring about a withdrawal. It is sometimes thought that the possession of a small nuclear force by the middle power would make such a threat ineffective. In the Suez adventure, for example, military action by Britain and France called forth Soviet rocket threats against them. Against states having no strategic nuclear forces, such threats would be more readily credited, and thus more likely to exert pressure successfully against the conventional action itself. A small military action, however, is not worth and does not require nuclear interference by a great power, for it can be stopped in other ways. The onus of threatening to use nuclear weapons first, in order to interdict conventional interference, is then placed upon the smaller power. Such a threat would not be credible.

Both the first and second uses presuppose the adequacy of the small country's nuclear threat when directed against the United States or the Soviet Union. A capability that is small compared to America's or Russia's may be adequate to its task; a certain minimum, doubtfully achievable in the foreseeable future, is nevertheless required. When Hedley Bull says that the French ambition is "to become strong enough to choose deliberately to act alone,"[21] he may have in mind the second use mentioned above, or the one following, which is seldom discussed.

(3) As the United States and the Soviet Union have opened up a gap in military power between themselves and all others, so Britain, France, the People's Republic of China, and states who may follow them can differentiate themselves from non-nuclear nations. Great Britain has placed nuclear weapons in the Middle and Far East. Let us suppose Indonesia were to move militarily against Malaysia. A British threat to use nuclear weapons could conceivably follow, which might cause Indonesia to stop short or might persuade the United States to offer the support of the Seventh Fleet and American Marines in order to avoid the use of nuclear weapons.

The effects of nuclear diffusion are necessarily uncertain, but one point can sensibly be made: Building a small nuclear force is an unpromising way of seeking to maintain the integrity of one's state, even though it may enable that state to act positively against equal or lesser powers.

There can be approximate equality among states even where there is considerable disparity in the material bases of their power. Whether or not effective power is fashioned from the material available depends upon adequacy of national organization, wisdom of policy, and intensity of effort. In the 1920's, France sought to

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

maintain a greater military strength than Germany in order to compensate for a lesser French productivity and smaller population. Where the material differences are relatively small or where countries of immensely larger capacity are quiescent, it may be possible to "mobilize" a nation in peacetime in order to build on a lesser material base a superior military strength. Germany and Japan in the 1930's began to play the game from which France was withdrawing. The Soviet Union, since the war, has been able to challenge the United States in many parts of the world by spending a disproportionately large share of her smaller income on military means. There is in the West a quiet nightmare that the People's Republic of China may follow such a path, that it may mobilize the nation in order to increase production rapidly while simultaneously acquiring a large and modern military capability. It is doubtful that she can do either, and surely not both, and surely not the second without the first, as the data previously given clearly indicate. As for France and Great Britain, it strains the imagination to the breaking point to believe that in a world in which scientific and technological progress has been rapid, either of them will be able to maintain the pace.* Unable to spend on anywhere near the American or Russian level for work in research, development, and production, middle powers will, once they have gained an initial advantage, constantly find themselves falling behind. France and Britain are in the second-ranking powers' customary position of imitating, with a time lag, the more advanced weapons systems of their wealthier competitors.**

From the above analysis, it is clear that the time when other states can compete at the highest levels of power by a superiority of effort in mobilizing their resources lies far in the future. Unless

* It is not wholly absurd for British and French governments to proclaim, as they frequently do, that an embryonic capability brings an immediate increase of strength; for further expenditures are not likely to bring much of an additional payoff. Cf. President de Gaulle's message to his minister-delegate at Reggane upon the explosion of France's first atomic device: "'Hurrah for France! From this morning she is stronger and prouder!'" Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), p. 91.

** The experiences of Chinese Communists prior to 1949 and of the People's Republic of China since that date suggest that attempts to outflank may bring a greater success than efforts to imitate! Or, applying an economist's term to military matters, would-be Nth-countries would do well to ask, where do we have a comparative advantage?

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some states combine or others dissolve in chaos, the world will remain bipolar until the end of the present century.

Some Dissenting Opinions

The fact remains that many students of international relations have continued to judge bipolarity unstable as compared to the probable stability of a multipower world. Why have they been so confident that the existence of a number of powers, moving in response to constantly recurring variations in national power and purpose, would promote the desired stability? According to Professors Morgenthau and Kaplan, the uncertainty that results from flexibility of alignment generates a healthy caution in the foreign policy of every country.[22] Concomitantly, Professor Morgenthau believes that in the present bipolar world, "the flexibility of the balance of power and, with it, its restraining influence upon the power aspirations of the main protagonists on the international scene have disappeared."[23] One may agree with his conclusion and yet draw from his analysis another one unstated by him: The inflexibility of a bipolar world, with the appetite for power of each major competitor at once whetted and checked by the other, may promote a greater stability than flexible balances of power among a larger number of states.

What are the grounds for coming to a diametrically different conclusion? The presumed double instability of a bipolar world, that it easily erodes or explodes, is to a great extent based upon its assumed bloc character. A bloc improperly managed may indeed fall apart. The leader of each bloc must be concerned at once with alliance management, for the defection of an allied state might be fatal to its partners, and with the aims and capabilities of the opposing bloc. The system is more complex than is a multipower balance, which in part accounts for its fragility.* The situation

* Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957), p. 37; and "Bipolarity in a Revolutionary Age," in Kaplan, ed., *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 254. The difficulties and dangers found in a bipolar world by Kaplan are those detected by Hans J. Morgenthau in a system of opposing alliances. It is of direct importance in assessing the stability of international systems to note that Morgenthau finds "the opposition of two alliances . . . the most frequent configuration within the system of the balance of power" (*Politics Among Nations* [3d ed.; New York: Knopf, 1961, part 4], p. 189). Kaplan, in turn, writes that "the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preceding World War I provides a striking example. The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would have left Germany alone in the center of Europe. The approximate equality of alliance partners, or their relation of true interdependence, plus the closeness of competition between the two camps, meant that while any country could commit its associates, no one country on either side could exercise control. By contrast, in 1956 the United States could dissociate itself from the Suez adventure of its two principal allies and even subject them to pressure. Great Britain, like Austria in 1914, tried to commit, or at least immobilize, its alliance partner by presenting him with a *fait accompli.* Enjoying a position of predominance, the United States could, as Germany could not, focus its attention on the major adversary while disciplining its ally. The situations are in other respects different, but the ability of the United States, in contrast to Germany, to pay a price measured in intra-alliance terms is striking.

It is important, then, to distinguish sharply a bipolarity of blocs from a bipolarity of countries. Fénelon thought that of all conditions of balance the opposition of two states was the happiest. Morgenthau dismisses this judgment with the comment that the benefits Fénelon had hoped for had not accrued in our world since the war, which depends, one might think, on what benefits had otherwise been expected.*

The conclusion that a multipower balance is relatively stable is reached by overestimating the system's flexibility, and then dwelling too fondly upon its effects.** A constant shuffling of alliances would be as dangerous as an unwillingness to make new combinations. Neither too slow nor too fast: the point is a fine one, made finer still by observing that the rules should be followed not merely out of an immediate interest of the state but also for the sake of preserving the international system. The old balance-of-power system here looks suspiciously like the new collective-security system of the League of Nations and the United Nations. Either system

---

most likely transformation of the 'balance of power' system is to a bipolar system" (*System and Process,* p. 36).

* Kaplan, though he treats the case almost as being trivial, adds a statement that is at least suggestive: "The tight bipolar system is stable only when both bloc actors are hierarchically organized" (*System and Process,* p. 43).

** Kaplan, e.g., by the fourth and sixth of his rules of a balance-of-power system, requires a state to oppose any threatening state and to be willing to ally with any other (*System and Process,* p. 23).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

depends for its maintenance and functioning upon a "neutrality of alignment" at the moment of serious threat. To preserve the system, the powerful states must overcome the constraints of previous ties and the pressures of both ideological preferences and conflicting present interests in order to confront the state that threatens the system.[24]

In the history of the modern state system, flexibility of alignment has been conspicuously absent just when, in the interest of stability, it was most highly desirable.[25] A comparison of flexibility within a multipower world with the ability of the two present superpowers to compensate for changes by their internal efforts is requisite, for comparison changes the balance of optimism and pessimism as customarily applied to the two different systems. In the world of the 1930's, with a European grouping of three, the Western democracies, out of lassitude, political inhibition, and ideological distaste, refrained from acting or from combining with others at the advantageous moment. War provided the pressure that forced the world's states into two opposing coalitions. In peacetime the bipolar world displays a clarity of relations that is ordinarily found only in war. Raymond Aron has pointed out that the international "système depend de ce que sont, concrètement, les deux pôles, non pas seulement du fait qu'ils sont deux."[26] Modifying Aron's judgment and reversing that of many others, we would say that in a bipolar world, as compared to one of many powers, the international system is more likely to dominate. External pressures, if clear and great enough, force the external combination or the internal effort that interest requires. The political character of the alliance partner is then most easily overlooked and the extent to which foreign policy is determined by ideology is decreased.

The number of great states in the world has always been so limited that two acting in concert or, more common historically, one state driving for hegemony could reasonably conclude that the balance would be altered by their actions. In the relations of states since the Treaty of Westphalia, there have never been more than eight great powers, the number that existed, if one is generous in admitting doubtful members to the club, on the eve of the First World War. Given paucity of members, states cannot rely on an equilibrating tendency of the system. Each state must instead look to its own means, gauge the likelihood of encountering opposition, and estimate the chances of successful cooperation. The advantages

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of an international system with more than two members can at best be small. A careful evaluation of the factors elaborated above indicates that the disadvantages far outweigh them.

Conclusions That Bear upon Policy

If the preceding explanations are correct, they are also of practical importance. Fixation upon the advantages of flexibility in a multipower balance has often gone hand in hand with an intense anxiety associated with bipolarity: the fear that a downward slide or a sudden technological breakthrough by one great state or the other would decisively alter the balance between them. Either occurrence could bring catastrophic war, which for the disadvantaged would be a war of desperation, or world domination from one center with or without preceding war. The fear is pervasive, and in American writings most frequently rests on the assumption that, internally dissolute and tired of the struggle, we will award the palm to the Soviet Union. Sometimes this anxiety finds a more sophisticated expression, which turns less upon internal derangements. In this view, the United States, as the defensive power in the world, is inherently disadvantaged, for the aggressive power will necessarily gain if the competition continues long enough. But a conclusion derived from an incomplete proposition is misleading. One must add that the aggressive state may lose even though the state seeking to uphold the status quo never take the offensive. The Soviet Union controls no nation now, except possibly Cuba, that was not part of its immediate postwar gains. It has lost control in Yugoslavia and the control it once seemed to have in China. The United States, since the time it began to behave as a defensive power, has seen some states slip from commitment to neutralism, but only North Vietnam and Cuba have come under Communist control. One would prefer no losses at all, but losses of this magnitude can easily be absorbed. On balance, one might argue that the United States has gained, though such a judgment depends on the base line from which measurement is made as well as upon how gains and losses are defined.

That the United States and the Soviet Union weigh losses and gains according to their effect upon the bipolar balance is crucial, but there are many changes in Africa, or Asia, or Latin America that are not likely to be to the advantage of either the Soviet Union or the United States. This judgment can be spelled out in a number

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of ways. The doctrine of containment, for example, should be amended to read: defend, or insulate so that one loss need not lead to another. The habits of the cold war are so ingrained and the dangers of a bipolar world so invigorating that the defensive country is easily led to overreact. In Southeast Asia, since no gain for Communist China is likely to benefit the Soviet Union, American concern should be confined to maintaining its reputation and avoiding distant repercussions. If one goes further and asks how great a gain will accrue to the People's Republic of China if it extends its territorial control marginally, the answer, in any of the areas open to it, must be "very little." Neutralization moves by President de Gaulle, if they can obscure the responsibility for unwanted events, may in fact be helpful. It is important to realize that the bipolar world is continuing lest we worry unnecessarily and define the irrelevant gesture or even the helpful suggestion of lesser powers as troublesome.

A 5 per cent growth rate sustained for three years would add to the American gross national product an amount greater than the entire gross national product of Britain or France or West Germany. Even so, the accretion of power the Soviet Union would enjoy by adding, say, West Germany's capabilities to her own would be immensely important; and one such gain might easily lead to others. Most gains from outside, however, can add relatively little to the strengths of the Soviet Union or the United States. There are, then, few single losses that would be crucial, which is a statement that points to a tension within our argument. Bipolarity encourages each giant to focus upon crises, while rendering most of them of relative inconsequence. We might instead put it this way: Crisis is of concern only where giving way would lead to an accumulation of losses for one and gains for the other. In an age characterized by rapidity of change, in many respects time is slowed down—as is illustrated by the process of "losing" Indo-China that has gone on for nineteen years without a conclusive result. Since only a succession of gains could be decisive, there is time for the losing state to contrive a countering action should it be necessary to do so.

Intensity and breadth of competition and recurrence of crises limn a picture of constant conflict verging on violence. At the same time, the relative simplicity of relations within a bipolar world,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the great pressures that are generated, and the constant possibility of catastrophe produce a conservatism on the part of the two greatest powers. The Soviet Union and the United States may feel more comfortable dealing *à deux* than in contemplating a future world in which they vie for existence and possible advantage with other superpowers. While there is naturally worry about an increase of tensions to intolerable levels, there is also a fear that the tensions themselves will lead America and Russia to seek agreements designed to bring a relaxation that will be achieved at the expense of lesser powers. The French general, Paul Stehlin, commenting on American opposition to Nth-country nuclear forces, which he interprets as part of an American-Russian effort to maintain a bipolar world, asks wistfully: "Does Europe have less political maturity than the Big Two credit each other with?" With some bitterness he criticizes America for placing "more faith in the ability of the Russians to control their tremendous stockpiles of offensive weapons than they do in my country's capacity to use with wisdom and moderation the modest armaments it is working so hard to develop for purely deterrent purposes."[27]

Worries and fears on any such grounds are exaggerated. The Soviet Union and the United States influence each other more than any of the states living in their penumbra can possibly hope to do. In the world of the present, as of the recent past, a condition of mutual opposition may require rather than preclude the adjustment of differences. Yet first steps toward agreement have not led to second and third steps. Instead they have been mingled with other acts and events that have kept the level of tension quite high. The test ban was described in the United States as possibly a first great step toward wider agreement that would increase the chances of maintaining peace. In almost the same breath it was said that we cannot lower our guard, for Soviet aims have not changed.[28] Larger acts than agreement to halt testing under the sea and above the ground are required to alter a situation that congealed long ago. The Soviet Union and the United States remain for the foreseeable future the two countries that can irreparably damage each other. So long as both possess the capability, each must worry that the other might use it. The worry describes the boundaries that have so far limited both the building up of tensions and the abatement of competition.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Where weapons of horrible destructive power exist, stability necessarily appears as an important end. It will not, however, be everyone's highest value. One who accepts the analysis of bipolarity and the conclusions we have drawn may nevertheless prefer a world of many powers. The unity and self-dependence of Europe may, for example, rank higher as goals than international stability. Or, one may think of European unity as a means of melding American power with the strength of a united Europe in order to achieve Western hegemony. Unipolarity may be preferable, for those peoples who then become dominant, to a competition between two polar states. It may even promise a greater stability. The question is too complicated to take up at the moment, but some words of caution are in order.

The United States has consistently favored the unification of Europe, for adding the strength of a united Europe to the existing power of America would be sufficient to establish a world hegemony. But there is a confusion in American rhetoric that accurately reflects a confusion in thought. We have wanted a Europe united and strong and thus able to share our burdens with us, but a Europe at the same time docile and pliant so that it would agree on which burdens are to be assumed and how duties should be shared. The enchanting dream of Western hegemony has many implications, some of them possibly unpleasant. A Europe of the Seven, or even the Six, could, given time to put its combined resources to work, become a third power in the world on the largest scale. President de Gaulle has entertained the fear that such a Europe, if it were to be born under Anglo-Saxon auspices, would serve as an instrument of American foreign policy. One may have doubts of what would necessarily follow.[29] De Gaulle is a useful instructor. If we find the weak troublesome, will the strong be more easily controlled? A united Europe would represent a great change in the world; because the change would be great, its effects are difficult to foresee. If Europe were to be stable, strong, and cooperative, one might be delighted; but surely it would be dangerous to predict that a new Europe would rapidly find internal stability and develop political maturity. It would be more dangerous still to assume that the old American and the new European state would find their policies always in harmony. It is seemingly a safe assumption that a clear and pressing interest of a new state of Europe would be to stand firm against any Soviet attempts to move forward. But interests must be taken in relation to situations. In a world of three

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

great powers, identical interests may logically lead and in the past have led to dangerously disparate policies. European history of the twentieth century makes optimism difficult. Nor could one be serene about America's reaction. Typically, Americans have insufficiently valued the prize of power. The yearning for a Europe united and thus strong enough to oppose the Soviet Union unaided is but one example. The pressures of bipolarity have helped to produce responsibility of action. A relaxation of those pressures will change the situation to one in which it will no longer be clear who will oppose whom. Two considerations then should give one pause: the necessarily unpredictable quality of the third power and the greater instability of a multipower world.

A system of small numbers can always be disrupted by the actions of a Hitler and the reactions of a Chamberlain. Since this is true, it may seem that we are in the uncomfortable position of relying on the moderation, courage, and rationality of men holding crucial positions of power. Given the vagaries of men and the unpredictability of the individual's reaction to events, one may at this point feel that one's only recourse is to lapse into prayer. We can, nonetheless, take comfort from the thought that, like other men, those who are elevated to power and direct the activities of great states are not wholly free agents. Beyond the residuum of necessary hope that men will respond sensibly lies the possibility of estimating the pressures that encourage and constrain them to do so. In a world in which two states united in their mutual antagonism far overshadow any other, the incentives to a calculated response stand out most clearly, and the sanctions against irresponsible behavior achieve their greatest force. Not only how the leaders will think but also who they may be will be affected by the presence of pressures and the clarity of challenges. One may lament Churchill's failure to gain control of the British government in the 1930's, for he knew what actions were required to maintain a balance-of-power system. Churchill did come to power, it is interesting to note, as the world began to assume the bipolar form familiar in wartime. If a people representing one pole of the world now indulges itself by selecting inept rulers, it runs clearly discernible risks. Leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union are presumably chosen with an eye to the tasks they will have to perform. Other countries can enjoy, if they wish, the luxury of selecting lead-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ers who will most please their peoples by the way in which internal affairs are managed. The United States and the Soviet Union cannot.

It is not that one entertains the utopian hope that all future Premiers of the Soviet Union and Presidents of the United States will combine in their persons a complicated set of nearly perfect virtues, but rather that the pressures of a bipolar world will strongly encourage them to act in ways better than their characters might otherwise lead one to expect. It is not that one possesses a serene confidence in the peacefulness, or even the survival of the world, but rather that cautious optimism may be justified as long as the pressures to which each must respond are so clearly present. Either country may go beserk or succumb to inanation and debility. That necessities are clear increases the chances that they will be met, but there can be no guarantees. Dangers from abroad may unify a state and spur its people to heroic action. Or, as with France facing Hitler's Germany, external pressures may divide the leaders, confuse the public, and increase their willingness to give way. It may also happen that the difficulties of adjustment and the necessity for calculated action simply become too great. The clarity with which the necessities of action can now be seen may be blotted out by the blinding flash of nuclear explosions. The fear that this may happen has reinforced the factors and processes described in the preceding pages.

By making the two strongest states still more powerful and the emergence of third powers more difficult, nuclear weapons have helped to consolidate a condition of bipolarity. It is to a great extent due to its bipolar structure that the world since the war has enjoyed a stability seldom known where three or more powers have sought to cooperate with each other or have competed for existence.

References

1. Henry Kissinger, "Strains on the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs,* XLI (January, 1963), 284. Cf. Max Kohnstamm, "The European Tide," *Dædalus,* XCIII (Winter, 1964), 100–102; McGeorge Bundy's speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, *New York Times,* December 7, 1961; John F. Kennedy, "Address at Independence Hall," Philadelphia, July 4, 1962, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 537–539.

2. Quoted in V. D. Sokolovskii, ed., *Soviet Military Strategy,* Herbert S.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dinerstein, Leon Gouré, and Thomas W. Wolfe, translators and English editors (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 43.

3. Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 315.

4. Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 210–211.

5. Hedley Bull, "Atlantic Military Problems: A Preliminary Essay." Prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations meeting of November 20, 1963, p. 21. Quoted with permission of the author.

6. P. E. Vyshinsky, "Communism and the Motherland," as quoted in *The Kremlin Speaks* (Department of State publication, 4264, October, 1951), pp. 6, 7.

7. National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, *Official Report*, 81st Annual Conference, Llandudno (October 10–13, 1962), p. 93.

8. Ambassade de France, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 185 (January 14, 1963), p. 9.

9. In a statement taped in Peking before his African trip in January of 1964, *New York Times*, February 4, 1964, p. 2. Cf. the message sent by Communist China's leaders to Premier Khrushchev upon the occasion of his seventieth birthday. After referring to differences between them, it is stated that: "In the event of a major world crisis, the two parties, our two peoples will undoubtedly stand together against our common enemy," *New York Times*, April 17, 1964, p. 3.

10. Leland M. Goodrich, "Korea: Collective Measures Against Aggression," *International Conciliation*, No. 494 (October, 1953), 164.

11. "Stresses and Strains in 'Going It With Others,'" in Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 7.

12. *The Statesman's Year-Book*, S. H. Steinberg, ed. (London: Macmillan, 1948), p. 50. *Ibid.* (1951), p. 991. *Ibid.* (1963), pp. 103, 104, 1003. The figures for Great Britain exclude the women's services, Territorial Army, and colonial troops. Those for France exclude the gendarmes.

13. Bull, "Atlantic Military Problems," p. 24.

14. Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, *Arms and Stability in Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 205.

15. Jacob Viner, "The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, XC (1946), 55.

16. Stanley Hoffmann, "Cursing de Gaulle Is Not a Policy," *The Reporter*, XXX (January 30, 1964), 40.

17. Cf. Malcolm W. Hoag, "On Stability in Deterrent Races," in Morton A.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kaplan, ed., *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1962), pp. 408, 409.

18. Cf. a forthcoming book by Victor Basiuk, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.

19. *House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates* (March 1, 1960), cols. 1136–1138. Compare Hugh Gaitskell, *The Challenge of Co-Existence* (London: Methuen, 1957), pp. 45–46.

20. Quoted by Eldon Griffiths, "The Revolt of Europe," *The Saturday Evening Post,* CCLXIII (March 9, 1963), 19.

21. Bull, "Atlantic Military Problems," p. 29.

22. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (3d ed.; New York: Knopf, 1961), part 4. Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 22–36. I shall refer only to Morgenthau and Kaplan, for their writings are widely known and represent the majority opinion of students in the field.

23. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations,* p. 350. Cf. Kaplan, *System and Process,* pp. 36–43; and Kaplan, "Bipolarity in a Revolutionary Age," in Kaplan, ed., *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1962), pp. 251–266.

24. The point is nicely made in an unpublished paper by Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Actor Objectives and International Systems" (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, February, 1964), pp. 43–44.

25. For a sharp questioning of "the myth of flexibility," see George Liska's review article "Continuity and Change in International Systems," *World Politics,* XVI (October, 1963), 122–123.

26. Raymond Aron, *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962), p. 156.

27. Gen. Paul Stehlin, "The Evolution of Western Defense," *Foreign Affairs,* XLII (October, 1963), 81, 77.

28. See, for example, Secretary Rusk's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *New York Times,* August 13, 1963.

29. Ambassade de France, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 175 (May 15, 1962), p. 6.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ROGER FISHER

Perceiving the World through Bipolar Glasses

AFTER reading "The Stability of a Bipolar World," I remain convinced that the world is neither stable nor bipolar. And yet, of course, one must agree with much of what Kenneth Waltz says.

In a world as complicated as that in which we live, clarity and understanding can come only through simplification and emphasis. A political scientist must select before he analyzes. His selection of features of international life for analysis and comment is based on explicit or implicit assumptions about what is relevant. This in turn depends upon the purpose his paper is designed to serve. Kenneth Waltz is saying that in some respects the world is dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States, that some features of their predominance—such as gross national product and second-strike thermonuclear capability—are likely to remain constant for more than a generation, and that this two-power situation will inhibit certain kinds of changes in the world and may minimize the risk of thermonuclear war between the two powers.

I agree. But where does this lead us? What conclusion is the reader asked to draw? If the purpose of the paper were limited to questioning the desirability of making Europe into a third superpower—a power which might produce instability in an area of relations which would otherwise be stable—the data selected would be clearly relevant and the analysis one with which I would have no quarrel.

There seems, however, to be a broader purpose in describing the world as bipolar. The paper seems to suggest that for the next thirty-five years the single most important feature of international relations will be a two-power conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, and that the United States ought to consider other problems primarily in terms of their bearing on this situation. Waltz states that "with only two world powers there are no pe-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ripheries," and emphasizes "the relative simplicity of relations within a bipolar world."

The paper suggests that a perception of the world as bipolar should affect and apparently determine United States policy toward third states. Having recognized that a "bipolar stalemate provides to the weak some opportunity to act," Waltz nonetheless considers countries such as France and China impotent because of "their inability to affect the dominant relation in the world." In his "Conclusions that Bear on Policy" he cautions the United States against paying too much attention to matters that do not relate to the strength of its single opponent:

> . . . there are many changes in Africa, or Asia, or Latin America that are not likely to be to the advantage of either the Soviet Union or the United States. . . . In Southeast Asia, since no gain for Communist China is likely to benefit the Soviet Union, American concern should be confined to maintaining its reputation and avoiding distant repercussions. . . . It is important to realize that the bipolar world continues lest we worry unnecessarily. . . .

Waltz recognizes that in describing the world of today and tomorrow as bipolar he is out of step with many. Perhaps some points of difference can be sharpened.

It might be unfair to define Waltz's position as being that "the world" either is or is not bipolar—that if it is bipolar for some purposes then it is bipolar for all purposes. Yet my principal difficulty with his position does come from his drawing political conclusions from the physical facts relating to nuclear weapons and industrial capacity. It seems to me unwise to attempt an all-purpose analysis of the world as being either bipolar or multipolar. A law student quickly learns to respond to general questions, such as whether a child is a citizen or whether an airplane is a motor vehicle, with his own question: "For what purpose?" Would it not be wise to identify with some precision the purposes for which the world may be considered bipolar from those for which it should not?

Even when the precise purpose of the analysis is known, what meaning is conveyed by the figure of speech "bipolar"? Early in his paper Waltz shifts in a single paragraph from referring to "a two-power world" to "the bipolar world." He suggests that "Bipolarity as a descriptive term remains appropriate so long as there is a great gap between the power of the two leading countries and the power of the next most considerable states." Bipolarity suggests more than that to me. An object that is polar is one that is pivotal, like

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a pole or axis, around which all else turns, or one of two opposites, like the poles of a magnet. The very question for consideration is whether a world of two super-powers will be one in which hostility between them operates as an organizing principle for the whole world. This is not simply a matter of definition of terms. Not only is a world of two super-powers defined by Waltz as a bipolar world; an intricate international political relationship is then deduced. For example, he asserts that with a bipolar balance other states "know" that it is the strength of the Soviet Union and the United States "upon which their own security continues to rest."

It may be that a world with two physically powerful countries necessarily becomes and remains one which, at least so far as they are concerned, is dominated by a political conflict between them. But that is far from being demonstrated to my satisfaction. I doubt whether economic and military potential is that determinative of history. Rather than perceived as the poles of a magnet, the economic and thermonuclear power of the two big states might be considered more like two jokers in a deck of cards, each joker capable of trumping any card except the other joker. Political factors may so shuffle the deck, or even change the game, that in many important future plays these powerful cards will not be involved; in others they may end up in the same hand.

In stating that a stalemate between two industrial and military giants is "the dominant relation in the world" and therefore should be the foremost guide to United States action, Waltz is making a prediction and suggesting a policy. There seem several reasons both to question a prediction that world affairs will in fact be dominated by a United States–Soviet Union conflict and to question whether the United States ought to pursue a policy of treating its differences with the Soviet Union as the most important feature of international relations.

First, as to the prediction. A bipolar stalemate, to the extent that it exists, may result in shifting the principal activity to other areas of conflict and other means of carrying it on. A seventeenth-century scholar, noting that Protestantism and Catholicism were contending for dominance in Europe, might accurately have calculated that no other religion would be able to catch up with these two. It would have been error for him to predict, however, that this would result in a substantial period of European history during which the dominant political feature would be a bipolar religious stalemate.

The stability which Waltz feels for the United States may, to use

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a different illustration, be like that of a blue-blooded family, secure in a stable relationship among "those who really count," and confident that no *nouveau riche* could ever catch up in terms of their criterion. But a stalemate in rivalries among great families tended to make those rivalries less important, certainly for others and even for the participants themselves. The expert gunman of the wild west who could hold his own against any other discovered that other contests quite quickly became more significant; for important issues drawing crowds and voters became more critical than drawing guns. Such analogies cannot prove that the cold war confrontation will in fact become far less significant. They do, however, suggest that it may.

A more basic cause for doubting that a strategic-nuclear and gross-national-product balance between the Soviet Union and the United States will be the dominant political feature of the world's next thirty-five years is derived from a look at the world today. Lively and troublesome conflicts in which a Soviet–United States confrontation is not dominant are suggested by place names currently in the news: Cyprus, South Africa, Yemen, Panama, Angola, Israel and Taiwan, to name a few. Waltz correctly notes that most crises would result in little or no change in the physical strength of the two super-powers. He suggests that therefore bipolarity renders most crises "of relative inconsequence." That most of the world's political business is irrelevant to the stable bipolar world of which Waltz writes may demonstrate the unimportance to us of the world's concerns—or, alternatively, the unimportance to the world of that stable bipolarity.

It is, of course, of overwhelming importance that the destructive capacity possessed by the Soviet Union and the United States not be used. To the extent that an effective balance between the gross destructive power of these two countries makes nuclear war unlikely it is critical that the balance remain stable. But the very existence of a strategic stand-off in political as well as military terms suggests that for the future the primary field of action will be elsewhere.

Major political conflict of the next generation may be drawn along racial lines, or along lines dividing haves from have-nots, agricultural from industrial societies, or primary producers from consumers. Perhaps more likely, new ideological lines may harden between revolutionary and status-quo powers, or between various blocs in the United Nations. The fact that practical goals—politi-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cal, economic or social—cannot be attained through the actual use of the gross nuclear force available suggests that in the years ahead other means of persuasion are likely to become the effective currency. These other forms of persuasion, like those used by Ghandi and current civil-rights demonstrators, will not be a simple distillation of a state's gross national product. Perceived legitimacy (including sympathy for the underdog) plays an increasing role in determining the outcome of public controversy. The fact that there are two industrial and military giants may thus neither form the issues nor dictate the outcomes of the problems with which most of the political leaders will be concerned most of the time.

If a world dominated by a bipolar conflict seems to me a dubious prediction, it seems an even more dubious guide to a foreign policy for the United States. Waltz is suggesting that the United States look at every international issue first and foremost in terms of its possible effect on the physical strength of the Soviet Union. Issues which do not touch the strategic balance can be dismissed as relatively unimportant. He believes that the most promising future for the world depends upon our maintaining a vigorous tension, sparked by frequent crises, between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

United States foreign policy should not only react to the world as it is. We have the power to affect the world as it is going to be. Our long run goal is to strengthen the United Nations and the general fabric of the international community the better to serve the needs of ourselves and other men. We are rightly concerned with the freedom and welfare of our fellow men wherever they are located. To be sure, the wisest policy for the United States may not be to attempt to control events for which we have no direct responsibility and over which, at best, we have a limited power of influence. But it is unlikely that a war on poverty can or should stop at the national boundaries. Much of the world is in political as well as social and economic turmoil. We know that already the United Nations can sometimes do a better job than could the United States. Already, the Peace Corps may be more significant than a Polaris submarine.

We have an enormous power of leadership in directing the world's efforts toward problems that cry for attention, such as curbing population growth, developing the ocean's resources, and applying existing technology toward feeding, clothing, housing and educating the billions of human beings that will be on this globe before the next thirty-five years are over. I remain unper-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suaded that the wisest use of this power of leadership is for the United States to undertake as its primary mission in the world the preservation of a modified version of the cold war. To look at the world through bipolar glasses runs the risk of blinding us to both problems and opportunities. The very stability of the bipolar aspect of the world—if true—demonstrates that the field for action and opportunity lies elsewhere.

Waltz is to be commended for concerning himself with a question which is far more important than most military or arms control questions: the general structure of the international community in which we are going to live, and our general guides to policy in it. In forcing us to recognize durability in the position of the two super-powers he has made a substantial contribution. The problem remains of reconciling this wisdom with the churning diversity of the world around us.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH

Eppuor Si Muove

"IT MAY seem that to write in 1964 of bipolarity is merely to display nostalgia for an era already ending," Professor Waltz writes; and I must confess that I agree with him.

His major thesis seems to be that the American and Soviet monopoly of major thermonuclear striking power, and the resultant bipolar strategic stalemate, preclude a multipolar international system. To this I would reply as follows.

1. There exists today a relatively new and immense disparity between economic, technological, and scientific power on the one hand and thermonuclear power on the other (e.g., in Western Europe), or between the potential of total power plus massive land forces (China), and actual military strength.

2. Given the bipolar thermonuclear stalemate, and the fact that the Soviet Union remains expansionist and the United States a status quo power which is determined to maintain what it has, their competition in underdeveloped areas is inevitable. Given, further, the exclusion of thermonuclear weapons from these areas, multipolarity (e.g., including France and China) is already an established fact at all levels below direct conflict of U.S.–U.S.S.R. vital interests (e.g., Cuba in October 1962).

3. The nature of the existing multipolarity is asymmetrical: France wants to influence the United States to accept a new and looser NATO, but China is determined to depose the U.S.S.R. as the predominant power in the international Communist movement and to force a change in Soviet leadership and policies.

4. U.S.–U.S.S.R. deterrence exists, far more so than Professor Waltz indicates, because of the mutual threat of at least partially irrational conduct—e.g., the launching of a thermonuclear strike over Berlin. This same assertion offers the key to the major point of difference between us.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He puts the major premise of his analysis perhaps most clearly on Page 907:

> . . . Other countries can enjoy, if they wish, the luxury of selecting leaders who will most please their peoples by the way in which internal affairs are managed. The United States and the Soviet Union cannot. . . .

Yet he adds:

> . . . A system of small numbers can always be disrupted by the actions of a Hitler and the reactions of a Chamberlain. . . . But . . . those who are elevated to power . . . are not wholly free agents. . . . In a world in which two states united in their mutual antagonism far overshadow any other, the incentives to a calculated response stand out most clearly and the sanctions against irresponsible behavior achieve their greatest force. . . .

A slender reed of hope, I should think. Professor Waltz argues often from history; he might well also have quoted Gibbon's dictum: "History is indeed the record of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind," and Acton's: "All power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

Professor Waltz has of course not been corrupted by power, but his whole treatment, it seems to me, has been too strongly influenced by it. He says to the French, and (*po russki*) to the Chinese: "We are more powerful than you; we will stay so; and anyway, you are safer with our judgment on thermonuclear weapons than with your own." To which they can well answer, "Good government is worse than self-government," and act—as they are doing—accordingly.

Professor Waltz does not discuss the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons, but clearly he is against it. Yet were I French or Chinese, I would regard his article as an excellent argument in favor of proliferation. And in any case nothing can prevent proliferation, not so much because France already has some nuclear weapons and China surely will have, but because the current disparity between economic and military power, history teaches, is unlikely long to continue. Furthermore, as General de Gaulle knows only too well for our own comfort, there is one key advantage to a small power of a small nuclear deterrent: it can prevent the two super-powers from coercing it when it is using conventional weapons in a limited or sub-limited war. If France had had nuclear weapons at the time of the 1956 Suez crisis, if China had had them at the time of the Quemoy-Matsu crises of 1958 and 1959, would they have been forced to such ignominious retreats? If Israel or

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

South Africa get them soon, will they then be as endangered as they are now by Arab or African onslaughts made worse by Soviet rocket-brandishing?

I cannot agree, therefore, with Professor Waltz's analysis: his precisely reasoned argument is nevertheless, I fear, *laus temporis acti*. Professor Waltz maintains the world has not moved away from bipolarity; I maintain it has. It follows, therefore, that I disagree even more strongly with his policy recommendations. They may be fairly summarized, I think, as advocating a continuing series of agreements with the Soviet Union, preferably from a position of American superiority, if necessary at the cost of our European allies and not necessarily precluding the abandonment of such American commitments as South Vietnam.

My own view is the contrary. The most serious threat to American security is the Soviet Union. True, it is now in a period of strategic pause because of its internal problems, its struggle with China, and its defeat by us in the October, 1962 Cuban missile crisis. But it remains a chauvinist, expansionist power, with whom useful but peripheral agreements can be reached only as long as it remains in a position of strategic inferiority. We can maintain this superiority only with the aid of our allies; were one or more of them to come under Soviet influence, we might easily lose it. They are, therefore, more important to us than is the Soviet Union. Furthermore, even General de Gaulle, as his firm stand during the Cuban crisis demonstrated, considers Moscow more of a threat than Washington; and London and Bonn hold this view much more firmly still.

Our most immediate enemy is Communist China because of her support of the guerrilla war in South Vietnam and her general chauvinism, expansionism, and support of revolutionary guerrilla war. Professor Waltz may consider the loss of South Vietnam as a "marginal" extension of Peking's influence, but so did Neville Chamberlain about Hitler's acquiring the Sudetenland; and one can hardly view Mao's signs of megalomania with equanimity.

The surest way to teach China that guerrilla aggression does not pay is to teach her in South Vietnam. If we abandon Saigon, not only will all Southeast Asia begin to reinsure itself with China, but India will become still more unstable, and even Japan will begin to waver. Perhaps most seriously from Professor Waltz's viewpoint, the Soviet Union itself will begin to doubt whether Khrushchev was right, and China wrong, in thinking that America is a paper tiger

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but has atomic teeth. We must contain China and reinforce our containment of the Soviet Union; any other course leads to disaster.

Professor Waltz, I fear, relies too much on our physical power and not enough on our demonstrated determination to use it. We shall be judged by how we act with our power, not by how great it is; and we falter or retreat at our peril.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ROGER FISHER

Fractionating Conflict

THE PROBLEM OF avoiding war is usually seen as one of establishing an alternative means of settling the important questions over which countries fight. Cures are designed not to alter the character of the dispute but to provide a substitute for armed conflict. Governments are urged to adjudicate or arbitrate those issues over which they would otherwise go to war.

Looked at in this way, the possibility of international adjudication or arbitration seems remote. The issues for which the United States, for example, would go to war are large and important; they include national survival, freedom, democracy, and our way of life. It seems unlikely that the United States will ever be prepared to refer such an issue to the International Court of Justice or let it be decided by any group of neutrals. Wherever a country believed that so much was at stake in a controversy that nuclear war was preferable to losing, it would almost certainly believe that too much was at stake to be entrusted to a court. Little issues can be adjudicated, but big issues appear to be different.

DANGERS INHERENT IN OVER-ALL CONFRONTATION

If we look at the relations between two hostile countries, we find that each international incident tends to be perceived as part of a large total confrontation, nation-to-nation. Rather than being considered as a small isolated event, each issue is seen as, and thus tends to become, an integral part of an over-all contest between

This article is a version of a chapter from *International Conflict and Behavioral Science: The Craigville Papers*, published by Basic Books, Inc., in June, 1964. This volume grew out of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Conference, "Alternative Ways of Handling Conflict: Behavioral Science Research Toward Peace," held in Craigville, Cape Cod.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

freedom and communism, or between colonialism and independence, or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers. In particular, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are perceived and described as a Cold War—a major all-out contest which is like a war except that there is no shooting.

When all incidents are considered part of a big dispute, the relationship is precarious. All eggs are in one basket. Similar situations occur between individuals when relations become on an *ad hominem* basis. Not what is said but who said it becomes important. The merits of particular issues are lost in one big over-all controversy. Statements, proposals, offers, and concessions are judged not by their content but by their source. Little controversies are pictured, understood, and dealt with as—and hence become—integral parts of a big controversy.

If we look at the relations between countries where there is the least possibility of war, we find that issues are more often dealt with separately. As problems come up they are formulated as small matters, each to be considered and negotiated in terms of what is most immediately relevant.

The danger inherent in big disputes and the difficulty of settling them suggests that, rather than spend our time looking for peaceful ways of resolving big issues, we might better explore the possibility of turning big issues—even issues like Hitler and communism—into little ones. Each side plays a part in determining the scope of a controversy. It is well recognized that moves made in the bargaining and negotiating process often increase the stakes, raising the controversy from a small one to a big one. It is also well recognized that on occasion part of a dispute can be settled, leaving the balance unresolved. But a change in the size of a conflict is usually the unintended by-product of action taken for some other reason. This paper focuses attention on the sizing of disputes. It considers the conscious formulation of issues in conflict, and the advantages and disadvantages of breaking up big issues into little ones. Viewed from this perspective, adjudication appears not as a process for settling big conflicts, but rather as one that is valuable because it tends to fragment conflict situations by cutting off and serving up for decision one small issue at a time.

To suggest that what is now seen as a major conflict should often be dealt with as a number of small ones is not to assert that the smaller issues have a greater objective reality than the large one. A detached observer from Mars might conclude that a useful way

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to understand current Soviet-United States relations is to consider "communism" and "democracy" locked in political combat; each move is part of a single large conflict. It could also be true that many moves on the part of the Soviet Union are taken by Communist leadership as part of a master plan for a Communist world. Fractionating such a conflict will not make existing differences disappear. It will affect not the diagnosis but the prescription for dealing with issues on a day-to-day basis.

Issues between people and between governments do not have objective edges established by external events. These problems of life lie in a seamless web of interrelated facts and circumstances. People and governments can choose which congeries of events shall be considered as a unit for the purpose of working out relations with others. Related events may be joined together for some purposes and treated separately for other purposes. Ideological, national, racial, and religious differences may be "fundamental," but may nonetheless be treated either as relevant or as irrelevant to economic questions that come up daily for decision.

A few examples show that the United States does have a choice in defining issues. In August, 1961, a civil aviation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union was negotiated. The United States might have signed the agreement, treating it as a separate matter. We chose, however, to decline to sign it, and considered the matter related to Berlin. Sometimes, as has been the case with cultural exchange agreements, we agree to treat a particular problem between us and the Soviet Union as a matter that can be settled independently of other outstanding issues.

Another way in which an issue can be fractionated was illustrated after Brazil expropriated an American-owned telephone company in 1962. There were suggestions in Congress that if Latin America treated the United States in this way, we should give no further aid to the Alliance for Progress. The president, however, at a press conference defined the dispute as one between the governor of a province and a single American company over the form and amount of compensation due. A potentially big issue was turned into a small one. The way in which a government defines a dispute obviously does make a difference.

In short, this paper is not concerned with debating whether major conflicts of interest exist between countries; it is concerned with dealing with them. It does not suggest that any one country has complete control over the formulation of international conflict

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

issues, but that it has a measure of control. It does not suggest that it is always wise to fractionate conflict into little issues, but that it is often wise to do so. Actions affecting the size of an issue should be undertaken consciously, with the advantages and disadvantages in mind. The formulation of issues in dispute between our country and another should not be undertaken accidentally or emotionally. Defining an issue in big terms—for example, defining issues in South Vietnam or Berlin in terms of freedom versus communism—may satisfy the human desire for clear, simple black-and-white choices. But it may be as ineffective as arguing military policy in terms of whether one is for peace or for war.

Within the last few years, it has been recognized that bigger military weapons do not necessarily mean better ones. Study of the complex questions involved in determining the military restraint which a country should exercise has developed the field of arms control. It is obvious that with international disputes, as with weapons, the bigger does not necessarily mean the better. Yet little study has been devoted to the criteria and methods by which a country should formulate and expand or contract issues in controversy. Arms are used only over issues. Perhaps more important than the field of arms control is the field of "issue control."

CRITERIA OF SUCCESS

The way in which a country wishes to carry on a dispute must be judged in light of the nation's objectives. The foreign policy objectives of the United States can be roughly divided into two categories. The first covers our substantive social goals: we want to preserve the freedom, equality, and prosperity that we have, and to extend such values to other people throughout the world. We are concerned with both defending and advancing the American position when it is in conflict with the social objectives of other governments. These goals are implicit in such phrases as "defending America from communism" and "winning the Cold War."

The second major category of foreign policy objectives lies in the field of international procedure, the process by which conflicts between nations are resolved. Here again, our objectives are both defensive and offensive. We want to protect America from the dangers involved in the present method of adjusting international differences and to develop better methods of dealing with situations in which one country's goals collide with those of another. The

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

second category of foreign policy objectives is implicit in such phrases as "avoiding war," "ending the arms race," and "developing a world rule of law."

In short, the United States' basic objectives are: first, to win each dispute with another country, and second, to avoid war and develop a fair way of settling such disputes—objectives which are somewhat inconsistent. While the United States would like to win *each* dispute, it is not seeking a world in which any one country wins *every* dispute. Internationally, as well as domestically, our government is simultaneously interested in winning each case and in promoting the rule of law—a regime in which the government does not always win. It is interested in winning disputes and in settling them peacefully. No absolute priority can be established between these two objectives; both need be kept in mind in each dispute. It is against these objectives that the process of formulating and fractionating conflict issues must be judged.

There are, perhaps, an infinite number of ways in which international issues might be sliced. For a first approximation, it may be useful to consider five dimensions which measure the size of a conflict issue:

(1) The parties on each side of the issue;
(2) The immediate physical issue involved;
(3) The immediate issue of principle;
(4) The substantive precedent which settlement will establish;
(5) The procedural precedent which settlement will establish.

With respect to each of these, there is a certain amount of choice as to how big or small the issue is made. Although these variables are not wholly independent, they will serve as a basis for exploring different ways in which conflict issues may be increased or decreased in size.

PARTIES ON EACH SIDE OF THE ISSUE

Objectively, there is no single correct definition of the parties on each side of a dispute. Each party is often free to define one or both sides in the way that best suits its interests. For example, if a Polish fishing vessel has damaged a transatlantic cable, the party on the "left-hand" side of the dispute might be taken as the helmsman of the ship, the captain of the ship, the department of the Polish government concerned with regulating fishing, the Polish

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government, the Soviet government, Khrushchev, or "the Communists." The party on the "right-hand" side might be considered to be the private company owning the cable, the United States, or the West.

In traditional international law, the nation is considered as the proper unit to represent the interests of a citizen who is injured. In some circumstances, the nation is held responsible for wrongs committed by its citizens. Thus history as well as nationalism support the present tendency to attribute to the Soviet Union and the United States positions taken by individuals or groups within each nation. If an editorial writer in *Pravda* criticizes the New York Stock Exchange, it is likely to be reported in American newspapers under the head line SOVIET UNION ATTACKS WEST. Similarly, if a retired United States Air Force general makes provocative remarks, Soviet spokesmen are likely to treat them as official statements of the United States government.

Disputes between people ruled by different governments need not be treated as intergovernmental disputes. Disputes between groups in different states within the United States are rarely treated as interstate disputes. Among nations, even actions by government officials are often deliberately treated as though the government itself were not involved. When the first secretary of the United States embassy in Moscow is accused of spying, the charge is directed against him as an individual. He is declared *persona non grata,* and when he leaves the country the dispute is usually treated as closed.

There are advantages in downgrading a dispute and in treating it as one between individuals, or at least as one in which the other government is not involved. As long as disputes are considered in this way, there is little chance of war. Part of the strong emotional outburst by the Soviet Union over the U2 incident in 1960 was apparently due to President Eisenhower's insistence that the flights were official governmental action, not unauthorized conduct on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Treating disputes as cases between individuals or groups rather than nations has the further virtue of establishing crosscutting conflicts. In such conflicts, the opponents in one controversy are not identical with the opponents in another. If a number of different disputes divide the same two nations or the same two groups of nations along a common boundary, the conflict situation becomes aggravated. But if the lines of one conflict cross those of other

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conflicts, divisions become less sharp, people begin to recognize some common interests. On the international scene today, Yugoslavia and Poland have helped this country understand that our disputes with the Soviet Union and our disputes with communism are not always the same thing. By identifying more accurately our opponent in certain Far East situations as "China" rather than as "communism," we may find that we have reduced the size of our opponent and also that on occasion we have an ally in the Soviet Union. We may be able to identify our opponent still more narrowly on some occasions as a particular guerrilla leader and further increase our chances of establishing crosscutting conflicts.

On our own side, we can insist that some matters are nongovernmental. The New York Worlds Fair Committee asked the White House whether the Peking government should be invited to exhibit at the 1964 fair. A White House decision that the Peking government should *not* be invited turned a possible nongovernmental matter into a governmental one. The issue would have been downgraded if either the committee or the White House had decided that it was a matter for decision by the committee.

There are often, however, conveniences in treating a single government as the responsible opponent in what would otherwise be a mass of unrelated problems. A simple over-all solution may be possible only by considering matters on a government-to-government basis. Using one dispute as leverage on another, as discussed below, often requires a preliminary step—that of treating as governmental two disputes which otherwise would be considered to involve different groups or individuals.

Defining the parties to a dispute is thus a basic way of making disputes bigger or smaller.

IMMEDIATE PHYSICAL ISSUE INVOLVED

Any particular conflict can be thought of as having a certain minimum size in factual or physical terms. This is measured by the inconsistency between the physical events desired by the two adversaries. If two men want to sit at the same time on a particular chair that will only hold one, a conflict is defined which can hardly be further reduced.

If the Soviet Union wants to keep a certain number of soldiers in Cuba and if we want them to have a smaller number, these facts set a certain minimal physical size to the conflict issue. It is possible

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to take action which makes the issue larger, and it is possible to take steps which will reduce the issue back to its physical dimensions, but often there is a minimum size below which it cannot be reduced. The apparent minimum size of a conflict can often be broken up by spreading it over a time scale. For example, assume that one country wants to increase the number of authorized border-crossing places by twenty, and the neighboring country is opposed. The issue might be broken down to consider whether one new crossing place should be opened this month, leaving open the question of the rest.

There are two ways of expanding the physical size of an issue: first, by defining more broadly the subject matter in dispute; second, by bringing in different subjects which are related only because the parties are the same.

By rational extension, almost anything can be related to anything else. The question for each party is whether it would prefer to deal with issues separately or together. Should it seek agreement on a portion of a problem and be willing to postpone consideration of other aspects, or should it insist that nothing will be agreed upon until all of a defined subject matter is settled? For example, countries can agree on co-operative development of weather satellites as a separate issue, or insist that the subject is intimately connected with military satellites and that a single agreement must cover both aspects of the problem. The question of releasing prisoners from the April, 1961 landing on Cuba could be treated as a special issue (in fact, each prisoner could be considered separately), or it could be treated as part of a single over-all political dispute between the United States and Cuba.

It seems clear that if a subject is too narrowly defined, there will be little possibility of a bargain. The narrower the point, the more likely it is that a change will benefit one party only. It would seem desirable to expand the subject until it is large enough for a bargain which benefits each, if not to the same extent, at least to some degree. As a general rule, enlargement of the issue beyond that point is unwise. If either party tries to get a still greater benefit, it runs the risk of cutting off its nose to spite its face. It is impossible to settle all matters simultaneously. The argument for settling disputes in small units so long as a bargain is possible is comparable to the argument for free trade versus state trading. It is possible that by state trading a nation, using its full economic leverage to make large bargains, will do better on a particular occasion. As a general

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rule, however, it will probably do better under a system in which individual trades are made wherever a bargain can be reached.

The Technique of Coupling Issues

The immediate issue under discussion between two sides may be expanded by coupling one dispute with another. Here the connection is made not by broadening the definition of the subject matter but by recognizing that two matters involve the same parties. The considerations involved in coupling one dispute with another deserve more study. If the joining of problems is made as an offer, the process seems constructive, facilitating agreement: "I will let you have what you want in the X dispute if you will let me have what I want in the Y dispute." Without such bargaining, it may be difficult to settle either dispute. If the proposed solution of the X dispute will benefit the other side by, say, sixty "utility units" but cost us twenty, we will suffer a net loss and hence have no incentive to accept the solution unless some other matter is thrown in—a matter in which we benefit by twenty units or more. Coupling disputes in this way may increase the chances of agreement.

Even here, however, shifting the nature of the dispute—from a narrow subject matter to one in which the only common denominator is the parties involved—tends to bring up all possible issues in the relationship and may do more harm than good. It encourages the unfortunate "over-all confrontation" described earlier. The joining of issues as leverage or bargaining currency, even when constructively looking toward a negotiated agreement, tends to shift the focus away from the merits of a problem and to put relative bargaining power in issue.

One way to improve the relationship between two adversaries may be to treat different subjects as separate issues. At roughly every other stage in the escalating process, each party has that option and should be aware of it.

In international negotiation, it may be difficult to couple apparently unrelated disputes. A large part of international negotiation is conducted in public view; governments are under some compulsion to justify their conduct. As national positions are increasingly expressed in terms of principle, it becomes increasingly unacceptable to engage in unprincipled bargaining. Coupling the Cuban problem with the Berlin dispute might make it objectively easier to draft an agreement benefiting both the Soviet Union and the United

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States. But both countries operate under political inhibitions that tend to make such a trade unacceptable, particularly when the interests of third states are involved.

Pressure in a Dispute

It seems important to distinguish talking about an additional issue by way of a counter-offer, as discussed above, from taking action on an otherwise unrelated matter by way of pressure. When pressure produces counter-pressure, the escalating process is much like that by which limited hostilities grow into all-out war. As is the case with limited war, the more unrelated the action of one country is to the action taken by the other, the more difficult it is to find a boundary to the conflict.

In such a process, it is also difficult to keep a limited objective in view. Although no shot may be fired, the situation becomes warlike, particularly in that the aims become unclear. The pressure is no longer being applied for a specific and limited purpose. Relations between the United States and China have broadened out in this way. The United States is applying pressure on a country that is now widely regarded as its enemy. But we are not sure what we want that pressure to accomplish or what China would have to do in order to yield to it. In effect, our pressure is for unconditional surrender, an objective so broad that it becomes impossible to attain by negotiation or otherwise.

When pressure, though substantively unrelated, is applied for a narrow, specific objective, the dispute in one sense remains quite small. This was the case in Laos when the United States suspended economic aid and brought substantial pressure on the government. The pressure was directed at causing the government to accept the specific terms of a particular agreement on the neutralization of Laos.

An unrelated matter may also be brought in by way of reprisal or punishment: "I am doing this to you since you did that to me." Such action may provide grist for future disputes but does not seem to be part of the process of formulating an international issue. Punishment, which functions as a lesson for the future, should apparently be distinguished from actions which broaden a dispute. The latter are taken or threatened in order to induce a change in an adversary's immediate position.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE

The size of a dispute is determined not only by the parties and physical issues involved but by the issue of principle which each side considers to be at stake. To some extent the immediate issue of principle can be considered apart from the problem of the precedent which a settlement may establish. The position which a country takes in a particular controversy is usually not an *ad hoc* position applicable only to those circumstances; it generally reflects broad political and moral principles of wide applicability. A major difficulty in settling a dispute lies in the fact that it is often seen in terms of principle, and on matters of principle countries are usually unwilling to yield.

To be strong and effective, a country apparently needs principles and needs to adhere to them. Principles can be flexible, however, and the extent to which they are involved in a particular controversy can be limited in two ways. The first is by recognizing that we can be loyal to our principles without insisting that our opponents be disloyal to theirs. To arouse the maximum support of our own people, we often identify a dispute as a conflict of principle, in which one principle or the other must yield. We do this also as a form of commital strategy in which we strengthen our negotiating position by tying our own hands and making it harder to back down. If we wish to win a controversy, it would seem wiser to say that the solution we seek is not only consistent with our principles but is also consistent with those of our adversary—at least if properly construed and applied. By insisting that our adversary can come along without abandoning his principles, we make it easier for him to do so. In this way a country can remove an issue of principle from a controversy without in any sense abandoning its principles. If another country is prepared to accept a physical solution which we regard as consistent with our principles, no principle of ours requires that it first accept some generalized statement of what it is doing.

In many instances, an issue is defined differently for several different audiences. Each government may tell its own people that a particular issue is an important step in furthering its national goals and is an application of strongly-held national principles. At the same time, it may be explaining to its adversary that the particular matter can be settled pragmatically without regard to differences of principle. While explaining to the American people that

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Antarctic Treaty was futhering the principle of complete inspection for any disarmament agreement, the United States government could point out to the Soviet Union that it could accept this practical solution without abandoning any matter of principle.

The Application of Principle

The second way of limiting the extent to which principle is involved in a controversy is to recognize the difference between principle and the application of principle. In almost every dispute, there are conflicting principles involved. In a lawsuit, each side urges that a different principle should be the controlling one. A resolution of the dispute does not necessarily mean that either principle need be abandoned; it often means that, at this point, a particular accommodation between them has to be worked out, leaving both principles intact. The United States government rarely argues a case in the Supreme Court except to further some principle in which it believes. To lose a case, as the government often does, is rarely to abandon its principles or to be disloyal to them. Litigation may simply determine that, in this case, the principle does not properly apply. The same determination can be reached through negotiation; to do so is not to be disloyal to principle.

Recognizing where possible that a dispute involves a question of the *application* of principle rather than the central principle itself should make it possible to decrease the stakes. Nonetheless, in every controversy, a certain minimum amount of principle is involved; it cannot be further reduced. This is probably best identified in terms of the precedent which will necessarily be established by resolution of the controversy. The size of a controversy may be measured in terms of both the substantive and procedural precedents which its resolution will set.

SUBSTANTIVE PRECEDENT WHICH SETTLEMENT WOULD ESTABLISH

In almost every conflict each side is thinking not only of how much it would lose immediately if it yielded a point, but of how much it would lose by way of precedent. Similarly, a country may press a position, not for the immediate consequences, but with the hope of establishing a precedent for the future.

A nation's concern in international affairs over the problem of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

precedent is substantial. Even those who contend that the precedents embodied in international law are wholly ineffective are often the first to contradict themselves by saying that the United States must not yield on a point because it would set a dangerous precedent which would be difficult or impossible to overcome. Those who contend that the Soviet Union respects no rules are often those who also insist that the United States must press certain propositions as precedents for the future. A precedent is a piece of a rule. There can be no doubt that it has some effect. The impact of a precedent depends upon its *strength* and its *scope*. To the extent that these can be controlled, the size of the matter in conflict can be changed.

A precedent no doubt has some strength. Even without an implied promise to be consistent, governments, like people, find it much easier to do what they have done before. A precedent is a fact which cannot be undone by accompanying the action with a statement that it is not a precedent. The fact demonstrates to oneself as well as to others what actions one is prepared to take under particular circumstances. Also, basic fairness tends to require that different people be treated in the same way under the same circumstances. A highly bureaucratic government like that of the Soviet Union is particularly bound by precedent on small matters—those which top authority is too busy to decide and which lower bureaucrats have no authority to decide.

The scope of a precedent is always somewhat ambiguous. In political affairs, as in the legal system, ambiguity permits a nice accommodation between consistency and flexibility as new circumstances arise. The minimum scope of a precedent is determined by that which cannot reasonably be distinguished from it. Additional scope may be established by what is said before and during the resolution of an issue. The language used by one or both sides may turn a simple case into a test case. Significant possibilities exist for limiting the size of a conflict by limiting the precedent. Apparently either party to a controversy can, by itself, limit the substantive scope of the precedent that will be established. It takes two to make an agreement, but either one can create a dispute. If the parties agree that a controversy is a test case which will decide a broad category of issues, the scope of the precedent is thereby enlarged. But if the parties disagree as to the scope of the precedent, it is thereby reduced. For if the yielding party truly considers a particular settlement unique, it will ignore it when other questions come

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

up. It will not have been effectively bound by the precedent, whatever the other party contends.

For several days in the fall of 1962, Russian guards for the war memorial were allowed to enter West Berlin in armored cars instead of buses. Later the United States told the Russian guards to revert to transportation by bus, which they did. The United States was not effectively tied up by the armored car precedent because it distinguished the circumstances. The armored cars were allowed during a period of rioting. Once the rioting had stopped, the cases were different.

PROCEDURAL PRECEDENT WHICH SETTLEMENT WOULD ESTABLISH

Since international substantive issues can usually be distinguished from each other, greater concern is generally expressed over the broad procedural aspects of a precedent. The United States is constantly being warned against establishing the precedent of giving up something for nothing, or of yielding to threats of force. We are told that particular issues are not so important in themselves but because a line must be drawn somewhere. We hear that appeasement does not work; that once concessions are made, further concessions are almost inevitable.

A close relationship exists between the substantive issue involved and the procedural precedent established by reaching an agreement. To the extent that a settlement is substantively sound, it can be justified "on its merits"; the fact that concessions were made will have limited effect. If both parties have made some concessions, the effects are likely to be in balance. If one party has made all the concessions, the Munich situation obtains. The effects of such a concession need to be examined in terms of their influence on each party and on third states. The lessons learned from Munich deserve more study than they have received.

The first lesson—that a country may not succeed in pacifying another by yielding to its purportedly last demands—has been thoroughly absorbed. In fact, appeasement has become such a bad word that there is little attempt to identify situations in which it might be politically effective. The fact that a particular concession may not accomplish its purpose has, however, little to do with the precedent established.

The second lesson of Munich is that the party to whom the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concession has been given may think that a procedural precedent has been established and may seek further concessions in the same way. Having discovered that the British would not fight over one issue, Hitler apparently assumed that they would not fight over a comparable issue. Third states may have reached the same conclusion.

The third lesson of Munich, however, is that Hitler was wrong. Governments, like individuals, are tolerant to a degree. They will co-operate with others on a give-and-take basis, but unless concessions are reciprocal, it is less likely, rather than more, that additional concessions will be made. Each concession a country makes diminishes the number of its citizens who perceive the other country's demands as legitimate. Finally it becomes clear that further concessions will accomplish nothing. Instead of weakening British will, the yielding at Munich tended to stiffen the subsequent British determination to resist. Of course, if a country gives up territory or arms of substantive importance, it may become weaker through concessions. The Munich example, however, suggests that the effect of a procedural precedent on a country that yields has been widely exaggerated. It suggests that the famous "slippery slope" goes uphill, not down.

FRACTIONATION AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

When considering only the "procedural" objective of the United States—to avoid war and to improve the method of settling international differences—it appears that the practice of fractionating conflict issues is definitely to our interest. Separating issues into their smallest components and dealing with them one at a time reduces the risk of war significantly. No country is likely to fight over what it perceives as a small issue. It is only when a country fears that it might lose a great deal, or hopes to gain a great deal, that it will go to war.

When issues are considered separately and in terms of their smallest size, the process of settling disputes should be peaceable. But some disputes may not be settled. Unlike judicial settlement, negotiation requires scope for bargaining. Ideally, one country should yield on a dispute about which its adversary cares more than it does, confident that on some subsequent occasion the process would be reversed. But realistically, the chance of settling an issue when one party's gain means another party's loss seems to be increased

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

either by enlarging the substantive issue until it includes enough ground so that a settlement will benefit each or by coupling it with another issue in which the position of the parties is reversed.

Fractionating conflict should avoid the stalemate that comes from a nation-to-nation confrontation in which neither country feels that it can make any concession without losing part of an over-all war. To the extent that issues are decided separately there is an increased chance that they are decided on their merits, that is, in light of their particular facts and circumstances. In this sense, agreements reached might be objectively better. Piecemeal settlement also recognizes that everything cannot be done at once and permits progress in certain areas while other matters are being worked out.

Thus, one technique of lessening the risk of war and improving the process of international settlement is to separate and reduce the size of issues. Apparently this technique ought to be pursued unless significantly better results can be obtained by the contrary technique of enlarging and coupling issues. Fractionating conflict can help in coping with disputes peaceably, but how does it stand up in terms of our companion objective—winning disputes?

FRACTIONATION AND THE WINNING OF DISPUTES

No general statement, of course, can be made that either fractionating a conflict issue or enlarging it will always be better for a country from the point of view of winning the matter in dispute. Sometimes a country will gain a point by coupling one issue with another, or by enlarging it in terms of a broader subject matter or in terms of principle. On other occasions, it will do better to treat the issue in its narrowest possible context. Some tentative guides as to when one strategy or the other will help to obtain a substantive payoff can perhaps be formulated.

Coupling one issue with another may be useful as a form of pressure. If one country has sufficient power for effective arm-twisting, the desired substantive result may be accomplished. Such substantive gain must be weighed against the procedural loss which deciding disputes on the basis of superior power involves. There are other limitations on the pressure technique. Usually, a country must possess superior power and be willing and able to use it to make the method effective. When dealing with an opponent who has the opportunity to escalate a conflict issue by throwing in counter-leverage and counter-threats, the tactic can backfire. It is not at all clear that

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the consequence of raising the ante will result in winning the original dispute.

Even when one country of superior power is applying pressure in large quantities, the effectiveness of that pressure is likely to depend upon keeping the issue on which it is focused small. The effectiveness of pressure is a function of the difference between how much the pressure currently hurts and how much it would hurt to yield on the issue involved. Economic sanctions against Cuba or Mississippi or South Africa, for example, would be more effective if it were made clear that they would stop upon the attainment of an identified, limited objective, than if pressure were directed against "communism" or against "discrimination." The effectiveness of pressure is increased by keeping the objective narrow and making it easy for the adversary to back down.

The coupling technique may also be a useful way of winning one dispute at the expense of another. If an issue that is likely to be lost anyway is on the table, a country may be able to retrieve something by coupling that dispute with one on which the adversary might yield. If an issue that a country strongly desires to win is on the table, perhaps it can be bought by coupling it with a "loser."

Similarly, expanding the subject matter under dispute may make it possible to work out an agreement in which we win something. Negotiating the allocation of a single radio frequency between several countries would be difficult. There would be more likelihood of success if the subject were broadened to include enough frequencies so that each country would get at least one. Finally, if it is already clear that one side is going to win in a particular conflict situation, the larger the terms in which the issue can be defined, the more that side will win.

These instances indicate that fractionating a conflict situation—insisting that the issues be dealt with separately and in their narrowest possible scope—may not always be the wisest strategy. However, they do not cover the most frequent occasions on which countries tend to insist that big issues are involved.

ESCALATION AS A DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUE

Perhaps the most inportant proposition developed in this preliminary consideration of the field of issue control is that a country which defines an issue in large terms has adopted a negative strategy. An issue is often defined broadly as a deliberate defensive

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

maneuver. Rather than treat the transit of men and materials from West Germany to West Berlin as a group of narrow, pragmatic questions, the United States has defined the problem in terms of freedom versus communism. The West has insisted that any interference with its access to Berlin would be serious enough to justify a war—including, perhaps, a nuclear war.

This tactic of issue escalation was deliberately adopted as a form of commital strategy. It makes the West less willing to yield. By turning an issue into a test case, by insisting that what is involved is not a small and unique event but a major principle, a country makes backing down more difficult. In addition, citizens, allies, and friends can more easily be rallied to fight for a big, clear-cut principle than for a particular case. In seeking to preserve the status quo, a country insists that any change would be catastrophic. The technique is common in domestic as well as international politics. In an effort to stop a threatened change, groups will argue that the proposed measure is the first step toward socialism or totaltarianism, or that it threatens the entire American way of life. Internationally, the United States has sometimes taken the position that recognition of a government is not simply a question of deciding what authority is in fact in charge, but involves the larger question of approval of the regime. Those opposed to the admission of Red China to the United Nations insist that the issue is a large one of principle, not a small one of credentials.

Insisting that a small change from the status quo would bring disastrous consequences is a defensive move, a kind of rear-guard action, slowing down the pace of change. It retards the loss of a substantive point, but is unlikely to be wholly successful in preserving the status quo. The United States can insist that any interference with our right of access to Berlin will be viewed as grounds for war. This may slow down the slice-by-slice "salami tactics" of the Soviet Union, but it can hardly stop them. To insist that a small change would be a justification for war does not by itself make it so. An additional five- or ten-minutes delay on a convoy of trucks to Berlin, or the addition of one more inspector to the routine, does not mean the end of freedom or democracy, whatever we may say. If the slices are thin enough and are taken slowly enough, the prophesied doom does not in fact materialize. The country which defines small issues and presses forward on them is likely to make headway which its adversary, by insisting that large principles are at stake, may delay but is unable to stop.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ESCALATION AS AN OFFENSIVE STRATEGY

If increasing the size of an issue has little long-run promise as a defensive strategy, it has even less promise as an offensive technique. If a party desires to alter the status quo, defining an issue as one involving a large subject matter or big principles tends to make success less likely. Almost inevitably, change from the status quo must be brought about incrementally. Even those who have the power to bring about major changes and would like to do so must face the question of where to begin. A group which defines its action program as "for peace" is likely to be as ineffective as if it were for virtue and against sin. If one is to be effective in domestic politics, he must combine the public support which broad issues and principles can arouse with the pursuit of narrowly defined goals.

It would seem equally important for a government which wishes to alter the behavior of another government to define its immediate goal in narrow and specific terms, to break up the big issues into smaller ones, and to press for these separately. At this writing, the United States is carrying on a dispute with Cuba over major issues. The Cuban government is pursuing policies which we would like to change; the United States has been applying increasing pressure on Cuba to that end. While broadening the pressure, we have, consciously or unconsciously, broadened our demands at the same time. We have stated our goals in such terms as "a free and democratic Cuba"—a goal which, like "peace" and "ending the arms race," is admirable, but too broad as a focus for effective action. We are interested in particular issues—for example, the removal of Soviet weapons from this hemisphere, no armed subversion in other countries, respect for international law, free elections. By asking for more than we need and more than we really want, and by lumping all our demands into one big issue, we make our case an extremely hard one to win. Furthermore we rally and unify the opposition. In seeking "to topple the Castro regime," we are defining the issue in the largest possible terms, as we did in seeking unconditional surrender during World War II. The British experience in seeking "to topple Nasser" is instructive. By defining an issue in all-or-nothing terms, we tend to make sure that we get nothing unless we are prepared to exert the force required to get all. Having declared that the choice is between communism and freedom, little victories look like compromises with communism. In this context it is difficult

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for us to apply the "salami tactics" of moving forward slice by slice.

Escalating a matter into a large issue of principle appears to be somewhat effective as a defensive strategy; at least it can gain time. It would seem generally unwise as a strategy to pursue in areas in which we would like to change the status quo.

Fractionating issues, on the other hand, seems almost invariably the best tactic for a country seeking to bring about change. And in a world in which change is inevitable, the best defense is probably a good offense. The situation anywhere could always be better. The best way to preserve and advance our values would seem to be to press constantly for *small* improvements in all areas. Ironically, those who take a "tough" position in international affairs are usually against breaking up the issues; they unwittingly inhibit action which could bring about changes they desire. Routine insistence upon the big issue would seem a prescription for an unsuccessful defense of the status quo.

THE SOUTHERN EXAMPLE

Within an organized society the legal system facilitates the fractionating process; domestic experience may nonetheless be useful in illustrating its virtues. In the South today, a fundamental and major conflict exists between differing views that are strongly held. Leaders of the Negro community and proponents of the conservative Southern point of view see the conflict in terms of broad principles—and they are correct. Each side also has a problem of strategy. Without in any way abandoning their over-all objective or their principle of full and equal rights, Negro leaders, by and large, have proceeded by fractionating the conflict issues and moving step by step. Small issues have been raised: including Negroes on a particular jury list, allowing Negroes to register to vote in a particular county, admitting Negro students to a particular school, and serving Negroes at bus terminals and restaurants.

On most occasions, the White Citizens Councils and others opposed to integration have adopted the strategy of escalating the issue into broad political terms. They insist that what is involved in this case is a choice between the Southern way of life and mongrelization of the races. This strategy may have caused some delay, but it has not served the White Citizens Councils well. The freedom riders and others have experienced substantial success by pursuing the salami tactics of one slice at a time. At almost no point has the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

loss of a particular slice been painful enough to cause a united uprising of the opposition.

If one were advising the conservative Southerner on the strategy he ought to take, one might well suggest that he fractionate the issues and proceed with his own salami tactics. For example, starting with the established base that a purely social club may exclude from membership whomever it pleases, one might proceed through a series of incremental cases; the country club that owns land; the country club where members live on the club property; the "residential" club where only members may use the swimming pool and take lessons at the private school; the two or three blocks which form a residential club, and so on. How successful such a series of cases might be in limiting the consequences of the racial covenant and school integration decisions is an open question. But the strategy appears to have far greater promise of success than the "big issue" strategy currently being pursued.

CONCLUSION

Internationally, it is more difficult to force a decision on the little issues. The lack of compulsory jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice means that we have no institutionalized method of bringing up and disposing of one case at a time. The virtues of adopting and pressing for a small specific objective, however, go far beyond the legal machinery. In international politics as in domestic politics, the strategy of separating out small and immediate issues and dealing with them one at a time would seem likely to advance our social and substantive goals.

Instead of identifying every issue as a part of a Cold War to be dealt with as a single major conflict, it would seem wiser to insist that each issue, whether or not it reflects basic and fundamental differences, be dealt with independently on its merits. By separating out the Antarctic problem, and dealing with it outside the context of the Cold War, the United States accomplished in the Antarctic Treaty a significant victory for its own objectives. By urging the United Nations to deal with the Middle East and Congo problems in terms of what the particular circumstances required we advanced our objectives of strengthening the United Nations and world order more than we would have had we cast these problems as part of an East-West conflict.

If the United States continues to press, in the United Nations

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and elsewhere, on many small and separate issues—issues in which our position makes more practical sense than the position of our opponents—we have a fair chance of prevailing. If the issues are small, no one defeat will be serious enough to cause any country to pick up its chips and go home. By dealing with issues in their narrow and immediate factual context, there is a greater chance that the position of other countries will be determined by the merits of the problem rather than by broad ideological points of view. To the extent that our position has merit, and to the extent that countries normally opposed to us are persuaded to pay less attention to ideological differences, we may find that the opposition has been lessened and divided. In Berlin, Cuba, the United Nations, Latin America, and elsewhere, we would seem well advised, in applying whatever political, economic, or military pressure we deem appropriate to the situation, to define immediate objectives which are limited and precise. The salami can be sliced either way.

Fractionating conflict would thus seem to be a promising strategy not only for reducing the risk of war but also for promoting victory for our values. This does not mean that such a strategy is opposed to the real interests of any other country. As we need to be reminded so often, the world is not a zero-sum game where victory for some automatically means defeat for others. If we examine all the detailed social objectives of any two countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, we find an enormous area of overlap. Each believes that the people should have better schools, better health, better highways, better homes, a chance to benefit from the experience of others, and so forth. However basic and significant other disagreements may be, in perhaps 90 per cent of the detailed factual issues our interests are not in conflict. In this area, measures can be taken which benefit us both. As long, however, as most issues are dealt with in terms of a nation-to-nation conflict, common interests will be lost in the major conflict which precludes agreement. It would seem that only by dividing up the issues and considering them separately in small units will we be able to find and to work together in those areas where we have common goals and common interests, and thus obtain the optimum accommodation possible.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LAWRENCE S. FINKELSTEIN

Comments On "Fractionating Conflict"

A "RESPONSE" to an article, even a solicited one, is bound to emphasize its differences with the article being responded to, and to slight the points of agreement which remain unexpressed. Let it be explicit then. Roger Fisher is right in urging us to be concerned with "issue control." He provokes us constructively and with imagination. Reading his article was, for this critic, a learning experience. Moreover, overall, the article elicited more agreement with its insights than disagreement.

Yet, the article, although it employs examples, treats conflict as an abstract concept in a way which leaves one wondering to what extent the abstraction resembles the reality to which the prescriptions are supposed to apply. After reading Professor Fisher's article, this reader felt as if he had just had a poem described to him, without hearing the words or sensing the meter. Conflicts between states, after all, involve the interaction of values, the perceptions and understandings of the actors, the means by which the conflicts are conducted, the international political environment in which they occur, and the political processes and human relationships which affect the decisions of governmental leaders. The possibilities for variation among conflicts are virtually infinite. To treat them as if they are easily summed up in the one word "conflict" is not to clarify the subject very significantly. Of course, abstraction for the purpose of model-building in social research is a useful, indeed necessary, technique. Presumably, "economic man" no more resembled the complex realities it helped to analyze than the Fisher model of conflict resembles the complex and varied phenomena it seeks to synthesize for the purpose of the analysis. Perhaps, like the economists, Professor Fisher can be induced to carry this beginning further—to reconstruct his skeletal model of conflict on the basis of materials drawn from life, and to test and draw conclusions from the hypotheses with which his article presents us. After the process is complete, and a book has been written, a condensation or synopsis in article form would be well worth reading.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If Professor Fisher takes this advice, one question which deserves clarification is whether there is a distinction between issues and conflicts. Professor Fisher does not explicitly equate the two, but gives them the same weight in his analysis, seems to reach conclusions about them based on the assumption that they are identical, and fails to examine the factors that differentiate them as they affect his theses. To point up the distinction, one could, speciously perhaps, argue that issues are potential sources of conflict which can be resolved by following Professor Fisher's guidelines, while conflicts are those more intractable disputes which defy such attempts at resolution.

Clearly, Professor Fisher offers wise advice when he urges that it is important to be alert to choices in defining issues which affect the risk that they will become acute conflicts which resist settlement. In this context, his questions and prescriptions are sensitive, interesting, and valuable, even if they are not always entirely persuasive. Thus, he urges, for example, that individuals, rather than governments, can sometimes be considered the parties to disputes. However, many disputes transcending national boundaries do ordinarily occur between individuals and remain at that level. A body of law—private international law or conflict of laws—exists to deal with such situations. Moreover, international law establishes standards—denial of justice and exhaustion of local remedies, for example—by which private disputes can become governmental ones. Disputes which have become governmental disputes have often become so either because they meet these standards or because they are intrinsically governmental in character. It is hard to argue successfully that issues involving countries that have no private enterprise are very likely to remain non-governmental ones. Professor Fisher gives as an example the question of an invitation to the government of Communist China to exhibit at the 1964 World's Fair. This could not have been treated solely as a non-governmental question, even on the U.S. side, for the essential reason that government decisions were inescapably involved. At a minimum, a government agency would have been asked to issue visas for Chinese personnel or to decide whether the embargo against trade with China should be lifted and whether tariffs should be levied against Chinese materials to be exhibited. On another level, the question clearly engages issues of public policy. To argue that such a question *should* be treated as a non-governmental one is to argue that black *should* be white.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The World's Fair example suggests a broader question. Professor Fisher's operating assumption appears to be that what he describes as the "sizing" of disputes or conflicts is a matter which can often be determined by rational choice. Again, it is useful to be reminded that we should be alert to such choices when it is possible to make them. However, it seems reasonable to ask how often one should expect to be able to make such choices with respect to intense conflict situations. His assumption is that the components of a dispute —the parties, the immediate physical issues, the principles at stake and the way they are applied, and the precedential implications— although inherently connected, can be treated separately. It is far from clear that this is so in all cases. For example, the Fisher assumption does not seem to respond with sufficient candor to the difference which he recognizes between conflicts which consist of accumulated grievances over discrete issues which *are* separable, and conflicts which exist because of fundamental hostility arising out of ultimately conflicting objectives and principles. In the latter category, issues may be no more than the means by which conflict is conducted. If the relations between the parties resemble *ad hominem* arguments, it is because the parties' beliefs about their intentions toward each other lie at the heart of the matter.

Even in such conflicts one should, of course, be alert to the possibility that disputes over issues can be insulated or separated from the main source of overriding conflict. It was, after all, possible to reach agreement on an Austrian peace treaty, an Antarctic disarmament treaty, and, most recently, on a reduction in production of nuclear materials, even though these issues and others on which agreement has been possible were intimately related to the overall texture of relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States. With respect to even such successes, however, it may be an instructive rather than merely a semantic distinction to point out that the settlement of these issues did not take place apart from, but rather as part of, the conduct of conflict relationships between the parties.

Professor Fisher, whether he focuses on the settlement of conflicts or the conduct of conflicts, concentrates his attention on the procedures without reference to the substance of issues or to the sharing of the values in dispute between the disputants. How the issues come out is, obviously, important and not only because of the interest each side in a dispute has in winning it. The question whether a particular solution is viable is an important criterion of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whether a dispute should be settled or not. For one thing, nonviable solutions, we have too often learned, may brew greater conflicts subsequently. The Versailles Treaty is a case in point, and our recent experience in Cyprus may prove to be another. Moreover, where conflicts involve the clash of conflicting value systems, the component issues which may appear to be separable nevertheless have to be examined in terms of the bearing they may have on the larger values in dispute.

Clearly, it would be wrong to suggest that basically hostile relationships are immutable. However, it is hard to believe that fundamental changes can be produced by Professor Fisher's method. In this connection, it would be worth examining what were the causes of such startling reversals of relationships as have occurred in recent memory, such as the conversion of Anglo-French enmity into alliance after Fashoda, the amelioration of Yugoslavia's postwar relationships with its neighbors, Germany's acceptance as a postwar friend of many of its wartime enemies, and the cordiality that has marked Japanese relations with the United States and its improving relations with neighboring countries in recent years. Merely to cite these examples is to suggest that such fundamental conversions seem historically to have come about as a result of forces other than the kind of chipping away at separable issues that Professor Fisher suggests. How much have Indian-Pakistan relations been fundamentally altered by the Indus waters settlement and all the other agreements, desirable in themselves, between the two countries? Is the amelioration of relations with the Soviet Union which we welcome today a consequence of the test ban treaty or is the latter a reflection of a mutual will to improve relations, growing from more fundamental causes, rooted in changing perceptions of the relationship? One thing is clear: the role of the existing agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States as stepping stones on the path of improving relations is not separable from the larger context. The interaction between small issues and large conflicts is at the core of Professor Fisher's subject. It deserves thoughtful and intensive exploration.

All this brings me back to my starting point. Professor Fisher's argument is a valuable beginning, but one which needs and deserves fuller development, both from Professor Fisher and others who may be inspired to put his hypotheses to more elaborate tests than he has done in this article.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STANLEY CAVELL

Existentialism and Analytical Philosophy

HOPELESS TASKS are not always thankless. They can define the limits of duty, or locate and release sources of courage, or discern the worth of hope itself. Since the task of comparing analytical philosophy and existentialism in a few thousand words can hardly command such high mitigation, I have tried to make it less thankless by organizing my remarks in the following way. In a brief opening section, I indicate a few general comparisons of these philosophies in order to discover *why* a general comparison between them is hopeless. In Section II, I sketch a history of the main movements within analytical philosophy, something I do not attempt for existentialism. The excuse for this disparity of treatment is that a history of existentialism would entail a history of European literature since Goethe and Hegel, whereas the stages or strands of modern analytical philosophy are at once fairly definite and widely unknown. (This difference of density in their histories is itself a significant difference between them as philosophies.) If my effort puts an end to anyone's referring to what is called "ordinary language philosophy" as positivism, and makes him recognize that he should know more about positivism before dismissing—or adopting—its program, it will have been worth its pains. This historical sketch also prepares for the specific comparison, in Section III, of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein with the writing in Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. It may appear that in choosing these particular writings as representative of analytical philosophy and existentialism I have made matters of comparison too easy for myself, may even have changed the subject. I should say, therefore, that I certainly hope the comparison does seem easy, and that while Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard may be untypical representatives of the philosophies for which I am making them stand, they are hardly peripheral to them. Any general comparison which could

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not accommodate these figures would also, if differently, risk irrelevance.

I

The most hopeless aspect of any undertaking to cover our subject lies not merely in its vastness, or in the fact that neither philosophy is simple or single; it lies more particularly in the fact that both are live and therefore open to change through self-discovery, and that their relation to one another may alter with fresh insight and result. At the moment, analytical philosophy is the dominant mode of academic philosophizing in America and England, while existentialism (together with phenomenology) dominates the philosophizing of Western Europe; and there seems to be no trade across the English Channel. Mutual incomprehension and distrust between them is one of the facts of contemporary philosophical life.

The task of comparing these philosophies is moreover a comic one. It is, in the first place, something of a logical, or metaphysical, jest to suggest simultaneously that these intellectual positions are incomprehensible to one another, that one is inevitably reared to speak from within only one or the other of them, and yet that one is going to comprehend both. Second, and more important, to summarize either of them counters the spirit of the philosophies themselves. For any of the philosophers who could be called analytical, popular discussion would be irrelevant; for the existentialist, it is betrayal. For the analyst, philosophy has become a profession, its problems technical; a non-professional audience is of no more relevance to him than it is to the scientist. The existentialist has not relinquished philosophy's traditional audience—namely, everybody, regardless of any technical competence, philosophical or other; but his entire animus is against the idea that what philosophy has to say can be *told*, not, as for the analyst, because philosophy has no content of its own, but because the very content of his philosophy *is* that significant content cannot cognitively or discursively be articulated, but must be communicated, if at all, in some other way.[1]

I have said that these philosophies were not merely mutually incomprehensible but mutually distrustful. Perhaps neither specifically blames the other for the catastrophes and dislocations of modern life, but each sees the other as symptomatic of the mentality which sustains catastrophe and blocks the only source of help. The one wishes to recover Reason from superstition; the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other wishes to recover the self from Reason. Yet both are modern philosophies; both are, by intention and in feeling, revolutionary departures from traditional philosophy. That is, perhaps, a characteristic of philosophy generally: every departure believes itself to be escaping from an empty, hateful past, and to be setting the mind at last on the right road. Yet it is striking that the terms "analytical" and "existential" were initially coined to purify philosophy of the identical fool's gold in its tradition—the tendency to issue in speculative systems. The discovery of analytical philosophy is that such systems make statements which are meaningless or useless; the discovery of existentialism is that such systems make life meaningless.

If history and thought do not march to Hegelian theses and antitheses, it is still true that what a philosopher finds wrong with philosophy is an intimate measure of what he thinks right, and important to say. The terms or categories in which a philosophy criticizes its competitors, and its culture, are an essential part of its positive achievement. But we should add immediately that what cannot be caught in those particular terms of criticism cannot be appreciated in that particular philosophy. The characteristic and specific differences of such terms of criticism is a principal theme of this essay, the principal way in which the various philosophical positions are distinguished. While this emphasis will not be expected to correct the mad divergence between analytical philosophy and existentialism, it may suggest a way of tracing it more accurately—and even of seeing why its correction would be desirable. Such an exercise will, in any case, be necessary if we are to learn the philosophical-cultural history which has fed the divergence, and it is this knowledge, unattempted, so far as I am aware, that must guide any serious attempt to transcend it.

II

However familiar the announcement, or sense, of revolution in thought, the fact that in hardly more than half a century, and within the line of analytical philosophy alone, we have had to absorb at least three such revolutions constitutes something of a record. The first grows out of the development of the new logic, mathematical logic, in the 19th century, associated most importantly with the name of Gottlob Frege. For its application to philosophy the most famous spokesmen were the young Bertrand Russell and

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his student Ludwig Wittgenstein. The commanding and continuously fruitful insight of their view was expressed by the dictum that the real form of a proposition is its logical form, or contrariwise, that the obvious linguistic form of a proposition masks or distorts its real form, and that this masking or distortion, unrecognized, has produced many of the deepest problems of philosophy since Plato. For example, philosophers have recurrently puzzled themselves over the possibility of asserting that something does not exist; for to assert the nonexistence of any given thing you have to name it, and if you can name it then mustn't it exist? If it doesn't exist, then the name can mean nothing at all, because the only thing a name can mean is the thing it refers to.

Even if you do not feel the paradox in saying that a name may be the name of nothing, and are convinced, indeed, that it is false, you may have trouble explaining why it is false, and why it should have seemed obviously and necessarily true to so many philosophers, and what a name is if it need not refer to anything. What Russell, following Frege, demonstrated can be put in something like the following way: In such a statement as "The deepest bell in the Campanile is flat" it would seem that the isolated descriptive phrase, "The deepest bell in the Campanile," in its ordinary grammatical dress, meant something, namely, that particular bell; and that if it did not mean that bell, it meant nothing. But such an idea would have the consequence that one could not know whether that phrase meant anything until he had discovered whether the thing it named or denoted did, in fact, exist. And that is intolerable. The phrase obviously does mean something, not only before we know whether what it names exists, but whether what it names exists or not. Indeed, we could not discover whether what it purports to name does or does not exist unless we knew, before determining that fact, what the name means, and so knew what to look for as its bearer. The solution of this puzzle took the form of saying that although the descriptive phrase means nothing in isolation, it does mean something in the context of the whole sentence. Yet if it means (refers to) nothing in isolation, then how does it suddenly start referring to something in the context of the whole sentence? The answer is: It doesn't refer to, name, or denote anything at all. When the whole sentence is put into logical form, it turns into a compound form which may be read as follows: Something is the deepest bell in the Campanile; everything satisfying that description is flat; if anything satisfies that

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

description it is identical with the first thing—or: nothing else is the deepest bell. In this splayed form, what emerges is that the brunt of reference falls wholly upon logical terms such as "everything" and "something" in conjunction with the variable pronoun "it," the whole complex being bound together by the cross reference of pronouns and the logical relations of conjunction and implication ("if-then") and identity. Such terms and relations seem to be fundamental to all language, and their meaning obviously does not depend on there being any particular thing in the world.[2]

This procedure is known as Russell's Theory of Descriptions, and from its promulgation in the first decade of this century, it became the accepted example of what a philosophical analysis should be. My ludicrously brief account will have conveyed little sense of the power this theory was felt to have, promising as it did a mode of solving the outstanding philosophical problems about naming, meaning, identity, existence, etc., not to mention problems in the understanding of mathematics. I hope, however, that it may serve these purposes: first, to convey a sense of one way in which the term "analysis" has been used by analytical philosophers, as referring to the procedure of translating statements from ordinary language into their corresponding form in logic; second, to suggest one way in which problems of philosophy came to seem problems of language (and of logic); and third, to elicit one particular criticism of past philosophy, that its problems have come from misunderstanding the logic of our language.

This wedding of logic and philosophy was given one definitive sanctification, and perhaps its most famous, in Wittgenstein's first book, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, written just before and during the First World War, and published in 1922. Within a few years, it became a major inspiration of a group of philosophers and scientists in Vienna who had been meeting to discuss various philosophical problems they found themselves to share. This group called themselves the Vienna Circle, and the point of view they espoused became known as "Logical Positivism." In 1929 this group declared itself in a public manifesto setting forth what they called a "scientific conception of the world," and reviewing problems in the philosophy of mathematics and science which they were concerned to solve.

Of the complex of motives and hopes this view contained, two or three are immediately relevant to our purpose. The new logic

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was to serve not so much to analyze and solve traditional philosophical problems and to unmask the logical disorder of the natural languages as to construct formal systems in which the structure of science would be logically displayed, to show the way in which concepts feed from a base of empirical observation. According to this view, science, physical science in particular, contains or will contain everything we can know about the world, and it is work enough for an ambitious philosophy to show the structure and sources of that knowledge. Indeed, such purpose is its only intellectually defensible ambition (apart from expanding the subject of pure logic itself), for, with notable exceptions, the traditional problems of philosophy, it can be seen, are not extremely difficult and understandably obscure, but meaningless. One needs only to subject these problems to the test of the famous Verifiability Theory of Meaning, to ask, of any statement or question which is not purely logical, what observations of the world would show it to be true or false; if you find that no observation could confirm its truth or falsity, then the statement or question is demonstrably without meaning. On the basis of this test most metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, and religious questions turn out to be meaningless. They have no answers because they are not significant questions; they are pseudo questions. Such radical dismissal of subjects is no doubt somewhat indiscriminate, nor did it help much that the view went on to describe such statements as "merely" without cognitive or scientific meaning, while acknowledging that they may have some kind of emotive or poetic meaning, because that disposition still seemed to say non-scientific statements lacked something, had something wrong or suspicious about them. No doubt something *is* wrong or suspicious about many of them, and if the dismissal of these subjects as not philosophically respectable was indiscriminate, that failure of discrimination was fully matched in the attacks launched against positivism by those who felt attacked in it, the violence of which seems fair evidence that, for all the difficulty the positivists continued to have in formulating their criterion of meaning to the satisfaction of all concerned, it had caught a guilty conscience napping.[3]

The latest phase of analytical philosophy is the most difficult for me to characterize in these brutally few strokes. It is most familiarly known, I believe, as ordinary language philosophy; but when confronted with that phrase I feel as I suppose any philosopher or writer does when he sees his commitments collapsed into a rubric.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I feel like denying it and leaving the room. But what is unfair for one is unfair for another, so let it stand.

The relevant components are these: In the background there is Russell's contemporary and colleague at Cambridge University, G. E. Moore. Neither a logician nor a scientist, Moore had only good sense to go on in his studies, and he found himself asking, faced with a traditional metaphysical thesis, "What on earth can anyone mean by saying *that*?" On earth is precisely where he tried to find the answer, bringing the question all the way down to the ground. If a philosopher were to say, "There are no material things," Moore would consider it enough to show that he *knew* this to be false by saying, "Here's one human hand and here's another; so there are at least two material things"; or if the philosopher said, "Time is unreal," Moore would be ready with, "If you mean that no event ever follows or precedes another event, you are certainly wrong; for *after* lunch I went for a walk, and after that I took a bath, and after that I had tea."

Such responses will hardly explain why Moore was, for many years, so influential a figure in English philosophy.[4] It does, however, underline one significant fact: philosophical theses or conclusions often contradict our common beliefs about the world, denying, for example, that we can see physical objects or that we know that other persons have the same feelings and thoughts we do, or that we can know any statement about the world to be certainly true; or they may suggest as possible something we fully believe to be false, for example, that we may now be dreaming or hallucinating our present experiences. Philosophers have always recognized a tension between philosophy and common sense, and considered the testing and the overthrow, if necessary, of common belief to be one of their virtues. What Moore's work began to suggest is that in the conflict with common belief, philosophy is wrong; that instead of philosophy's results overthrowing common belief, an appeal to those beliefs and the language in which they are expressed (ordinary language, the language in which philosophy itself is mostly expressed) shows that the philosopher cannot literally or fully have meant what he said. What on earth can he mean?

After the Second World War, the large force of philosophers who had been on leave from Oxford University re-grouped, and within a few years were undertaking major campaigns within the English-speaking philosophical world. Under the new direction of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin, many of them vowed, so to speak, that they would never again be led down the philosophical path. As with most vows, it faded and became clouded over, but while it lasted in its pure form it created its own kind of exhilaration. Instead of rehearsing yet again what the hero of Beckett's *Endgame* calls "the old questions, the old answers," these philosophers took ordinary questions, with new examples, sensible examples, and gave ordinary, sensible answers to them. The surprising result was that their results were surprising. In their work, the term "ordinary" in "ordinary language philosophy" meant simply that the words and problems and examples discussed would not be chosen from the philosophical repertory. If we have learned anything in the past couple of millennia, they were in effect pronouncing, it is that this repertory is not adequate to its reputation. If we are to ask the old questions, like "What is knowledge?", then let us not begin by asking, in the old way, how we know, for example, that the external world exists, or that another world exists, or that there is a table or a sheet of paper in front of me. No person in his right mind, or at least in his ordinary frame of mind, asks such questions. And if to philosophize means merely to go out of one's mind, then let us fully admit that fact, and either make serious efforts to give the subject up, or radically to transform it, or else not be surprised that philosophy is treated with distant suspicion.

In avoiding philosophical theory—which, like any fault, is easier to see in others—Oxford philosophy came most immediately into conflict with its competitors within the analytical temper of philosophy, namely with Russell's theory of descriptions and of logical translation, and with positivism's theory of non-logical, non-scientific discourse. For example, the Oxford group accepted positivism's sense that scientific or descriptive statements are different from ethical and aesthetic and religious utterances. (I say "positivism's sense"; but the mere fact *that* there is a difference had been noticed as early as Plato's *Euthyphro,* and it became a dominant theme of moral philosophy from the time of Hume's *Treatise* and Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason.*) But the positivist went on, as though *explaining* the difference, to say that scientific statements have cognitive meaning and that non-scientific statements do not. The Oxford philosophers rejected these critical or theoretical terms, as they rejected all the theoretical terms they recognized as such, and asked: what meaning, or use, *do* ethical statements, for example, have? Why compare them—and why unfavorably?—

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with scientific statements? Perhaps, seen in their own light, they lack nothing, but, as it were, have a logic of their own.

The feature of ordinary language philosophy which seems to me of the greatest significance is the *pervasiveness* of its conflict with accepted philosophical opinion; and here I mean not just the completeness of its distrust, something it shares with positivism, but the possibility it provides of detailed and intimate assessment of philosophical assertion. Modern philosophy has often been said to begin in doubt and skepticism, but few philosophers have been able to press their doubts very far, particularly not about their own assumptions, however radical their conclusions may have been. (Nietzsche is the most obvious exception in Continental philosophy.) The philosophy of ordinary language seems to me designed to nudge assumptions into the light of day, not because it demonstrably makes no assumptions of its own, but because there is no point at which it must, or even may, stop philosophizing. This perhaps explains why philosophizing of this sort issues in such various criticisms of other philosophy, and why such criticisms as it has so far offered can seem dishearteningly easy and trivial. The moral I draw, however, is not that the philosophy is easy and trivial, but that its criticisms are themselves to be subjected to the same methods which have produced them.

One example must suffice for a taste of one sort of procedure typified, and apotheosized, in Austin's work, generally regarded as the purest example of Oxford analysis. He notes that in ordinary English we ask questions of the form "Why do you believe so-and-so?" and "How do you know so-and-so?" but almost never, it seems, questions of the form "Why do you know so-and-so?" and "How do you believe so-and-so?"[5] From such simple facts as these, advancing through dozens of facts of equally humble extraction, what appears to emerge is that perhaps belief and knowledge are not related in the way philosophers have commonly supposed. The most famous historical image of this relation is that of Plato's "divided line" in the *Republic:* we begin in complacency and ignorance and move up gradually to more firmly founded beliefs; then, under further pressure to examine our beliefs, move further in the same direction until we arrive at real knowledge. But Austin's little contrast, supported by further strands and knots of little contrasts and comparisons, suggests that belief and knowledge are not to be thought of in this way. They lead him to emphasize these facts: I cannot be more certain than I am of some beliefs, so that

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when I say I know, what I am expressing is not some further unattainable range of belief—belief secured absolutely, as it were, against all future contingency—but a different stance I take toward that certainty. In saying I know, I commit myself differently. I assume authority in new ways, authorize you explicitly to take my word, and stake my reputation or my mind more starkly. And if I refuse ever to take such steps, I am not being *cautious*, but irresponsible or obsessional.

What are we to say, then, of the philosophical image of the relation of belief and knowledge? That it is out of its mind? That philosophers have played tricks on us, and perhaps been in collusion to deceive us? That they have misused the ordinary words of their language (for theirs is no different from ours)? That they have changed the meanings of their words, or used them perfunctorily, inattentively, more or less randomly and without seriousness? These are all terms of criticism used, or implied, by such a philosopher as Austin. The trouble is that they are either unbelievable descriptions of traditional philosophizing, or else they undermine the assumptions of Austin's own philosophizing. Take the suggestion that philosophers have not meant what they say quite seriously. They have, however, been speaking from within their own language and it is not obvious that they have (except when they *obviously* have) meant their words in any un-ordinary technical sense. How *can* they not have been serious, or spoken randomly? And if they can and have, then any of us may and do speak in these ways at any time. But in that case, such discoveries as Austin has seemed to make would either be impossible or utterly inconsequential, which in turn suggests that just to the extent Austin's discoveries are significant, traditional philosophy becomes more significant, or significant and problematical in a new way. We really do mean what we say, even though we may not always appreciate its implications, and may fail of meaning in particular ways. And the same is true for philosophers. Yet we are in conflict with them —or, if we are philosophers, then we are in conflict with ourselves as normal men. The situation might perhaps be explained if one could show that there is something about the very act of philosophizing which produces unseriousness or randomness or unnoticed and self-defeating drift in our words. But nothing in Austin's work, or in Oxford philosophy generally, shows that anything of the kind is in fact the case.

This conflict between philosophy and everyday language is also

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at the heart of the later philosophizing of Wittgenstein, where he does indeed begin to take apart the act of philosophizing itself. With his first book, the *Tractatus,* he claimed to have provided definitive solutions to the problems of philosophy; accordingly, he withdrew from the subject to become, among other things, a school teacher in his native Austria. Some ten years later, in the early thirties, he came to feel that these solutions were no longer satisfactory, and he returned to philosophy, and to England, to begin the work of writing and private lecturing which was soon rumored to be the major new influence in English philosophy, but which was made publically available only with the appearance of his *Philosophical Investigations* in 1953, some two years after his death.

In that book he says, "What we do is to bring words back to their everyday uses." Presumably, then, he felt that in philosophy words were unhinged from their contexts; it now became a problem for him *how* this could happen and why it happened, what there is about philosophy that makes it happen and how language can allow it to happen. None of the criticisms of the tradition produced by Moore or the Oxford philosophers or the positivists seemed to him to be right, to do justice to the pain, the pervasiveness, even the mystery of that conflict. He could not, for example, be content to say that in this conflict philosophy had been playing tricks or spoken with lack of seriousness, because he had had the experience of producing his first book, and he knew that such criticisms were not true of it. If he was to philosophize again, then the experience of that first book must be as continuous a matter of investigation for him as the new insights he had come to. Here we see dramatized a major difference between the superficially, and sometimes deeply, similar thoughts of Austin and Wittgenstein. Austin is helped to dismiss with easy conscience philosophical results which conflict with his own because the philosophers he takes to task are often not original; it may be true of *them,* at least at the moment he catches them, that they are inattentive in some obvious way, or lack philosophical seriousness. On the other hand, the thinkers Wittgenstein confronts in his *Investigations* are Plato, St. Augustine, Frege, William James, and the early Russell, thinkers whom, whatever their faults, it will be somewhat harder to convict of lacking philosophical seriousness. Not that either Austin or Wittgenstein spends much of his time confronting other philosophers directly. Austin always concentrates on proceeding with his accumulation of surprises, and on showing

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

us the obvious, but unnoticed, ways, and connections of ways, in our uses of words.[6] Moreover, he shares with Sir Francis Bacon the sense that past philosophy is often a matter of empty, childish prattling, and that to dote on the greatness of the past merely stands in the way of present productive work. Wittgenstein's writing, on the other hand, is writing in continuous confrontation of philosophy, not of other *philosophers* (the names I cited appear in his book only once or twice each), but of that dimension of the mind which insists on philosophizing no matter how often the arguments of philosophy have been refuted. Part I of the *Investigations* (which is some four-fifths of the book, and just over 170 pages) consists of 690 numbered sections, most of which are miniature dialogues between himself—or that part of himself which maintains a firm grip on the world all men share—and nameless interlocutors who manifest over and over, from every direction and in all moods, those temptations or dissatisfactions or compulsions which drive ordinary men away from the everyday world and out to philosophy. The force of this mode of composition depends upon whether the interlocutors voice questions and comments which come from conviction, which are made with passion and attention, and which, as one reads, seem always something one wants oneself to say, or feels the power of. If they do, then their voices cannot, in any *obvious* way, be criticized or dismissed. If these voices were to be described in one word, the one that for me best captures the experiences they suggest is the existentialist's term "inauthentic," that new term of philosophical criticism directed against our lives. I have said that for the Oxford philosopher, "ordinary language" and "ordinary contexts" mean not much more than "non-philosophical language" and "non-philosophical contexts." In Wittgenstein's work, "ordinary" or "everyday" contexts and examples are, I suggest, meant to carry the force of "authentic" examples authentically responded to in language.

III

Anyone who has looked into Wittgenstein's *Investigations* will appreciate the difficulties of saying briefly what the book is about and of conveying its particular tone and force. I want now to follow up my suggestion of its relation to existentialism and try the experiment of comparing it with Kierkegaard's writing, in particular the writing in his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript.*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard see their worlds as laboring under illusion. Both see their function as authors to be the uncovering or diagnosing of this illusion, and freeing us from it. In both, the cure requires that we be brought back to our ordinary human existence.

For Kierkegaard the illusion is that such a thing as Christendom exists, that one can be a Christian simply by being born in a Christian state, of Christian parents, and by being given a Christian name and nomenclature. Moreover, it is an illusion to suppose that there are any Christians, for no one, or almost no one—including himself—is now capable of the resignation and faith required to follow Christ. For Wittgenstein the illusion is perfection or generality or completeness. One of its forms is the idea that the intelligibility of our language rests upon a foundation of logic, or is secured by essences or rules. It is as though he had asked himself, ten years after his *Tractatus* was written, "How can logic show us the real form of language?" and had to answer, "It can't." That does not mean it is not often possible, and sometimes useful, to put utterances from a natural language into logical form. But from this possibility nothing follows of the sort that philosophers, including the young Wittgenstein, had thought followed. For example, it does not follow that one *must* put statements in logical form in order to see their function and, as it were, understand their intelligibility. And it would in particular not provide, as philosophers have supposed, a more exact set of statements, because the notion of "more exact" depends on the particular goal one has in mind: logic cannot provide it, once for all, for all goals. And if one says that logic provides an analysis of ordinary statements, then he must not go on to suppose that ordinary language needs analysis (or at least, that kind of analysis), nor that there is some final and complete analysis toward which ordinary language longs, nor that the analyzed form tells you more, in general, than the unanalyzed form. In some ways, for certain purposes, it tells you less. (In these important respects Wittgenstein is profoundly opposed to the conception of philosophy as analysis.)

Kierkegaard's diagnosis of our illusion, our illness, in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, is that we have lost the capacity for subjectivity, for inwardness, and therewith the capacity for Christianity. We live in an Objective Age, an Age of Knowledge, and we have stopped *living* our lives in favor of knowing them. Wittgenstein's diagnosis is that we have, in part because of our

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

illusions about language, fixed or forced ideas of the way things must be, and will not *look and see* how they are. Kierkegaard finds us trying to escape our existence and our history; Wittgenstein finds us wishing to escape the limits of human forms of language and forms of life. In Kierkegaard's descriptions, we live in the universal rather than in our particularity; in Wittgenstein's we crave generality instead of accepting the concrete.

In both, the cure is for us to return to our everyday existence. It will be obvious that this emphasis on diagnosis and cure continues the early image of the philosopher as the physician of the soul, and it also aligns these writers with the characteristic effort of modern thought to *un-mask* its audience, its world, an effort as true of Marx and Nietzsche and Freud as it is of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. And the effort to un-mask requires a few masks or tricks of its own. Traditional forms of criticism, of logical refutation preeminently, are unavailing. Our new problems do not arise through inconsistency or falsehood; they are worse than false, and they are all too consistent. What one must do is to alter the terms and ground upon which the whole argument rests. The problem is not whether the workers are paid enough, but why one has the right to *pay* them at all. The problem is not whether one has been baptized, but what it means to *become* baptized. The problem is not why man suffers, but why man interprets his suffering as punishment. The problem is not whether the life of pleasure is higher or lower than the life of knowledge, but why one cannot feel pleasure and why one desires to *know*. The problem is not whether universals or essences are *before* things or only *in* things, but why one has the idea that there are universals or essences.

Nothing is more characteristic of the writing in the *Philosophical Investigations* and in the *Unscientific Postscript* than its shunning of normal modes of argument and the insistence on the language and life of ordinary men. But this itself is not a new turn in philosophical writing. Here is a passage from a recent discussion of the so-called Revival of Learning in the Rennaisance:

> In its simplest terms, this revolution consisted in a shift within the spectrum of the three primary liberal arts that were the nurture of all scholars, a shift from dialectic as the key discipline toward grammar and rhetoric. . . . The study of words and of style, the analysis of how a language is put together and what it may be made to do, the examination of an author in relation to his audience and the whole purpose of his work—these became increasingly the preoccupations of scholars. The Revival of Learning thus meant a shift of interest from philosophy [i.e., from

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

philosophy in the style of Abelard and Aquinas] to philology, from logic to literature, from abstract truth to concrete, personal fact.[7]

That description, it seems clear to me, fits Wittgenstein's procedures and his motives as well as it fits existentialism and a familiar part of contemporary theology. When to this one adds Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's recurrent and obviously pointed use of humor, paradox, aphorism, irony, parable and dialogue, the memory and effect of these writers take on an hallucinatory similarity.

Readers of both of them have often found the cure they offer worse than the disease. Kierkegaard calls for the end of Christendom. He imagines, in his Journal, that someone will object: If all men became Christians, if all men became celibate, ascetic, martyrs to the truth, and suffered the full fact of aloneness, the world would come to an end. To which he answers: "What a pity." No doubt that was itself meant ironically. And Wittgenstein asks, at one point: "Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important?" And he answers: "What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards. . . ." But that seems little consolation for the loss of philosophy.

And in both writers the cure seems no cure. All we are given is the obvious, and then silence. Kierkegaard has some sport with the man who feels the need to make profound discoveries before he can find his salvation and know his true responsibilities. Kierkegaard's suggestion is that the only discovery that man needs is that he needs no new discovery. And Wittgenstein says, "If one tried to advance *theses* in philosophy, it would never be possible to question them, because everyone would agree to them." Yet they both claim that obviousness and silence provide *answers,* and moreover that nothing else does, that is, not to *their* questions.

Before I go further, I feel I should speak for a sense of impatience which has every right to break out. "One thing you've said is certainly true, namely, that the similarity between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein is hallucinatory. They are simply different, so why try to deny it? Kierkegaard is important because he describes our lives and depicts salvation, whereas Wittgenstein speaks about words, and if about our lives, then about the commonest portions of our everyday life. It would be more honest simply to say that the term philosophy can refer either to a body of propositions supposed to comprise knowledge of some sort, or else to a mode of life, and that analytical philosophy is an example of the former

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and existentialism an example of the latter. Moreover, Kierkegaard writes in defense of Christianity, saying over and over that his one thought is that Christianity is inwardness, that truth is subjectivity, that the enemy of truth is objectivity, scientific knowledge, and that since we have chosen the latter we have lost our souls and are damned.[8] Wittgenstein has nothing to say about such matters, and moreover thinks there is nothing wrong with science. He merely says that it is *not* philosophy, that philosophy's problems are not solved by science. Such a position may be an advance over positivism's servility to science, but it is still nowhere near making us servants of God."

It would not be profitable, or pleasant, to argue the question of the relative importance of our writers. Though it should be remembered that when Wittgenstein says "philosophy leaves everything as it is," he seems to think that is in itself an important thing to say—as though men, and not, perhaps, just philosophers, were always in danger of trying to make philosophy change things. And does one want it to? One does not want it, for example, to become merely another ideology—in the words of George Orwell, another of "the smelly little orthodoxies which are now contending for our souls." If philosophy could keep ideologies from changing the world out from under our lives, could help to let us grow into our future, knowing it as we go, that would be change enough, and important enough. And I would add that Kierkegaard said he was *un*important, or mattered at most accidentally to our lives. One may think this just more of his humor and irony; but I think that if he was in dead earnest about anything, he was about that.

Again, is it true to say that "philosophy is *either* a body of knowledge *or* a mode of life"? At the beginning of philosophy, in Plato and Aristotle, the knowledge it provided, going beyond "scientific" knowledge, was supposed to make one good, give one joy. With Christianity, such knowledge was found irrelevant for true, eternal happiness; the truth one needs is as easy, and at least as difficult, for a wise man as for a fool. Christendom has always been ambivalent about the merit of learning, until today we no longer know whether knowledge is itself saving or damning—perhaps imagining each in turn. But further, it is one of Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's best discoveries—or rediscoveries—that knowledge itself exacts a mode of life. Kierkegaard's "objective thinker" is a well-known comic figure—like the Devil—though not everyone may appreciate his humor. And Nietzsche, in characterizing what

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he calls the "ascetic ideal," asks, or re-asks in a new way: "Why do men wish to know? What does their concentration on, their faith in knowledge, do to them?" As man, the ideal of the knower, is heightened in Christian spirituality, he will be the overthrow of that Christianity. Because he will press his knowledge until he knows his own motives to knowledge, knows that they are ones of passionate destructiveness, of fear and power over others disguised as self-control, of hatred and possessiveness disguised as disinterestedness. And he will go on to know that the same is true of the motives as a Christian. Perhaps then he will become capable of the knowledge that will be joyful.

It is true that Wittgenstein does not entertain such questions. And yet it is not clear what the effect will be of saying to philosophy: answers must be satisfying, and the old philosophical answers are not satisfying; *more* knowledge will not solve your problems. For that can lead one to ask: What will solve them, what will be satisfying? And now we are back to the question of silence which we broke off a moment ago.

At one point in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein says, "Let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be *deep*?" And he adds parenthetically, "That is what the depth of philosophy is." One example of what he may have meant by a grammatical joke is perhaps the following: A child I was taking for a walk saw a younger child stumble and fall, and she asked me, "Why did the baby fall?" I answered, "He just lost his balance." The child immediately replied, "Where did he lose it?" and began looking around in puzzlement. (That is the sort of question that the child, a year or so later, will herself find enormously funny, and she will ask it just *for* the fun.) How are we to answer the child's question? We may feel: the baby didn't lose something in the way the child thinks, or: "lose" means something different when I say, "he lost his balance," from what it means when I say, "he lost his blanket." And we may feel that the child is not ready for certain explanations. That is doubtless right enough, but we may then imagine that *we* do possess the explanations, but for some reason cannot in fact hand them over to a child. But do we know how the baby "lost something" differently from the way the child thinks? How shall we say what the difference is? And do we know *our* meaning of "lost something" which is different from the meaning the child attaches to those words? How do we explain that meaning to ourselves? That we may not be able to provide ourselves with such explanations

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

does not show that we do not really know what we mean; what it shows is that "knowing what we mean" is not always, though it sometimes is, a matter of having *explanations* for our meaning. Sometimes we know a thing, but cannot express our knowledge in explanations; sometimes we do not know a thing, but what we lack cannot be supplied by explanations. (We may, for example, need to come to *see* everything differently.) Our lack of explanation to ourselves also suggests that our difference from the child is not a difference in the explanations we can or cannot give. The child will eventually learn what we mean by the phrase "lost his balance," or perhaps we should say, she will learn how we use it; that will happen when she also learns how we use forms like "lost his way" and "lost his chance" and "lost his turn" and "lost his sense of humor." Wittgenstein says, "To imagine a form of language is to imagine a form of life." And we could, accordingly, say that the child is not ready to learn certain forms because she as yet lacks the forms of life in which those forms of language have a use, have a natural function. The extent to which we understand one another or ourselves is the same as the extent to which we share or understand forms of life, share and know, for example, what it is to take turns, or take chances, or know that some things we have lost we cannot look for but can nevertheless sometimes find or recover; share the sense of what is fun and what loss feels like, and take comfort from the same things and take confidence or offense in similar ways. That we do more or less share such forms rests upon nothing deeper; nothing *insures* that we will, and there is no foundation, logical or philosophical, which explains the fact that we do, which provides the real form of which our lives, and language, are distortions. What has to be *accepted,* Wittgenstein says, is forms of life. This is not the same as saying that our lives as we lead them—in particular, for Wittgenstein, our lives of theory—must be accepted. What it says, or suggests, is that criticism of our lives is not to be prosecuted in philosophical theory, but continued in the confrontation of our lives with their own necessities. He also says that language, and life, rests on conventions. What he means is, I suppose, that they have no necessity beyond what human beings do. He does not mean, for example, that we might all convene and decide or vote on what our human forms of life shall be, choose what we shall find funny or whether we will continue finding loss and comfort where we do. If we call these arrangements conventional, we must then also call them natural.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The thought was perhaps expressed by Pascal when he said of human beings, "Custom is our nature." It is from such an insight that Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard explicitly avoid explanations of our lives and concentrate on descriptions of them as they are, together with the alternatives which present themselves at given moments. Or perhaps we should say: for them a philosophical explanation takes the form of a description, unlike explanations in science.

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein says, "The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem," and in the *Investigations* he says: ". . . the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear." Yet he calls these problems *solved* (*Investigations*), and he says that when "there are . . . no questions left . . . this itself is the *answer*" (*Tractatus*). Putting these remarks together, the implication is that the problems of life and the problems of philosophy have the same form—Wittgenstein would say they have the same "grammar": they are solved only when they disappear; answers are arrived at only when there are no longer questions. In the *Investigations*, this turns out to be more of an answer than, in this simple form, it seems to be; for here such an answer more explicitly dictates and displays the ways philosophy is to proceed in investigating problems, ways leading to what he calls "perspicuous representation," which means, roughly, that instead of accumulating new facts, or capturing the essence of the world in definitions, or perfecting and completing our language, we need to arrange the facts we already know or can come to realize merely by *calling to mind* something we know. Wittgenstein also says that these perspicuous representations are "the way we look at things," and he then asks, "Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?" The answer to that question is, I take it, not No. Not, perhaps, Yes, because it is not a special, or competing, way of looking at things. But not No, because its mark of success is that the world seem—be—different.[9]

I think of Kierkegaard's description in *Fear and Trembling* of the man who can, as he puts it, "express the sublime in the pedestrian," something he takes as possible only through the possession of faith. I would certainly sympathize with the feeling that *this* connection between Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard is fanciful; and yet it seems to me to throw into relief the *kind* of writing in which they both engage. For not just any mode of composition will tell

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

us something we cannot fail to know and yet remain enlightening; not just any way of arguing will try to prevent us from taking what is said as a thesis or a result. Theses and results are things that can be believed and accepted; but Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein do not want to be believed and accepted, and therewith, of course, dismissed. And not just any way of addressing an audience will leave them as they are, leave them alone, but transformed.

These are effects we have come to expect of art, and perhaps it is because of such effects that a literary theorist like Northrop Frye says even of the art of literature—not merely, with Malraux, of the visual arts—that it is silent. Wittgenstein says that his *Philosophical Investigations* is a work of "grammar," and Kierkegaard calls his *Postscript* a "Mimic-Pathetic-Dialectic Composition," and he first thought of entitling it simply, "Logical Problems." To understand these descriptions would be to understand the works in question.

Kierkegaard speaks in his early works little, if at all, *about* his literary or philosophical methods, but he tells more and more about his methods as his books tumble into the world, and perhaps by the time of the *Unscientific Postscript,* and surely in the posthumous *Point of View of My Work as an Author,* he says rather too much about them. His principle methodological claim in the *Postscript* is that he is forced to use what he calls "indirect communication"—and his "forced to" means something close to "logically forced to," as if he were to say that what he wishes to communicate cannot be communicated any other way. Direct communication would be appropriate for transmitting beliefs, or presenting scientific results, etc. It is inappropriate, indeed impossible, for something else. For what else? One understands the sort of thing Kierkegaard has in mind when he says, "This can be communicated in no other way." It points to the fact that makes art itself possible, or necessary, but its application to Kierkegaard's composition is not perfectly clear, and a bit of analysis may be in order.

What would it mean to say, "Poetry communicates indirectly" or "What poetry says can be communicated in no other way"? (The former question seems more fundamental, since we could, it seems, also say of science that what it says can be communicated no other way.) Let us take, for example, a poem of Wallace Stevens' in which he says, "Death is the mother of beauty." Suppose someone feels he doesn't really understand that line and asks for its meaning. I may try to help by such remarks as these: What

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the line means is that without a knowledge of death, of real and final change and loss, there would be no knowledge of life, and no art; we have art that we may not perish from the truth; and art itself is a kind of death, but in the service of the only life there is. What does it mean to say that Stevens *means* what I say he means by that line? Have I not, if my reading is accurate, communicated his meaning?—though communicated it in another way, if you like. Perhaps one feels: Yes and No. That feeling itself suggests that it is not *obvious* that Stevens' line has communicated something which can be communicated in no other way. Perhaps one still wishes to say: You haven't communicated the *very* meaning of that line, not said it *exactly*. But that suggests that I got the line *wrong*, that what I said it meant wasn't exactly right. No doubt something is lost when the line is explained; but no doubt something is gained, if the explanation is right, especially if it is exactly right. But Kierkegaard says *everything* is lost in reverting to direct communication, so our example must not be the sort he had in mind. This is also suggested in asking *which* of these communications—Stevens' line or my reading of it—one wants to call "direct" and which "indirect." The answer seems to be: In a sense the original line is more direct, but in another sense the explanation of the line is more direct.

Then let us take a different example. At the beginning of his poem, Stevens imagines a lady who knows what it means to say that death is the mother of beauty, and he pictures her, late one Sunday morning, in the center of his mortal heaven; and he finds that her thoughts wander, that she feels a pang of regret and yearning for the old heaven, the old promise. Or rather, what he finds is that

> she feels the dark
> Encroachment of that old catastrophe,
> As a calm darkens among water-lights.

If someone fails to understand these lines, I *may* try to help; but I cannot do what I did with the former line. I may say that "old catastrophe" refers to the failed promise of redemption, but I cannot explain any special weight he attaches to any of the particular words, nor show complexities in the thought. I cannot *explain* the lines at all. I may try to *describe* some particular scene and mood and gesture which captures the particular touch those lines have for me, hoping to lead you to the line itself. Then again, I may

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be unwilling to say anything, wanting to leave them as touchstones of intimacy. In that case, I will perhaps say or feel: The thought can be expressed in no other way. And here I mean that absolutely —no "in a sense" about it. But just for this reason the question whether the lines communicate directly or indirectly loses all significance here—there simply is no alternative way of communicating it. So this again cannot be the sort of case Kierkegaard has in mind.

These examples bring out a conflict between the characterizations, "must be communicated indirectly" and "can be communicated no other way."[10] It is only when there is some alternative way of communicating a thought that it makes sense to say that the thought has been, in a given instance, communicated directly or indirectly. Where there flatly is *no* other way in which thought can be communicated, then the unique expression of it can be called neither direct nor indirect; the contrast no longer applies.

So what can Kierkegaard mean by saying *both* that his communication is indirect *and* that there is no alternative to it?[11] Does he really mean, or need, only one of these characterizations? What leads him to his joint characterization can, I think, be seen in this: the thoughts he wishes to express seem easily to be expressed in familiar words—the words, say, of the Sermon on the Mount; people are always using the words and supposing themselves to know what they mean. But Kierkegaard finds that they do not know, or will not know, what the words really mean. They lose, or cover, their meaning when they are spoken apart from the (Christian) forms of life which give them their meaning. Yet they are the same *words,* and no others will do for the thoughts to be expressed. It is because the words can be uttered and meant in conflicting ways that Kierkegaard maintains the contrast between direct and indirect communication; it is because only one way of saying them gives the real, the Christian meaning that he says only one form of communication is possible.

This, then, is a very particular literary problem, a problem concerning a very particular situation of language, not one, as in the first example from Stevens' poem, in which there are alternative vehicles for expressing a thought, one of which can be said to convey it directly, the other indirectly; nor, as in the second example, a situation in which there is no alternative vehicle of expression for the thought and therefore no way in which it can be conveyed differently (directly or indirectly). It is one in which, while there

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is only one vehicle of expression, there are two thoughts it can express, and moreover the thoughts are incompatible, mutually defeating. (Which thought is expressed by the one vehicle depends, as it were, on the direction in which it is travelling, outward or inward.) Examples of such vehicles are these:

Truth is subjectivity
Truth is appropriation
Christianity is inwardness
Faith is greater than knowledge
The mark of faith is certainty
The mark of faith is uncertainty
Faith lies in the grasp of the ordinary
Christianity demands that you: Die to the world
Become a witness to the truth
Love thy neighbor and thine enemy
Deny your mother and father

And so on, through the content of the Christian message. This message is of such a form that the words which contain its truth may be said in a way which defeats that very truth. And Kierkegaard sees modern man as fated to say them the wrong way.

If one way of saying and hearing and understanding such words is to be called direct and the other indirect, then it must still be made clear that the relation between these modes is not the same as in our case of paraphrasing the poem (first example), because there the paraphrase ("direct communication") is meant to, and in successful cases it does, open us to the poem ("indirect communication"), whereas here the direct expression blocks the indirect. In using such words directly the relation between what one says and what there is in those words to be heard and understood is ironic, and, depending on the context and the consequences, comic or tragic. If you take (say) Christ's parable of the sower and the seed as an unvarnished tale, it is utterly trivial, pointless; heard and understood, it teaches the reception of the word of salvation. He that hath ears to hear, let him hear. Kierkegaard, bent with knowing the distance between what Christendom says and what it understands, tries to unstop its ears, to awaken the Christian by producing for him the irony, the comedy and the tragedy of his existence.[12] Above all the irony, which is the specific for words and deeds which have the opposite of their intended effect, which mask what they seem to reveal, or produce what they were meant to avoid.

For Wittgenstein, the distance between what is said and what

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is meant is not ironic.[13] His audience is not the Christian inoculated against Christianity; and his dialogues are rather the reverse of the Socratic. Socrates' interlocutors have not found their lives, because they have failed to examine them. Wittgenstein's have lost their lives through thinking too much, or in the wrong way. What he seems to uncover is not that someone's words mean the opposite of what he says or that someone fails to recognize the implications of what he says. What he finds, rather, is that someone means something very *specific*, only *different* from what he thought he meant, or else means nothing at all just when he thought his meaning was clearest and deepest. He finds that someone has become obsessed with "pictures" of the way he imagines the world or the mind must be; or supposes himself to be communicating a piece of information when in fact no one could fail to know what he says (hence no one could be informed by it). Such a person—any person at such a moment—is lost not in parable but in fact; he has lost not the depth of his words, but their surface, their ordinariness—not their power to save but their power to record; he is out of touch not with his individual existence but with his common human nature. Which of these is the greater loss it is perhaps less important to decide than to discern the necessities of each.

Wittgenstein's general diagnosis, as has been said, is that these are the eventualities which come, in philosophizing, when one is led to speak as if beyond the limits of human language, as it were, looking back at it. Therefore, what he does is to bring words back to their everyday uses. That this is a difficult thing to get people to do says something about the difficulty of philosophizing—and about the difficulty of *not* philosophizing. That a call for the return to the everyday requires its own ironies, hints, jokes, parables and silences, says something about what this return requires—not an itinerary through new information to the goal of theory, but through renewed looking and seeing to the point of knowing where you are.

If I do not say that Wittgenstein's *Investigations* is a secularization of Kierkegaard's *Postscript*, that is partly because other of Kierkegaard's own writings may also be called secularizations of his religious works, and partly because the idea of secularization is all but useless; not just because it is so unclear, but because it suggests at once less intimacy between these writers than details of comparison will reveal, and also more intimacy than the different weight and shape of details within each writer will tolerate. When Kierkegaard finds the modern philosopher (in particular Hegel)

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

supposing that he can transverse the infinite distance to God by erecting a very high and long system, he remarks that "philosophy rests not upon a mistaken presupposition, but upon a comic presupposition." One could almost expect to find that particular criticism numbered separately in the *Investigations*. For when Wittgenstein finds philosophers attempting to explain the workings of the mind by appealing to physiological mechanisms about which they know nothing, rather than to the noticeable inner and outer contexts in which the mind takes the forms which puzzled them in the first place (and these are the forms which physiological mechanisms will have to explain), or when he finds a philosopher supposing that he is *pointing* to a sensation by *concentrating his attention* on it, or finds him citing "evidence" for the "hypothesis" that other people "have" feelings "similar" to "our own," or finds him attempting to locate the essence of a phenomenon (say of intention, or meaning, or belief, or language) by stripping away all the characteristics which could comprise its essence, he does not say of them that they are making *mistakes*—as though greater attention and care could have gained them success. The success of someone trying to press his camel through the eye of a needle will not come with his addressing greater attention and care to the enterprise.

I might summarize what I have been saying in somewhat the following way: Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard take seriously the fact that we begin our lives as children; what we need is to be shown a path, and helped to take steps; and as we grow, something is gained and something is lost. What helps at one stage does not help at another; what serves as an explanation at one stage is not serviceable—we could say, it is not intelligible—at another. In grown-up philosophy, the problems we have *remain* answerable only through growth, not through explanation or definitions.[14] And grown-ups give themselves as many useless or fraudulent explanations as they give children. What we must hope for is not that at some stage we will possess all explanations, but that at some stage we will need none. And the task remains to discover what we need. Wittgenstein puts it this way: We impose a requirement (for example, of perfection, or certainty, or finality) which fails to satisfy our real need. Kierkegaard could also have said that, as he also suggests that we impose such requirements upon ourselves for just that reason, to avoid seeing what our lives really depend on.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Before stopping, we owe it to ourselves to ask of what real use it was to say that Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein find the world suffering from illusions, and write to free us of them. Kierkegaard speaks of such an illusion only relatively late in his authorship, after he has written *through*, so to speak, the stages on life's way. Each stage has its own mode of communication, and an individual in one stage cannot use the explanations which serve in another. From what existential stage does Kierkegaard see the world as under an illusion? I suggest, from none at all. In such writing he has become exactly the objective thinker, the Hegelian world-historical-monger he so despises. His description rests, to use his precise phrase, on a comic presupposition. The notion of illusion suggests that there is a reality to be seen. But if what is meant is an illusion held by *that* individual in *his* existence, then the reality with which it contrasts must be one held by that individual in his existence. And *that* reality cannot, on Kierkegaard's own teaching, be known or seen in the way his use of "illusion" suggests.

We might say that no human existence can properly be described as under an illusion; for illusions are inevitable, or they vanish, in ways the human modes of existence do not. The notion of illusion suggests that different existences in their different worlds (for example, the same person at different stages) can be compared in ways they cannot be. Similarly, we should say of the child who looked for the baby's lost balance, not that she *mis*understood what I said to her, but that she understood it in the only way she could, in her stage.

Nevertheless, saying of Kierkegaard that he wrote to free the individual of illusion repays investigation. It is a more useful thing to say than, for example, as one sometimes hears, that he is a Romantic, or to say that he is an individualist, or to say that he writes as a Christian. The first, if true, would be tragic, since a romantic view of life is, in Kierkegaard's view, the other principal way (the way other than "objectivity") to miss the plain facts of a Christian existence. The second would be ironic, because in the sense that *he* means "individual," there are no individuals any more than there are Christians. The last is unknowable, for whether a man is a Christian is a matter of his relationship to God, and that is an essential secret.

One of Wittgenstein's characterizations of his work has, I believe, been fairly widely quoted—that his aim is to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle. But he does not *announce* this as his

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aim—communicating a result or an intention. The context is a paragraph which, in its entirely, consists of the opening question, "What is your aim in philosophy?" and the closing answer, "To show the fly . . . etc." That response is made for that question. What kind of answer *can* that question have? I don't suggest that Wittgenstein does not *mean* the answer he gives, only that the answer is not to be taken as suggesting that he knows beforehand, and once for all, that all questions asked by philosophy are just so much buzzing, and that he can see them, before investigation, to be the product of illusion. What is the aim of philosophy? To respond to the particular question asked, and to get satisfying answers. And satisfaction is not had, and philosophy is not done, once for all.

References

1. This characterization may seem, and should seem, less faithful to the work of Heidegger than it is to Kierkegaard's, to which this paper is restricted. Before concluding, however, that it is not at all true of Heidegger, one would have to consider the following points: (1) While Heidegger is the most important of contemporary existentialists, he is not the purest; so the characterization may still be true of him to the extent that he is (or to the extent that there is something worth noticing as) typically "existentialist." (2) At the beginning of *Being and Time*, Heidegger expresses his awareness of the difficulties of his writing, and claims that its roughness and unfamiliarity have been necessitated by the radical novelty of his point of view. So a modification of our characterization would remain fully faithful to his writing: there is no existing way of writing (writing philosophy) in which what he says can be told. (3) It is true that he insists on the possibility of existential *knowledge* in a way Kierkegaard would deny. He is not, that is, willing to leave science and knowledge as the (or one) fixed enemy of authentic human existence; nor, on the other hand, would he regard some given alternative to knowledge (for example, feeling or the irrational) as a fixed route to such existence. But, with respect to the former, this position requires him to discover a new mode of philosophical knowledge, which means that it is not obvious that he asserts exactly what Kierkegaard denies; and, with respect to the latter, it would be equally wrong to say of Nietzsche or Kierkegaard—as I take to be popularly supposed—that feeling or irrationality are their hoped-for alternatives to our intellectualized existences.

2. In this account I have followed W.V.O. Quine's presentation in "On What There Is." This paper is reprinted in his *From a Logical Point of View* (Harvard University Press, 1953), which includes the relevant bibliography, in particular, references to the classical papers of Frege and Russell.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3. A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* remains the best-known, and the best, popularization of the positivist position. He has recently edited a convenient and useful selection of the original positivist writings (*Positivism*, Free Press, 1959), which weakens any excuse for confining one's knowledge of the view to his early book.

4. The exemplifications I gave of Moore's address to philosophy are taken, or adapted, from Norman Malcolm's "Moore and Ordinary Language." This paper is reprinted in a small collection of essays entitled *Ordinary Language* (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), which contains a serviceable bibliography of its topic. No explanation of Moore's influence would be complete which failed to describe the force and originality of his personality. The most extended account I know of is given in J. M. Keynes *Two Memoirs* (Hart-Davies, 1949).

5. These questions occur in Austin's "Other Minds," reprinted in his *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford, 1961) and in *Logic and Language* (Oxford, 1953, 2nd series), a collection of papers edited by A. Flew.

6. This is preeminently true of his work on Excuses (described and exemplified in his paper of that title, reprinted in *Philosophical Papers*) and in his posthumously published lectures, *How to Do Things with Words* (Harvard University Press, 1962). It is not true of his *Sense and Sensibilia*, also posthumously published lectures (The Clarendon Press, 1962), and, I think, not unrelated to this fact, that the former two investigations are more likely to remain permanent contributions to the subject of philosophy.

7. E. Harris Harbison, *The Christian Scholar in the Age of the Reformation* (New York, 1956), pp. 34–35.

8. I do not wish to be taken as suggesting that Nietzsche and Kierkegaard were unequivocal in their rejection of scientific knowledge. Sometimes they suggest that, in its place, it is unobjectionable. One trouble about it would then be that it just will not stay in its place. But their views about science remain, for me at least, as unclear as they are important.

9. I have lifted this paragraph out of a paper of mine, "Esthetics and Modern Philosophy," which is soon to appear in a volume entitled *Philosophy in America*, to be published by Allen and Unwin in England.

10. This is the chief point at which a reading of the original of this paper by Rogers Albritton forced revision and expansion. I am grateful to him.

11. This is not merely a verbal matter concerning the words direct and indirect. Literary critics say similar things about metaphors and their relation to the words which purport to paraphrase them. I have treated the problem at greater length in the esthetics paper cited in note 9.

12. The reason Jesus gives for speaking in parables ("That hearing they may hear, and not understand") seems different, seems opposite, not to say un-Christian ("Lest at any time they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them"). A consideration of these differences will doubtless have to give at least these facts an accounting: that the audi-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ence of the one is the new Christian, while that of the other is the lost Christian; and that the powers of the speakers differ as heaven and earth.

13. The category of irony re-emerges with poignant relevance in comparing existentialism with the positivist phase of analytical philosophy. Both say that ethical and religious utterances must be subjective; both say that rhetoric prevents an utterance from being genuine; both say that it is not philosophy's business to exhort anyone to the moral life; both say that philosophy provides no objective or empirical knowledge; and both say that science provides objective knowledge of the world. And in each case one of them means the opposite of what the other means, or has opposite feelings about it and draws opposite conclusions.

14. I do not want this to imply that Wittgenstein bars all real, stable answers or explanations or even definitions from philosophy. What I am emphasizing is that all these traditional modes of conclusion will look different in Wittgensteinian perspective. I spoke earlier of explanations taking the form of descriptions, and of the peculiar form philosophical *answers* have in his work. To say that we need to grow is meant to emphasize that we are no longer to expect answers and solutions in traditional terms—any more than we can accept philosophical questions and answers as *given*. What has happened is that the *fact* that something is an "outstanding philosophical problem" has itself become problematic. This is true of all phases of analytical philosophy, but it is equally true of existentialism.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HEINZ POLITZER

The Trial Against the Court

THERE is hardly a theme in European letters between 1880 and 1920 that has undergone so radical a change as the motif of the city. From Zola's markets in *Le Ventre de Paris* to the aloof and eerie promenades of Proust; from Francis Thompson's Charing Cross to the "unreal city" of T. S. Eliot; from James Joyce's *Dubliners* to *Finnegans Wake*; from Theodor Fontane's to Alfred Döblin's Berlin; or from the Lübeck of Thomas Mann's *Buddenbrooks* to the Kaisersaschern of *Doctor Faustus*—the motif of the city has been subjected to constant deepening and intensification. Reality, more and more discredited, became transparent in an ever-increasing degree. The milieu began to be seen as a projection of the hero's character or, as in Joyce, as his pseudo-mythical antagonist. The individual and his background merged, as on a tapestry. Precisely because the modern city became the meeting ground of the "lonely crowd," of men who constantly passed by one another without ever being able to establish genuine communication, it grew into the image of human forsakenness par excellence. It was depicted as idol and demon, Babel and Baal, or as the empty shell that surrounded the nothingness of modern existence. In it, modern man found a palpable symbol of the spiritual crisis through which he saw himself moving. Anguish and alienation, solitude and bewilderment were accepted as basic experiences; they were, in many instances, childhood experiences as well. Thus, as often as not, the motif of the demonic city was built from material gathered at the native places of the writers.

Within the orbit of German literature the city of Prague was predestined to show this transformation first and most radically.

This article is a version of a chapter from the author's book *Franz Kafka: Parable and Paradox*, published by Cornell University Press in 1962.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Its tragic history was well preserved in crooked streets and shady courtyards; its uncanny atmosphere had impressed observers as early and as independent from one another as the American Longfellow and the Northern German Wilhelm Raabe. Inhabited by Czechs and ruled by Austrians, the Bohemian capital was a hotbed of conflicts that were both national and social by nature. Literature reflected these conflicts by changing a living city into a haunted abode. Already the glassy shallowness of the Prague landscapes in Rilke's *Larenopfer* caught an atmosphere which the poet himself called "ghostly"[1] in his later years. While national strife within the Hapsburg empire moved toward a climax, ghosts and monsters like Gustav Meyrink's *Golem* of 1915 began to appear in the streets of Prague; madmen like Max Brod's Jastrau-Klas (*Der Tod ist ein vorübergehender Schwächezustand*) mixed with eccentrics, hunchbacks, prostitutes, and procurers, the *Mädchenhirten* of Egon Erwin Kisch. The very air of the city seemed infested with the miasma of sexual promiscuity as in Max Brod's novels of manners, in Leo Perutz's historical sketches, and, much later, in Paul Leppin's *Golem* drama. For this process of demonization did not come to an end with the proclamation of the first Czech republic; instead, many a German writer now replaced the historical center of the city, the Hradžany castle, with the petty bourgeois quarters and proletarian slums which had eaten their way deep into the heart of the city. Thus Franz Werfel in his *Embezzled Heaven* of 1939 describes in almost identical words the scenery which Franz Kafka had chosen for his *Trial* twenty-five years before:

> A tortuous congeries of dilapidated buildings seems to be waiting for the house-wrecker. The city has spread far out into what was once the countryside, having forgotten this quarter and left it to moulder away with its crooked roofs, worm-eaten loggias, squalid little courts, and worn wooden steps. . . . In the undrained swamps of the past . . . there dwell only the lowest ranks of the community, a few feeble-minded eccentrics, the wrecks of society, and people who, having come down in the world, are unable to afford better shelter.[2]

The Julius Street where Joseph K. is summoned for the first (and only) interrogation by the Court may well have been situated in a neighborhood like this. Having entered through the passageway, K. may have found himself surrounded by a maze of outdoor loggias and balconies, typical of Prague, where they are called "Pawlatschen" in a hybrid mixture of Slavic and German. Under the roof and appropriately hidden from the eyes of the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

passer-by in the street, the magistrate lies in wait for Joseph K.

Even the Cathedral of St. Guy on the Hradžany Hill reappears in the church which provides the setting for the ninth chapter of *The Trial.* As late as 1960 the photographer Jan Lukas succeeded in capturing the mood in which the Cathedral Square presented itself to K. on the morning before he was to meet the prison chaplain and to listen to his recital of the parable "Before the Law."[3] "The rain had slackened," Kafka says in *The Trial,* "but it was a raw, wet, murky day, one would not be able to see much in the cathedral, and there was no doubt that standing about on the cold stone flags would make K.'s chill considerably worse."[4]

Striding down the nave of St. Guy's Cathedral, K. found the side chapel with the chaplain's pulpit, the carving of which "was very carefully wrought, the deep caverns of darkness among and behind the foliage looked as if caught and imprisoned here." Indeed, even this airy place of worship, still existing today, became ambiguous in K.'s (and Kafka's) eyes: the pillars supporting a bold structure in the Gothic manner have changed into bars that encage a very modern conscience.

The cathedral plays as important a part in the skyline of Prague as it does in Kafka's *Trial.* Visually, if not thematically, K.'s dialogue with the prison chaplain is the climax of the novel, although an abysmal one. The parable "Before the Law" is still told within the confines of the city, and yet on a vantage point high above it. As Prague is dominated by its cathedral, so do K.'s errands through the city culminate in his encounter with the priest.

Allowing our imagination to range somewhat more freely, we may even suggest that there, on Hradžany Hill, Kafka found in the royal residence next to the cathedral one of his inspirations for *The Castle.* To a certain degree this suggestion is supported by our knowledge that Kafka lived up there, in the small *Zlatá Ulička,* the Golden Lane, which is said to have been the place where the alchemists of Emperor Rudolph II worked. Since Kafka spent the winter of 1916–1917 in one of these houses, the image of the castle may very well have risen in his imagination in close proximity to the cathedral of *The Trial.* This would contribute to our understanding the distinct similarities in the basic design of the two novels.

Prague is a city of contrasts: the silhouettes of its Gothic churches clash with the exuberant outlines of its baroque palaces and are indented by the quarters of the poor. The vestiges of the Thirty Years' War were just as visible in Kafka's day as the traces

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the internecine strife between its inhabitants. An atmosphere of doom has survived through the ages: inbred morbidity lingered on, especially in the German-Jewish enclave. The commonness of this Old Austrian fatigue is borne out by the frequency with which the word "sleep" appears in the diaries of the restless Franz Kafka. If the German-Jewish writers of Prague seemed to be stricken more violently and for a much longer time by a-vitality (a malaise that had been a literary fashion around the turn of the century), it was because their unique position in an alien environment tended to aggravate their disturbances and to make them linger on. A common note of self-irony, at times unmasking itself as sheer self-hatred, was prevalent. For them, Prague was an apocalyptic place.

Thus, Kafka's *Trial* is, among many other things, the tale of one city. Of this city, *Zlatá Praha,* the golden one, *Matička Praha,* the little mother, Kafka could say at the age of nineteen that "this little mother has claws."[5] Eighteen years later he wrote in a sketch describing and at the same time removing into the realm of fantasy the coat of arms of Prague:

> All the legends and songs that came to birth in that city are filled with longing for a prophesied day when the city would be destroyed by five successive blows from a gigantic fist. It is for this reason too that the city has a closed fist on its coat of arms.[6]

To this prophesied day, these blows, and this gigantic fist the hero of *The Trial* is exposed in utter human solitude. But is Joseph K.'s exposure to this city, residence of the law and stockyard of the outlaw, related to the existential forsakenness of man, to Heidegger's *Geworfenheit*? Can Joseph K.'s ordeal amidst the labyrinthine lanes of a town without sun and a world without grace be compared to the quest undertaken by existentialist man searching for his own being across the universal night, the *Weltnacht*?

An answer to these questions may be found in one of the more recent Kafka studies, Michel Carrouges' *Kafka contre Kafka.* "Why does Kafka stand against Kafka?" the French critic asks. And he explains:

> Because the *Trial* of Kafka, the writer and student of law, is the trial of the son by the father, the father by the son and even of the son by the son. It is also an action brought by him against women, society, the human condition and even God. But the accuser never spares his own person, he does not even save himself from the love of those whom he accuses of tearing him to pieces.[7]

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A trial so mercilessly concluded and an existence so radically committed to the search for truth recommends Kafka's novel to the existentially oriented reader. Human fate is ontologically investigated here. Yet if existentialism attempts to give answers (even negative ones) and pass judgments (even sentences of life-long exile or imprisonment) then Kafka has not reached the stage of existentialist thinking yet or has passed beyond it already. Camus, who in an appendix to his *Myth of Sisyphus* tried to connect Joseph K. with the concept of an absurd hero, is nevertheless forced to admit with regard to *The Trial:* "It is the fate and perhaps the greatness of this work that it offers everything and confirms nothing."[8] We are simply left to ponder the book and to read it again and again. If we have existentialist leanings, these leanings will find support in the pages of the novel; yet the same can be said for an approach which is psychological, sociological or religious. Kafka's books are Rorschach tests of their readers.

As the title indicates, *The Trial* is not focused on the fate of the bank clerk Joseph K. but on the proceedings to which he is subjected. These proceedings are Kafka's theme and Joseph K. can claim to play the rôle of the protagonist only because the trial, to become manifest, needs him. He is a man without qualities, a nondescript man, a *Mann ohne Eigenschaften* (Robert Musil), devoid of spectacular deficiencies and virtues. His personal tragicomedy stems from the fact that he, in his mediocrity, is called upon to respond to demands even a character of a more impressive stature would find impossible to fulfill.

Since the novel is told from K.'s human point of view, it is bound to give the impression that its action consists of K.'s idle attempts to discover his guilt. This, however, would lower *The Trial* to the level of a mystery story in which not the criminal but the crime has to be ferreted out. (W. H. Auden once actually tried an interpretation along these lines.[9])

Yet it is the reality of the invisible Court of Justice that permeates the novel with its presence, and K. is nothing but the visible object chosen by the Court to stake its claim to adjudge man. The Court's efforts to prove K.'s guilt are at least as fruitless as K.'s own attempts to discover his crime. Not only does the man try to penetrate into the interior of the Court, the Court also does its best to reach the conscience of K., to present the case made against him as justi-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fied and to induce him to atone actively. Yet K. and the Court miss each other. Both movements, K.'s quest and the Court's pursuit, run past one another and lead to nothing. The metaphysical world of the trial and the everyday sphere of K. have lost their common meeting ground. If K. is "exposed" to the trial, then the Court is likewise exposed to the grasp of K. As can be expected, the double exposure distorts the picture.

In his "Reflections," Kafka once coined a very enlightening simile for the state of affairs, as he perceived it in *The Trial:* "A cage," he says, "went in search for a bird."[10] This aphorism includes the parabolic content of the novel. In its desire to communicate with man the Court of Justice has to choose messengers and use a language which must appear to K. as hostile as a cage seems to a bird. The paradox underlying the novel is bound to strike the reader with the surrealistic absurdity of this cage image. And yet, in the final analysis, there is a great amount of truth in this simile. Just as it is highly improbable that the search of a cage for a bird could ever be successful, so little does the Court of Justice, seemingly equipped with infinite power and an equal store of information, succeed in convincing K. of his guilt. It wins the trial only by slaughtering an ultimately unconvinced victim.

"Someone must have denounced Joseph K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one morning." Already the first sentence of the novel points to the paradox of the law. But it remains hidden from the reader until he hears the last words the chaplain speaks in the cathedral scene. Here, at the high point of the climactic chapter of the book, the clergyman formulates the law of the law. His words contain the only statement about the trial which is no longer the guess of an outsider, the gossip of a meddler, or the doubtful hint of an incompetent intermediary, but a declaration of principles made by the Court about itself. "Why should I want anything from you?" the priest asks K. And he continues: "The Court wants nothing from you. It receives you when you come and dismisses you when you go."

This characterization of the Court is accurate but for one exception. In majestic patience the trial has enveloped K.'s life, yet it still allows him to come and go as he pleases. "You are under arrest, certainly," he had been informed in the beginning, "but this need not hinder you from going about your business. Nor will you be prevented from leading your ordinary life." In this respect, the trial resembles the cathedral, the scene of this revelation: the church

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is always there but only for him who enters of his own volition; its doors are equally open for those who come and those who go, as K. will realize when he leaves. It, too, wants nothing from him.

But if it is the law of the law to receive those who come, dismiss those who desire to go, and for the rest remain unmoved and unmovable, then the Court has broken this law by the very act of arresting K. It has singled him out and separated him from the others; it has initiated the action when it forced him to start on the way that leads to the cathedral, and eventually to his execution. This law is at variance with another law, which was announced by the tall warder in the hour of K.'s arrest: "Our officials, so far as I know them, and I know only the lowest grades among them, do not by any means go hunting for the guilty ones in the populace, but, as the law decrees, are drawn toward the guilty and must then send us warders. This is the law." The limitations and qualifications of this statement should not deceive us; they are due to the warder's desire to avoid any responsibility for what he has said, an attitude typical of the servants of this Court. The law itself, which "must" dispatch its emissaries and is "drawn toward" the criminals it persecutes, has lost its supremacy. No longer does it rest impassively above the humans who come and go, it reacts, it acts, it arrests. Even the chaplain violates the fundamental laws by calling K.'s name as soon as he sees him, thus summoning him once more. And when K., who senses a contradiction between the spirit of the law and its administrators, suggests to the priest: "You may not know the nature of the Court you are serving," the chaplain cries: "Can't you see one pace before you?" Here the sovereign indifference of the law gives way to its urge to seize the man, to direct him, to keep him back and to impart itself to him. The narrator himself adds by way of elucidation: "It was an angry cry, but at the same time sounded like the unwary shriek of one who sees another fall and is startled out of his senses." In this moment of terror the law unmasks itself. Showing concern for K.'s despair, it also admits the responsibility for the arrest which caused him to despair in the first place.

This novel, the imagery of which abounds with symbols of light and darkness, is steeped in twilight. Twilight fills the offices, the courthouse and the studio of Titorelli, the painter; it winds its way into K.'s room in the bank and changes it into a shadowy tomb-like chamber; it floats through the nave of the cathedral before it is extinguished by the night of K.'s execution. Yet twilight presupposes a source of light, however veiled. The sadness which informs the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imagery of *The Trial* originates in Kafka's realization that there is a sublime sphere of light desiring to reach man. But in order to do so, it is forced to renounce its own nature: light. Max Brod reports a conversation he had with Kafka on February 28, 1920, during which the friend described the human world as "one of God's bad moods, one of his bad days." Thereupon Brod asked whether there still was any hope. And Kafka replied: "Plenty of hope—for God—an abundance of hope—only not for us."[11] As long as we are primarily interested in K.'s guilt we shall find support here for the thesis that K. is condemned to his sinister fate because he is and remains unaware of the existence of this hope. If, however, we read *The Trial* as a statement about the separation which exists between the spheres of light and darkness, hope and torment, then the realization that there *is* hope but *not for us* can only increase the shadows of forlornness thronging upon a lost world. This does not mean that the light has ceased to exist, but it does indicate the still more tormenting thought that, although it exists, it will never be able to dispel the twilight. The year of K.'s trial is only a "bad day" of the Court. Yet this day is lost, not only for K. but especially for the Court.

K.'s guilt is relatively simple if we compare it with the guilt of the Court and its intermediaries. Yet it is equally paradoxical. The whole catalogue of his sins—which are mostly sins of omission—does not suffice to justify his arrest. He has been blamed alternately for his inability to love,[12] his "weakness in living,"[13] and his mediocrity, which makes him a representative of modern middle-class society,[14] but he shares these negative characteristics with most of the characters in his circle. These other people, however, were not arrested. Nor can he be reproached for his ignorance of the laws governing his trial. Most of the Court's emissaries are just as unfamiliar with the intricacies of the law as he is. There is, of course, a distinction to be made between the law and the Court, but only a legal expert would be equipped to draw it satisfactorily. To K. it must seem that the net in which he finds himself entangled is woven of split hairs. If, on the other hand, the law does not lie, then the utterances of its emissaries are nothing but opinions and, as the priest in the cathedral says: "The text of the law is unalterable, and the opinions are often enough only an expression of despair about this text." How, then, would we be justified to base K.'s guilt on his lack of familiarity with a law about which even its messengers have only vague and highly subjective opinions?

In spite of this apparent guiltlessness, K. *does* make a confession

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of his guilt. On the way to his execution, he realizes that "the only thing for me to do is to keep my intelligence calm and analytic to the end." In German he uses the word *einteilend,* which means "distributing" as well as "analytic." How does his intelligence distribute and systematize his guilt? "I always wanted," he confesses, "to snatch at the world with twenty hands." This is not a metaphor: it is not introduced with an "as if" or "as it were." It is a stark exaggeration: he multiplies the number of his hands by ten. But Kafka was a realist of unreality. If he has Joseph K. refer to his fantastic "twenty hands," he uses an image which characterizes his state of mind rather than one which expresses directly his guilt or his awareness of it. Before this exaggeration K.'s guilt dissolves again into nothingness.

In this passage, K. accuses himself of boundless ambition, of greed, and of ruthlessness when he disturbs the even proportions of the organized world with his grasp of twenty hands. Yet until his arrest his life has been a downright model of moderation; and this very moderation was considered by some of K.'s critics to be his guilt. If eventually he really begins to lose his balance during his trial, and starts to fidget and to grasp nonsensically into the void, then his "snatching at the world" is like that of a drowning man who is trying in vain to arrest his demise. It reveals no lust for life, but is, rather, a final symptom of the mental destitution to which he has fallen prey.

The tirade he adds to his confession continues and exaggerates the attitude which was expressed in the image of the twenty hands: "Am I to show now that not even a year's trial has taught me anything? Am I to leave this world as a stubborn man who has no common sense? . . . I am grateful for the fact that . . . it has been left to me to tell myself all that is needed." This confession comes close to the type of statement made by political prisoners who have been brainwashed by their opponents. Yet Joseph K. has neither been beaten nor drugged physically. Exhausted and horrified, he follows the last advice his "calm and analytic intelligence" is able to give him. Having recognized in his conversation with the chaplain that lying has become a universal principle, he tells the Court what, in his opinion, the Court expects him to say. But if he commits the sin of hypocrisy, he acts in self-defense. These lies are the last consequence of his trial; they remain confined to his thoughts, are never uttered, refuted, or approved, nor do they contribute anything to our understanding of K.'s arrest or his execution.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In spite of the fact that there seems to be no actual source for K.'s guilt, he has been feeling guilty from the moment the proceedings against him began. Kafka has used here the contrapuntal technique of juxtaposition: at the same time that K. is protesting his innocence, there are distinct indications of his guilt feelings. K. does not notice them, but the reader is forced to stop and consider their sudden and unexplained emergence in the text.

When, for instance, on the evening of K.'s arrest, his landlady announces her intention to give notice to his neighbor, Fräulein Bürstner, in order to "keep her house clean," he bursts out with the cry: "Cleanliness! . . . If you want to keep your house clean you will have to begin by giving me notice." This eruption occurs without preparation and remains without immediate consequence. Nor are we given any motivation why it should have happened at all. Here we could assume that K.'s guilt is the guilt of existence proper. But this answer would be too unequivocal for Kafka's imagination.

Eventually the reader is led to the conclusion that the very paradox of K.'s guilt consists in his inability and unwillingness to remember what this guilt really is. "I forget myself" (*"Ich vergesse mich"*), he exclaims when he re-enacts his arrest during the first night of his trial. To the very end of the novel he goes on forgetting himself and his guilt.

So far we have been discussing K.'s guilt primarily on the basis of our psychological insight into his character. But *The Trial* is a parable, and when we approach the novel on the more-than-realistic level suggested to us by its intention of being a simile of human existence, we may discover in its very language a clue to K.'s apparently enigmatic guilt.

In the cathedral the priest tells K. the parable "Before the Law." He tells it to prove to K. that he is deluding himself about the Court. The first two sentences are: "Before the law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper comes a man from the country and begs for admittance into the law. . . ." Since K. is told the story so that he may learn through it the delusion under which he is laboring with regard to his trial, the man from the country stands in the same relationship to the doorkeeper as does K. to the emissaries of the Court of Justice, above all the priest. Yet what is the country from which the man has come? K., who is supposed to identify himself

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the man, never poses this question. In the parable, the qualification "from the country" is used to indicate the long distance the man had to cover before he reached the door of the law; he has, the priest tells K., "equipped himself with many things for this journey." Joseph K., on the other hand, has not changed his residence after his arrest; he has entered the cathedral completely unequipped; and although he may have been born in the small provincial town where his mother still lives, he now behaves like a confirmed big-city dweller.

Yet, although at first glance, the description "the man from the country" hardly seems appropriate, it begins to fit K. as soon as it is translated into its Hebrew equivalent, "Am-ha'aretz." Kafka was familiar at least with the Yiddish version of the word, "Amhoretz":[15] since 1911 he had occupied himself intensively with Jewish and Yiddish folklore and the expression "Amhoretz" appears indeed in the diaries late in November of that year.[16] Amhoretz, however, is the nickname for an ignoramus. The Am-ha'aretz is as unfamiliar with the scriptures as he is ignorant of the social conventions in secular life. K. inevitably acts and reacts as an Am-ha'aretz whenever he comes near one of the messengers of the Court: in spite of the smooth manners which befit him as an average person, he appears both arrogant and submissive, both gauche and slick; he asks awkward questions, gives coy replies, and exhibits a knack of doing the wrong thing or saying the false word at the slightest provocation. Before the law he is a primitive whose mind only grasps what he can touch with his hands or otherwise take in with his senses. He is able to understand pictures like the image of Justice represented as a goddess of the hunt and victory which he finds in Titorelli's studio; but he is by nature unable to comprehend the legal and theological abstractions which form the law of his trial. If he were to possess the Bible, it would have to be one of the mediaeval *biblia pauperum*, which substitute the picture for the word, the comic books of the Middle Ages. When he enters the cathedral, he actually carries instead of a prayerbook a picture book, an album for sightseers, tucked under his arm.

In biblical times, however, Am-ha'aretz did not mean an individual simpleton but the whole people of the Palestinian hinterland: the fishermen, shepherds, and craftsmen who were looked down upon by the dwellers of the mountain city, Jerusalem, living close to the Sanctuary. They, too, belonged to the "Am," the people bound by the Covenant, but "ha'aretz," the country, claimed their

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

services and barred them from easy access to the nation's spiritual center, the law. Thus, through the ages, the word Am-ha'aretz has retained some vestiges of the tension between the priestly and abstract on the one hand and the profane and concrete on the other.

In the cathedral scene, where the law comes closest to revealing itself to K., Kafka may, perhaps even consciously, have used the image of a Catholic church and the figure of a Christian priest because he recognized in Christ the promise of a mediatorship between the country below and the law on high. To be sure, this promise concerned Kafka, the Jew, as little as it became visible to his hero, K. Much rather, it was a ray of that "abundance of hope" which was "not for us." When, in the fourth Octavo Note Book, Kafka jots down: "We too must suffer all the suffering around us. Christ suffered for mankind, but mankind must suffer for Christ,"[17] the accent falls heavily on suffering, and redemption remains unmentioned. Kafka used Christian symbols in his cathedral scene but he employed them solely as scenery and costume, as props in a play of his imagination, without being able to derive from them the good tidings of man's salvation. In other words, what may have seemed to be a theological solution of K.'s problem is, in the final analysis, a question concerning his existence as a human.

K. is an Am-ha'aretz in that he is a man dedicated to the concrete activities of his professional life and has no patience with the lofty abstractions of the law. Disturbed in his daily pursuits by his arrest, he is eager to win his trial and resume his former active life. His controversy with the chaplain, then, is an expression of the conflict between a mundane and a priestly life. Kafka himself was torn by a similar conflict, the incompatibility of his professional activities and his vocation as a writer. The conflict seems inherited, for Kafka was, on his father's side, the offspring of a "man from the country" whose boorishness, ignorance, and unbelief he deplored in the "Letter to His Father." Kafka's mother was born a Löwy, who could trace her descent to the priestly family of the Levites. Thus Kafka saw himself as a "Löwy with a certain basis of Kafka, which, however, is not set in motion by the Kafka will to life, business, and conquest, but by a Löwy spur that urges more secretly, more diffidently, and in another direction, and which often fails to work entirely."[18] The Kafka in Kafka prevailed upon him to stand his ground in life and prove his worth to the father by conquering reality. The "Löwy spur" drove him in the opposite

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

direction and forced him to dedicate himself to writing, the "form of prayer."[19] He never resolved this conflict; he thought he had failed both the Kafka and Löwy trends in his heritage, and felt guilty on both counts.

Kafka's own despair may be reflected in K.'s guilt. Conversely, K.'s guilt may remain undecipherable as long as it is sought within the confines of the novel. Since K., the average man, is as alien to writing as he is to prayer, he is unable to remember a guilt which is not his at all but was enjoined upon him by his author. Kafka's failure to implant this guilt intelligibly in K.'s personality and life history forces us to break the story open and extend it into Kafka's biography, in other words, to commit an "intentional fallacy."[20] But as usual, Kafka exploits his failure to his best advantage. For within the parabolic framework of the novel K.'s guilt acquires the mysterious air of complete impenetrability. Remaining to the last undefined, it appears also all-encompassing, just as K., by remaining a nondescript Everyman, appears as universally typical. The parable, built around this paradox, is essentially circular. Its end points back to its beginning. Were Joseph K. to be strapped on the execution machine of Kafka's *Penal Colony,* the apparatus could engrave onto his body no other commandment than "Remember thy guilt." Thus the paradox is being kept intact and reigns supreme.

Only as long as we treat the paradox of K.'s guilt as the main subject of *The Trial,* will Kafka's failure to motivate it remain a major flaw in the construction of the novel. It seems, however, negligible if we return from the paradox of K.'s guilt to the much more vexing paradox of the law that violated itself by his arrest.

If the paradox of the law is accepted as the central point of interest for Kafka in *The Trial,* it follows that the central figure in the parable "Before the Law" is not the Am-ha'aretz, the man from the country, but the doorkeeper who denies him entrance. There is some textual evidence to support this assumption. The doorkeeper is introduced in the first sentence of the parable, the man only in the second. The language itself establishes his priority. The doorkeeper is described in detail, even the "fleas in his fur collar" do not go unnoticed. The man from the country, on the other hand, remains as impersonal as K., to whom he is meant to serve as an example. The doorkeeper is mentioned twenty-three times during the very brief narrative, the man only eleven times (nine times in the German original), and of these only twice with

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his full title, the "man from the country." This word count betrays the priest's—and the law's—intention to sidetrack K., to divert his attention from the man and direct it to the doorkeeper by the frequency of his appearances in the text.

The doorkeeper seems to have been there since time immemorial; just as the law which is introduced even before him ("Before the Law stands a doorkeeper"), whereas the man has to undertake a long and troublesome voyage to appear before the door. Human time and eternity seem to meet before the gate of the law. A first discrepancy appears: according to "the very words of the scripture" the law has precedence over the doorkeeper, but the latter behaves as if the law were there for his sake, and not the other way round. He interferes between the man and the law when he says that he cannot admit him at the moment. Immediately afterwards he contradicts himself: he steps aside and grants the man entrance to the law, which "stands open as always." Just as confusing is the next information he gives the man: "I am powerful. And I am only the lowest doorkeeper." Almost literally, the doorkeeper repeats here the words the tall warder had spoken to K. in the first chapter. Although he was powerful enough to arrest K., he immediately betrayed his insignificance before the higher grades of the Court's officials. The way that led K. from his arrest to the cathedral is mockingly extended into infinity when in the parable the doorkeeper continues to enlighten the man: "From hall to hall, doorkeepers stand at every gate, one more powerful than the other. And the sight of the third of them is more than even I can bear." As was the case with the warder, the doorkeeper seems to impart this information to the man partly to impress him with the magnitude of the law, but partly also to escape a full measure of responsibility. Visually we can grasp the double rôle he is playing when we realize that, while addressing the man, he has to turn his back upon the law he represents. His words are spoken simultaneously with regard to the law and with disregard of it. His actions betray a similar ambiguity: he interrogates the man but merely as a routine measure. He accepts his bribes but only "to keep you from feeling that you have left something undone," thus adding compassion to corruption. Finally he roars at the man whose hearing is failing him already: "No one but you could gain admittance through this door, since this entrance was intended only for you. I am going now to shut it."

This amazing statement concludes the parable "Before the Law"

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

just as the law of the law is pronounced at the very end of the cathedral scene itself. This structural parallelism establishes the correspondence between the doorkeeper and the chaplain: they are both intermediaries between law and man; they both act as deterrents rather than as helpers; and the priest is defending his own rôle when he subjects the doorkeeper to an "exegesis." It also relates, by way of contradiction, the last words of the doorkeeper to those spoken by the prison chaplain. By pronouncing his final verdict, the doorkeeper speaks counter to the scriptural passage according to which the door is open "as always." Furthermore, he belies the principle, announced by the priest, that the Court "receives you when you come." Finally, an authority such as the Court described by the priest, which is prepared to dismiss the man who wants to go, does not need a door, and certainly not a closed one. Put into the context of the whole chapter, the parable shows that the doorkeeper is speaking and acting quite independently from the law. His independence, however, works to the detriment of the man from the country.

The exegesis of the parable turns right away to the doorkeeper and occupies itself with him almost exclusively. "'So the doorkeeper deluded the man,' said K. immediately, who was strongly attracted by the story." He falls into the trap set for him by the very wording of the story. With his first remark he misses the one dialectical advantage he had had: by concentrating on the man from the country instead of the doorkeeper he could have denied the relevance of the parable for his particular situation. He could have stressed the fact that the man from the country had come to the law out of his own volition, whereas he, K., had been sought out and overtaken by the Court. However, K. is as spellbound by the parabolical doorkeeper as he had been fascinated before by the warders when they appeared in his bedroom. Quite generally, the parable serves as a symbolic master plan for the novel as such. The initial situation of the novel is repeated here; this time it is couched in the form of an intellectual exercise, rather than being part of the plot. Yet K. loses out both here and there.

Actively supported by K., the chaplain now "interprets" the doorkeeper instead of the man. Accordingly K. fails to learn anything from this exegesis which he could not have gathered previously from his meetings with the other intermediaries. Like them the doorkeeper is simultaneously dutiful and negligent of his duty, both patient and impatient, compassionate and condescending, free

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and bound, a deceived deceiver, extremely powerful and yet a bungler.

The chaplain is prepared to support this paradox with a note from the commentators: "The right perception of the matter and a misunderstanding of the same matter do not wholly exclude each other." It is the little word "wholly" that protects this statement from any attack and renders it at the same time useless for K. It explains that the doorkeeper can misunderstand the law and still have the right perception of the order he serves. The command given him may even have been *meant* to be misunderstood by him. Only at the very end of the exegesis when the figure of the doorkeeper has vanished behind a multiple web of pettifogging sophistry, does K. voice the claims of the man from the country, which are also his claims: "Whether the doorkeeper is clearsighted or deluded does not decide the question. I said the man is deceived." Now he has let go of the intermediary; it is, at long last, the man and his existence that matter. Therefore, he dismisses as a lie the priest's concluding remark that "it is not necessary to accept everything as true; one must only accept it as necessary." Still, this paradox contains the truth. Although it is not a truth which would profit K. in his trial, it reveals the true nature of the Court: K.'s arrest had become necessary since it offered the Court the only opportunity to communicate with him. By this "necessity" the law explains the offense it committed against itself. For its "truth" rests in itself, consists of itself, is "beyond human judgment" but also beyond the law's ability to communicate it to man.

The words of the priest throw light on the Court and its proceedings. However, it is a light that leaves K. in the dark about himself and his guilt. For this paradox Kafka has found a poignant image introduced shortly before K. is summoned by the chaplain:

> K. happened to turn round and saw not far behind him the gleam of another candle, a tall thick candle fixed to a pillar. . . . It was quite lovely to look at, but completely inadequate for illuminating the altarpieces, which mostly hung in the darkness of the side chapels; it actually increased the darkness.

The light shines to reveal the depth of the darkness. Hope is there for man to fathom his despair. Even the radiance that in the priest's parable "streams inextinguishably from the door of the law," starts up only when "the man's eyes grow dim and he does not know whether the world is really darkening around him or whether his eyes are only deceiving him." One thing has become clear after

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the reflection of this radiance has played across his deadly tired eyes: "Now he will not live much longer." Also K.'s life is drawing to a close after he has perceived, in the words of the chaplain, a ray of the mortifying light of the law.

The light of the law only illuminates the unfathomable abyss in which it appeared to K.

On the eve of his thirty-first birthday Joseph K. expects the end of his trial. A full year has passed since his arrest, the circle closes, and K. is ready to let it close. A year ago the warders had insisted that he wear a black coat and had enforced their order against his objection: "The main session is not yet"; now he is voluntarily dressed in black. To his solemn attire he has added "a pair of new gloves that fitted tightly over the fingers"; gloves such as a host may wear who expects a ceremonial visit, or a surgeon who prepares for an operation. K. seems prepared for any eventuality and preserves throughout the composure of a man who is ready for everything.

"So you are meant for me?" he asks the two men who enter his room unannounced. The initial "so" indicates the strange blend of fatigue, resignation, and disgust that has settled over his mind. The visitors seem to annoy K. more than one might expect, but the reason is not disclosed. One only learns that he is reminded of the theater by their appearance, and that their puppetlike impassivity increases his uneasiness to the degree of nausea. "Tenth-rate old actors they send for me," he says to himself, not yet willing to ask for the purpose of their mission. Have they come to accompany him to the main session of the Court, to free him or to execute him? He is willing to let the events take their course. "Perhaps they are tenors," is all he thinks, "studying their heavy double chin." Kafka's language cuts a sinister caper here by attributing only *one* double chin to the two men. Turning abruptly to them with the question: "What theater are you playing at?" he elicits no more than an astonished stammering from them.

It is a characteristic of those works which Kafka actually finished that they end in a subtle form of theatricality. Since he cannot envisage an absolute conclusion—either an unconditional condemnation or complete redemption—he resorts to effects quite opposed to his otherwise understated style. To be sure, his narratives are fundamentally endless: they consist of an infinite se-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quence of tortured moments of metaphysical anguish and despair, produced by the absence of any metaphysical frame of reference. But when he reaches the end (of his strength and patience rather than his tale), he is forced either to interrupt his work or to use costumes and masks. (Substituting theatricals for valid religious content, he reminds us of his distant relationship with the author of the spectacular Salzburg *Jedermann,* Hugo von Hofmannsthal.) Quite literally he had to stage K.'s execution, borrowing actors and props from the alien world of the theater. By doing so, however, he seems to take sides in the proceedings. A Court whose executioners look like tenors, by tradition the silliest members in a European theater company, condemns itself. The horror inevitably evoked by an execution is increased, almost beyond endurance, by the air of incompetence spread by the executioners. They have come to murder K., not to carry out a judgment. The Court which sent them is once more compromised by the intermediaries it has chosen.

"He was repelled by the cleanliness of their faces," K. observes. "One could clearly still see the cleansing hand which had been at work in the corners of the eyes, rubbing the upper lip, scrubbing out the skinfolds at the chin." The cleanliness of his executioners cannot hide from K. the melancholy dirt he had noticed on the faces of the other officials; their puffed-up faces and apparent harmlessness relates them paradoxically with the features of the judges he had seen in Huld's office and Titorelli's studio. As the radiance of the law had indicated the depth of the night enveloping him, so the cleanliness of the visitors betrays the filth from which they emerged and the murky aims they pursue. K. has seen enough of the double face of this Court to be able to read his destiny in the cleansed dirt on the faces of these men. He stands still and cries: "Why did they send you, of all people!" Here he has accepted the inevitable; but he still protests against the shameful confusion of the clean and the unclean which will accompany him, must accompany him to the end, because this paradox contains the very essence of the law.

The appearance of his executioners has once more revealed to K. the structure of the law: founded on a paradox it is built of contradictions. Therefore, he decides to refrain voluntarily from any resistance. During the short span of his last moments he realizes that he can only preserve his dignity as a man by divesting himself of any sign of theatricality. He gives up arguing, harping on his innocence, and the pathos he had previously displayed in

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his defense. He counters the melodrama of his execution by utter simplicity. As his so-called confession has shown us, he is willing to comply with the wishes of the Court: he allows it to execute a marionette.

Fräulein Bürstner appears and vanishes again. He cannot ascertain whether the apparition is real. If, however, the Court really produces Fräulein Bürstner in this dramatic moment in order to stir up K.'s old guilt feelings, then this legerdemain is lost on him. To be sure, a year ago he had poured out his frantic words and feelings before her. Now, however, he attempts to shoulder the responsibility for himself in its total, existential, sense, he is strong enough "to do without her" and let her disappear.

Wedged in by his companions, he sets out on his walk "and the joy he caused thereby the men, was transmitted to some extent even to himself." He neglects an opportunity to shake off his companions and to call a policeman for help. He drags the men along until they have to run, breathless, beside him. For the first time he has taken the lead and is resolved to keep it.

The execution takes place in a quarry, on the border of the town, near the open country to which the man from the country now returns. He is as far from the petty bourgeois neighborhood of his office as he is from the slums in which the Court resides. To be sure, the force of his executioners keeps him physically within the jurisdiction of the law. Moreover, the Court is not satisfied with disposing of him physically, it reaches for his mind once more: over his head the executioners pass the knife from one to the other.

> K. now perceived clearly that it was his duty to seize the knife himself, as it traveled from hand to hand above him, and to plunge it into his own breast. But he did not do it. . . . He could not completely rise to the occasion, he could not relieve the authorities of all their work; the responsibility for the last blemish lay with him who had denied him the remnant of strength necessary for the deed.

As he has seen the executioners' true face behind their official masks, he comprehends now the meaning of the murderous ritual over his head. The law expects from him a sacrificial death, a self-execution, which is, after all, only another word for suicide. He has to "rise to the occasion" and do his duty; failing to commit suicide, he would commit a crime, prove guilty, vindicate his arrest and justify his execution. But having assumed the responsibility for himself, he now puts the responsibility for this "last blemish"

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

squarely before the seat of the Supreme Judge, "who had denied him the remnant of strength necessary for the deed." By surrendering the responsibility for his case to the Court, he assumes paradoxically the full responsibility for himself as a free man. In K.'s refusal to kill himself, in this biblically simple sentence "But he did not do it," Kafka has articulated K.'s final revolt against the law. With the strength of his weakness he resists a superior opponent in the very last minute of the struggle. Not being permitted to die as a marionette, he dies as a man.

He also dies on the borderline between extreme fear of God and extreme skepticism. As long as he is able to think and speak, his words will oscillate confusedly between these two poles. For language does not travel far enough to reach these limits. Only by raising questions can it point in their direction, only by ambiguities can it break the silence of the inexpressible. The end of the novel abounds with both questions and ambiguities.

Questions arise in K. when he catches sight of the top story of the house that adjoins the quarry: "As a light flares up, the casements of a window there suddenly flew open; a human figure . . . leaned abruptly far forward and stretched both arms still farther. Who was it?" This sets off a veritable litany of questions which lead from the individual ("Was it one person only?") to the universal ("Or was it mankind?") and culminate in the outcry: "Where was the Supreme Court to which he had never penetrated?" Only the most noncommittal figure of speech, only a question, could be used to hint at the possibility that there, "faint and insubstantial in the distance," the law itself is extending its arms toward man; toward the man it has to kill because it can neither convict nor acquit him. This possibility is, to a certain extent, supported by the secret interplay of images which sustains the novel as a whole. The casements which flare up "as a light" may indeed be the reflection of the parabolic radiance streaming "inextinguishably from the door of the law." However this may be, at the end of his questions, K. "raised his hands and spread out his fingers."

It is at this point, in this mute gesture, that the ultimate ambiguity of the story sets in. Spread out fingers indicate a warding off, an attitude of rejection, and are the very image to preserve K.'s humanity in an existential solitude, no longer persecuted by the Court, but freed from it by his death. But spread out fingers are also a sign of worship, even of blessing, such as Kafka may have seen on the tombstones in the old Jewish cemetery of Prague.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Raising his hands and spreading out his fingers, K. may accept his judgment here, affirm it and welcome the death at the hands of the Court.

The manuscript of the last page of *The Trial* shows that Kafka even wondered for a while whether the narrator himself or K. was to die. Originally the last sentences in the penultimate paragraph should have read: "*I* have something to say. *I* lift my hands." We may find a certain degree of comfort in the realization that Kafka eventually decided for the hero to perish, thus, if not saving Joseph K., at least rescuing the narrator and with him the basic design of the story.

For this basic design is inexorably imbued with ambiguity. Ambiguity prevails even in the very last sentence of *The Trial.* It reads: " 'Like a dog!' K. said, it was as if the shame should survive him." Whose shame, and the shame of what? The shame that K. has to die like a dog or that the Court has to finish him off like an animal? The shame of a man who has lost his trial or the shame of a Court who could not convince him of his guilt? A Court that taught him responsibility in order to be blamed for its own irresponsibility? Is it the primal shame of man who has to appear before his Supreme Judge as naked as he once was born? (K.'s body, too, lies half-naked before the executioners.) Or is K. ashamed of his perception that he has seen authority resorting to murder when man refuses to kill himself? That he has met a Court whose jurisdiction does not know of acquittals? Is the shame which should survive him man's shame of the mercilessness of law, and of the deadliness of a light still worshipped as divine?

We do not know, for Kafka did not know either. Like the Court, he can only accuse; like K., he can only answer accusations by cross-accusations; the power of conviction is denied him. At this point Kafka himself turns into a man from the country, and so does the reader. In this process Kafka exemplifies the monstrosity as well as the grandeur of the Court against which he had instituted his trial.

Joseph K. anticipates Camus' Sisyphus by being "a proletarian of the gods, powerless and rebellious."[21] On the level of psychological development, Kafka demonstrates how the loss of power (mostly over himself) leads Joseph K. to an ever-increasing resistance against the authorities until he dismisses his lawyer and tells the chaplain his mind. Unlike Sisyphus, however, he is congenitally incapable of the "higher fidelity that negates the gods and

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

raises rocks."[22] Here Kafka has transformed his own lack of vitality into a parabolic quality: Joseph K.'s weakness is the indecision of Everyman when he is confronted by the dilemma between accepting or rejecting the world. No conqueror of himself like Sisyphus, K. is, however, a saboteur of the old order (and in this respect a distant relative of that arch-saboteur, the Good Soldier Schweik, immortal creation of Kafka's fellow citizen Jaroslav Hašek). His very existence seems to be a thorn in the side of everybody connected with the law. He continually disturbs the disturber, the Court, first by misunderstanding, then by disobeying its command and thus he unwittingly points the way towards the release of man from his submission to authority, be it secular or metaphysical.

He refuses to take the leap and seek new ground amidst the nothingness of death. He resists the temptation to commit suicide. Instead, he waits and tries to fathom the bottomless abyss at his feet. He does not expect to reach any foothold after life; he questions the ground he still stands on, and questions even the rightness of his question. Courage and cowardice conspire to bestow an interminable dubiousness on his last words. But the silence that answers him is as valid a statement of the human condition in general as the parable of the priest or the "skyless space" and the "time without depth" that serve as a measure of the efforts of Sisyphus, the absurd hero.[23] This silence continues to reverberate in our conscience as a painful memory of mankind's struggles for a dignity all its own and as a harbinger, still infinitely remote, of a human existence manumitted from its archaic fears.

References

1. Rainer Maria Rilke, *Briefe 1907–1914* (Leipzig: Insel, 1933), p. 10.
2. Franz Werfel, *Embezzled Heaven*, Trans. Moray Firth (New York: Viking, 1940), pp. 213–214.
3. Emanuel Frynta, *Franz Kafka lebte in Prag* (Prague: Artia, 1960), p. 144.
4. All quotations in the text are from the Definitive Edition of *The Trial*, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir and E. M. Butler (New York: Knopf, 1957).
5. Franz Kafka, *Briefe 1902–1904* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1958), p. 14.
6. Franz Kafka, *The Great Wall of China*, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir (3d. ed.; New York: Schocken, 1946), p. 247.
7. Michel Carrouges, *Kafka contre Kafka* (Paris: Plon, 1962), p. iii.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

8. Albert Camus, *Myth of Sisyphus*, Trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Knopf, 1957), p. 138 n.
9. "K. 's Quest," in *The Kafka Problem*, ed. Angel Flores (New York: New Directions, 1946), pp. 47–52.
10. Franz Kafka, *Dearest Father*, trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins (New York: Schocken, 1954), p. 36.
11. Max Brod, *Franz Kafka: A Biography*, trans. G. Humphreys Roberts and Richard Winston (2d. ed.; New York: Schocken, 1960), p. 75.
12. Max Brod, *Franz Kafka. Eine Biographie* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1954), pp. 218–219 n.
13. Wilhelm Emrich, *Franz Kafka* (Bonn: Athenäum, 1958), p. 264.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
15. Klaus Wagenbach, *Franz Kafka. Eine Biographie seiner Jugend* (Bern: Francke, 1958), pp. 179 ff.
16. *The Diaries of Franz Kafka 1910–1913*, trans. Joseph Kresh (New York: Schocken, 1948), p. 166.
17. *Dearest Father*, pp. 46, 97.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 312.
20. W. K. Wimsatt, *The Verbal Icon* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1954), especially pp. 3–18.
21. *Sisyphus*, p. 121.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KURT RUDOLF FISCHER

The Existentialism of Nietzsche's Zarathustra

IN THIS essay Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* will be considered as a document of that current in modern thought known as existentialism. For the definition of existentialism, I turn to Jean-Paul Sartre, to the lecture he gave at the Club Maintenant in Paris in October of 1945 (translated and published as "Existentialism is a Humanism"), a talk the main purpose of which was to defend his position against Communists and Catholics, and in which the formulation of the doctrine, that *existence* comes before *essence,* was enunciated. As Marjorie Greene pointed out in her *Introduction to Existentialism,* "the storm around existentialism rages mostly about Sartre and the French atheistic school." Sartre was the acknowledged center, and his definition, therefore, must be taken as authoritative. It was so considered by Heidegger, by Jaspers, and by Marcel, who together with Sartre were generally considered the chief exponents of existentialism, but who left to Sartre the privilege of explaining existentialism, excluding themselves, however, from a movement of whose existence they had become aware. In assessing whether, and in what manner, any given piece of writing is existentialist, it should be sufficient to consider how it exhibits those features that Sartre pronounced to be essential to existentialism.

Sartre offers his definition of existentialism as referring to and as responsible to a doctrinal core shared by those he calls Christians —Jaspers and Marcel—and the atheists—among whom he includes Heidegger, himself, and other French existentialists: "What they have in common is simply the fact that they believe that existence comes before essence." It is this belief he attempts to justify, and does, in fact, justify by the claim that atheism is true. But first he furnishes an explication of the formula that existence comes before essence. In order to do so, he considers the opposite case, the case in which *essence* comes before *existence*—as it does in any article

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of manufacture. Sartre's example is the paper-knife. Its maker must have a conception of it, he must have an idea of its nature or essence before he can bring it into existence. The purpose of this article of manufacture, which is to cut paper, governs its production. It is in this sense that the *essence* of the paper-knife is said to precede its *existence*. It is in similar terms, in terms of an article of manufacture produced by an artisan, that man—until recently—thought of himself as an article of manufacture by a very special kind of artisan, made by God, created by the creator. Sartre writes that

> the conception of man in the mind of God is comparable to that of the paper-knife in the mind of the artisan: God makes man according to a procedure and a conception, exactly as the artisan manufactures a paper-knife, following a definition and a formula. Thus each individual man is the realization of a certain conception which dwells in the divine understanding.

According to this view man's *essence* comes before *existence*—exactly as in the case of the paper-knife. Sartre points out that in spite of the dependence of such a view on a belief in God, it continued to be embraced by thinkers of the eighteenth century who denied his existence. It is manifested in their concern with "human nature."

> Man possesses a human nature; that "human nature," which is the conception of human being, is found in every man; which means that each man is a particular example of a universal conception, the conception of Man . . . the essence of man precedes that historic existence which we confront in experience.

While confessing that he belongs to the tradition of the French philosophical atheists of the eighteenth century, Sartre affirms that he differs from them by being more consistent. He argues that the notion of a human nature that is fixed once and for all must be abandoned if there is no God.

> Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the human reality. What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus there is no human nature, because there is no

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills and as he conceives himself after already existing—as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism.

And, Sartre continues, this is what is called the "subjectivity" of existentialism, when "subjectivity" is used as a term of reproach, charged with depriving man of his dignity. In answer Sartre asserts that existentialism gives man a greater dignity than is possessed by a stone, a table, and—two sentences later—by moss, fungus, and cauliflower. One may wonder whether existentialists have indeed been charged with considering man's existence to be of the kind led by material objects, be they artifact, mineral, or vegetable. And possibly Sartre does not seriously think so either, since the demands that existentialism makes on us must be very extreme indeed if they are designed only to serve as defense against charges levelled at one man and his philosophy. For him the first principle of existentialism is that man is responsible for what he is, that existentialism "places the entire responsibility for his existence upon his shoulders," an assertion with the further implication for Sartre that everyone must choose for himself, followed by the still further implication that man, in choosing for himself, chooses for all men.

When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that everyone of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men.

To read this forceful exposition of the main tenets of existentialism is to raise questions that seem unanswerable. How could Sartre, as he did, posit atheism as an absolutely essential ingredient of existentialism, after having classified existentialists as divided into Christians and atheists? How could he formulate existentialism as belief in the priority of *existence* and then claim without any further ado that man in choosing for himself is choosing for all men?

It would seem that according to Sartre's formula, that in man *existence* precedes *essence*, every choice in which one can be said to choose for all men is based on a previous choice—in other words, I must first have chosen that all my choices be guided by the principle that in choosing for myself I am choosing for all men. Sartre gives two supporting examples. However, since Sartre's formulation of existentialism does not justify such a requirement, the examples that he submits may be approached with the suspicion that in de-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fending himself and existentialism, he presents his own particular choice, the choice of Jean-Paul Sartre, as if this choice were necessitated by the philosophy of existentialism with which he is identified, and with which he identifies himself.

The two examples given to support the dictum that in choosing one chooses for all men concern a choice between two trade unions, one Christian and the other Communist; and, secondly, a choice between getting married and having children and not getting married and having no children. Of the first of these two choices Sartre says:

> If I am a worker, for instance, I may choose to join a Christian rather than a Communist trade union. And if, by that membership, I choose to signify that resignation is, after all, the attitude that best becomes a man, that man's kingdom is not upon this earth, I do not commit myself alone to that view. Resignation is my will for everyone, and my action is, in consequence, a commitment on behalf of all mankind.

But if *existence* comes before *essence* in man, my choice does not imply that I am choosing for all men unless I have also made the choice to respond to political demands, to concern myself with the political organization of man's life. Only if I have so committed myself does my choice involve the recommendation of my attitude —as Sartre puts it rather mildly—as my will for everyone. What does seem to follow from the formula that *existence* comes before *essence* is rather that I may make any choice for any reason—or for no reason at all—with respect to union membership as long as it is truly my choice. Nothing in existentialism is to prevent me from, say, choosing the Christian union because I wish to be liked by the local labor leader whose daughter I desire to marry, or from choosing the Communist union in order to spite an uncle who hates communism. Apart from this the example has special defects. My choice is between Christian and Communist unions, and if I choose the former I signify that resignation is the attitude that best becomes a man, that man's kingdom is not upon this earth. But is this choice really open to me if my freedom of choice is based upon the truth of atheism? Can I hold that there is no God, the belief that justifies my freedom, the belief that enables me to realize that *existence* comes before *essence,* and then recommend as an attitude that best becomes a man the attitude that signifies resignation and signifies that man's kingdom is not upon this earth?

It is a matter of common knowledge that Sartre has involved himself in politics and that he has committed himself to the activist

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attitude. He certainly also recommends this as the attitude that best becomes a man. The cited example accords, except in the side taken, with a description of Sartre's own existential response, his commitment to political activism, a commitment that he later attempted, and is now attempting to justify in his philosophical writings. Wanting to defend himself against the charge that existentialism involves arbitrariness of choice, Sartre answers by arguing that in choosing one chooses for humanity. But he is convincing only in proving that he has so committed himself. He does not succeed in showing that in principle existentialism puts such a qualification on man's choice. He has merely shown Communists that he, Sartre, is concerned with the affirmation of the activist attitude as much as they are.

The second example again seems to reveal something about Sartre's particular choice, that in choosing he is choosing for all men, and again by way of contrast. And this choice is presented as if it too followed from the principle of existentialism. Sartre writes,

> if, to take a more personal case, I decide to marry and have children, even though this decision proceeds simply from my situation, from my passion or my desire, I am thereby committing not only myself, but humanity as a whole to the practice of monogamy.

But why may one not marry because one chooses to be wealthy and has found a rich girl—according to the formula of existentialism? If only it be my choice! It is a matter of common knowledge that Sartre is not married. Given his example and the fact that he is single, Sartre shows his Christian assailants that he is taking marriage as seriously as they do, and that he is an honest man even by their standards.

In his lecture of 1945, "Existentialism is a Humanism," Sartre goes on to explain some of the key terms of existentialism: anguish, abandonment, and despair. If one takes what he says about anguish, the suspicion will be reinforced that Sartre's particular commitment is smuggled into existentialist principle or is made to appear as if entailed by it. Sartre asserts that anguish is experienced when a man commits himself, because in committing himself he decides for the whole of mankind. Conceding that as a matter of fact people do not ask themselves what would happen if everyone did as they do, Sartre assures us, however, that "in truth, one ought always to ask oneself what would happen if everyone did as one is doing." But what entitles Sartre so to instruct us if *existence* comes before *essence*? Does not my choice create my essence? How can I

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be told what to ask myself when choosing? The theologian, Rudolf Bultmann, articulates what existentialism is. This is what Sartre should have said:

> Existentialist philosophy does not say to me "in such and such a way you must exist"; it says only "you must exist"; or, since even this claim may be too large, it shows me what it means to exist. (*Jesus Christ and Mythology,* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958, p. 55.)

On the basis of Sartre's explication of existentialism a commitment to mankind cannot be established as prior to other choices or as an ingredient of all choice.

In his lecture Sartre is mainly concerned with defense. But existentialism is itself an attack, an attack on man's self-image as God's creature, a self-image that had remained operative, according to Sartre, in the thought of the atheists even under the guise of a concern with "human nature." Such self-image must be abandoned if there is no God, and Sartre does indeed abandon it. But he turns it upside down, so to speak, and then adopts it again. In turning it around he loses what used to be man's *essence.* Where man's *essence* was there is now nothing; hence man's freedom. But, surreptitiously, in the heat of battle, Sartre restores some part of that *essence* which, according to existentialist principle, is yet to be created. The part returned is the principle of humanism as contained in Sartre's pronouncement that "our responsibility . . . concerns mankind as a whole." But to be consistent either the existentialist or the humanist principle would have to be abandoned as principle, that is to say as fundamental. In "Existentialism is a Humanism," it seems that Sartre has exhibited his thought in transition from the existentialist to the humanist phase. His later development, issuing in the declaration that existentialism is a mere ideology, serves as evidence for such a conjecture. In 1960 Sartre writes:

> . . . I consider Marxism the one philosophy of our time which we cannot go beyond and . . . I hold the ideology of existence and its "comprehensive method" to be an enclave inside Marxism, which simultaneously engenders it and rejects it. (*Search for a Method.*)

This, however, is the later Sartre. For our present concerns the existentialist is before us, the existentialist, moreover, who has to be freed from any foreign elements so that he may satisfy the role of existentialist prototype that is his by his own confession and by the admission of others. Thus the humanist principle must be removed. The concern, in any form, with mankind cannot be part of the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

existentialist principle according to which *existence* precedes *essence*. Concern with mankind may of course be freely chosen; but in order that it may be freely chosen, it must not be related to man's *existence* except as a possibility of choice. Remove the humanist and retain the existentialist principle, and man emerges as totally free. The question remains whether man, after such long enslavement to one *essence* or another, can be liberated so easily. It is true that Sartre conceives of man's freedom as man's burden, a conception that can be justified only by reference to the humanist rather than to the existentialist principle. But the humanist principle is a remnant of man's old *essence*, an *essence* that came before *existence*. The demand existentialism puts upon man is to create his *essence* from scratch in his *existence*. How can one predict whether doing so will be agony or delight? From Sartre's account of existentialism such knowledge could not be claimed.

If it is realized, however, that there is no God, that belief in the existence of a creator accounts for the millenia-old notion of the priority of *essence* over *existence*, and that God, the creator, is himself a creation of man—and this last realization is not given the proper weight in Sartre—then the question raised before, whether after so long an enslavement man can easily be liberated, is to be answered in the negative. Before man's freedom can be achieved, that in man which has generated God and all the ideals deriving from belief in God needs yet to be brought under control. The new freedom, if gained, will look very much like a new necessity, since that freedom will be modified by what man has created so far, including his creation of himself as a creature of God. The arbitrariness and the purity of freedom inherent in Sartre's formula are eliminated in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Sartre's presentation resembles Nietzsche's as far as the new self-image of man, its elements and their relation, and as far as the conclusion reached on the basis of this self-image are concerned. Again we find the priority of *existence* over *essence* validated on atheistic grounds. But in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* the attempt to determine man's *existence* takes fully into account that it was man himself who gave birth to that which tyrannized him for such a long time. The task of undertaking this liberation is assigned to Zarathustra. He it is who is to aid man in freeing himself from his self-imposed tyranny.

One figure haunted Nietzsche from childhood; although he called this figure by different names, "finally," he states in a note, "I had to bestow the honour on a Persian. The Persians first conceived his-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tory as a whole, and on a grand scale." This Persian prophet and founder of a religion, now turned into his opposite, is appointed to reverse the course of history he initiated when he posited as the ultimate principle of the universe the strife between light and darkness, between Ormuzd and Ahriman, between Good and Evil. In his *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche gives another reason for selecting Zarathustra.

> Zarathustra created this most portentous of all errors—morality; therefore he must be the first to expose it. Not only because he has had longer and greater experience of the subject than any other thinker—all history is indeed the experimental refutation of the so-called moral order of things —but because of the more important fact that Zarathustra was the most truthful of thinkers. In his teaching alone is truthfulness upheld as the highest virtue—that is to say, as the reverse of the cowardice of the "idealist" who takes flight at the sight of reality. Zarathustra has more pluck in his body than all other thinkers put together. To tell the truth and to aim straight: that was virtue to the Persians. Do you understand me? . . . The overcoming of morality by itself, through truthfulness, the moralist's overcoming of himself in his opposite—in me—that is what the name Zarathustra means in my mouth.

What is to be understood as the most portentous of all errors—morality—is its metaphysical conception, or its "translation," as Nietzsche puts it earlier in the passage quoted from just now, "into the realm of metaphysics, as force, cause, end-in-itself, in his work," i.e., in the work of the first Zarathustra. Morality, lodged in a sphere outside of this world, becomes the criterion by means of which the world is assessed, a criterion eventually depriving the world of all its worth, representing it as worthless. This metaphysical ideal will continue its work of destruction even after man has revolted against it and turned it around, has become anti-moral and substituted a sensualistic or materialistic content for its original supersensual and idealistic content. In this manner man never goes beyond Good and Evil, he remains a prisoner of that world which the first Zarathustra broke in two: only now one of these parts—the supersensual, which was generated by man, represented by Zarathustra but also tracked down by Nietzsche in Platonism and in Christianity—is lost, cut off, and the question pressing on Nietzsche is whether such a fragment of a man can live. His answer is an unqualified "No!"

"The overcoming of morality by itself, through truthfulness, the moralist's overcoming of himself in his opposite," that is the task set for Zarathustra in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. It demands a reconstruction of the world out of the ruins of the chaos that once

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was a cosmos—a cosmos no longer, since it has been exposed as man's projection, man as represented by the old Persian prophet Zarathustra. Nietzsche conceives of this work of reconstruction as a necessity if life is to be lived. The alternative to the achievement of this task is madness. "The Madman" (Aphorism 125) of *The Gay Science,* the work immediately preceding *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* may be read as presenting this alternative. In this aphorism one will find something Sartre offered as a basis for existentialism, the assertion that there is no God. It was, according to Sartre, atheism that justified the teaching that *existence* precedes *essence.* But Sartre substitutes the absence of the experience of God for the madman's experience of the absence of God. It is this experience that drives him to madness. In Sartre's presentation of existentialism as humanism, not only is the absence of God not experienced, but one might say that the message of God's death has not even been heard. The madman's words apply: "I come too early . . . my time has not come yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still travelling—it has not yet reached the ears of men." Otherwise, how could man freely define himself by his acts—*existence* comes before *essence*—and in so doing commit himself for all men? Only if the absence of God is a joke, and indeed in the penultimate scene of Sartre's play, *The Devil and the Good Lord,* Goetz says: "Heinrich, I am going to tell you a colossal joke: God doesn't exist." This is atheistic existentialism. Sartre's classification of existentialism into theistic and atheistic is undercut by the thought that is Nietzsche's in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra.*

"God is dead" articulates an experience analogous to a former experience that had been formulated as "God exists." If the latter came as reassurance that there is God and that there is a world, the former does not. And when man discovered that he had lived so long under the sovereignty of a being he had himself created, a being whose power was ultimately derived from his own, then to man God's death became God's murder. And since the thousands of years in which men lived lives formed by belief in God cannot be wiped out, the madman cries out:

> We are all his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not perpetually falling? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not more and more night coming on all the time? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet of God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, the murderers of all murderers, console ourselves?

The answer is that consolation can be achieved only through the moralist's overcoming of himself in his opposite, in Zarathustra. "The Madman" is preceded by another aphorism, "New Struggles" (Aphorism 108) which treats the same topic:

After Buddha was dead people showed his shadow for centuries afterwards in a cave,—an immense frightful shadow. God is dead: but as the human race is constituted, there will perhaps be caves for millenia yet, in which people will show his shadows.—And we—we have still to overcome his shadow!

If this is "atheistic existentialism," then *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is a document in this species of philosophy. All religionists who claim the author of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as theirs must admit that God's death is asserted as a fact. God's death was, of course, the precondition for the work. But the occasions on which God's death emerges in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* define the nature of Zarathustra's atheism, and they provide the role this atheism is to play.

In the Prologue Zarathustra meets an old man in the forest. This old man represents the age in which man could truly believe in God, a God whom he celebrates by singing, laughing, and muttering. He has not yet heard in his forest that God is dead. What had driven him to the forest was disappointment with man, where the problem of the idealist's search for love for imperfect man is resolved in isolation. In isolation he finds satisfaction in love for the perfect being, for God. Zarathustra leaves the old man without giving him the news of God's death, for Zarathustra realizes that he could only take from the old man and give him nothing. The old man is a sincere believer; the price he pays for his belief is isolation. One might raise the question whether voluntary isolation is not a cheap price to pay for the satisfaction obtained, since man is, if Nietzsche and the atheistic existentialists are right, now isolated or "alienated" anyhow. But man must remain in this condition only if, to use Nietzsche's language, "the moralist's overcoming of himself in his opposite" cannot be achieved.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the speech entitled "Retired from Service," the last pope, who has now retired from service but had served the old God up to the last hour, is seeking the last pious man, the old man that Zarathustra had met in the forest and left unenlightened concerning God's death. The last pope finds the old man dead, and now he has to be content with the next best choice available to him, with Zarathustra. The last pope had hoped that he might "at last celebrate a festival once more, as becomes an old pope and church father: . . . —a festival of pious memories and divine services." But since the old man is dead, the old pope asks:

> Had I come into these forests and mountains in vain? Then my heart decided to seek another, the most pious of all those who do not believe in God—to seek Zarathustra.

To this old pope Zarathustra seems the most pious of atheists, even after Zarathustra identifies himself as "the godless Zarathustra, the same who says: Who is more godless than I, that I may rejoice in his teaching?" We are in the fourth part of the book now. Zarathustra has tracked down many of the manifestations, the ghosts and shadows, of the God that has died. In the eyes of the last priest, Zarathustra with his un-belief is more pious than he realizes. The pope puts to Zarathustra the rhetorical question whether it is not piety that has converted him to his godlessness:

> Is it not your piety itself that no longer allows you to believe in God? And your exceeding honesty will yet carry you off beyond good and evil, too!

This is indeed a true insight into Zarathustra's nature, and a true prediction as well. Zarathustra concludes his speech with the words: ". . . this old god no longer lives: he is quite dead," an assertion repeated in the following speech, "The Ugliest Man," and finally in "Of the Higher Man." Here Zarathustra justifies the existence of the higher man, who must maintain independence from the mob, that mob which insists on the doctrine of equality.

> "You Higher Man"—thus the mob blink—"there are no Higher Men, we are all equal, man is but man, before God—we are all equal!"
>
> Before God! But now this God has died. And let us not be equal before the mob. You Higher Men, depart from the market-place!

God's death sets the stage on which Zarathustra is to bring the enlightenment. It will have to be a new enlightenment since the light of the old Enlightenment—which was based, openly or surreptitiously, on a belief in God's existence—does not shine any

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more. The madman of *The Gay Science* had cried out that God's death deprives us of our center of gravity, that it has become dark, so dark in fact that lanterns have to be lit in the morning. Yet not even their light can penetrate the darkness.

> Is not more and more night coming on all the time? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? . . . At last he threw his lantern to the ground, and it broke and went out.

A new, natural light is needed to overcome the darkness: the light of the rays of the sun, to which Zarathustra addresses himself in the Prologue. The purpose of his teaching is to create a world for man, but how can he fulfill this end if there is darkness, if communication is not possible?

Zarathustra speaks to the people in the market square: "I teach you the Superman. Man is something that should be overcome. What have you done to overcome him?" This is the most esoteric of Zarathustra's teachings, but his words become more and more esoteric with his increasing realization that he cannot be understood, that the audience to which he will address himself becomes smaller and more select. According to Zarathustra man is now "only a discord and hybrid of plant and ghost" since God's death has destroyed man's self-image as God's creature. Zarathustra's teaching of the superman rather than of man is justified since "man" designates the creature that thought of himself as God's creature, and lived under a morality according to which the supersensual was the measure for the sensual, with the former eventually establishing a destructive tyranny over the latter. But even in the revolts of suppressed sensuality against this tyranny—when the ascetic no longer waits for heaven but becomes the pleasure-seeker—man's existence after God's death is not justified; it is devoid of meaning. The emergent new demand for justification of man's existence may be presented by the following consideration: the experience of God's death and the discovery that God was only an objectification of what man had desired and feared and dreamt of—that God was man's own projection—coalesce. Man discovers that he had lived under what he had projected as if it had an independent existence and thus was in a position to make demands upon him. Previous revolts had consisted in denying these demands without coming to terms with them in their original habitat: man himself, who, having broken apart, had lost his center of gravity and is now alienated. The justification for man's liberation from his self-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imposed slavery demands that the creativity which man had transferred to his now rejected projection be returned to the place of its origin. Now, as creative act, destruction and obstruction of conventional morality and its derivatives can proceed. But all this applies to the higher man only. Indeed, what defines the higher man is his ability to experience, and thus to suffer, the split that man had perpetrated.

The steps in the development of man—and here again it is the higher man—towards appropriating this creativity, towards becoming superman, are outlined in the first of the speeches, or "discourses" as our translator has it, "Of the Three Metamorphoses":

> I name you three metamorphoses of the spirit: how the spirit shall become a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child.

Since they are metamorphoses they must contain the same spirit; furthermore this spirit has a predecessor who has been left behind, the old man, the believer who celebrated God in the forest and who had not yet heard of his death. The camel stands for the strong and weight-bearing spirit, asking for the heaviest load, representing passivity towards authority, laboring under duty. He lives under the command, "Thou shalt"; it is in this way that the camel now appears to the lion who, "in the loneliest desert . . . wants to capture freedom." And he wants to capture freedom, to liberate himself from the ideals under which the camel, the beast of burden, labors, because in the lion intellectual honesty has destroyed the belief in the objectivity of these ideals. The lion rejects the "Thou shalt" and adopts the "I will." The lion is destructive; he stands for the skeptical, negative spirit that is neither affirmative nor creative, except for having created the condition, i.e., freedom, for new creation. And then comes the last metamorphosis:

> The child is innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes.
>
> Yes, a sacred Yes is needed, my brothers, for the sport of creation: the spirit now wills *its own* will, the spirit sundered from the world now wins *its own* world.

These metamorphoses describe, and justify, the Higher Man's existential transformation. Zarathustra himself is such a higher man; and his *existence*, his life in solitude, his creation of new values resulting from an assessment of old values, his creation of a new *essence* for man from his *existence*—all this is explained and justified by the inner necessities of the life of the Higher Man that he is.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the speech, "Of the Way of the Creator," Zarathustra, the creator, giver of meaning to life, asks:

> Do you call yourself free? I want to hear your ruling idea, and not that you have escaped from a yoke.
>
> Are you such a man as *ought* to escape a yoke? There are many who threw off their final worth when they threw off their bondage.
>
> Free from what? Zarathustra does not care about that! But your eye should clearly tell me: free *for* what?

In the last speech of the first part, entitled "Of the Bestowing Virtue," we find that Zarathustra possesses "bestowing virtue," which both justifies and demands that Zarathustra teach. "Bestowing virtue" is the virtue of giving rather than taking and therefore appears Christian. What makes this "bestowing virtue" a virtue in the mouth of Zarathustra, however, is not what made its Christian ancestor a virtue, namely, the precept that giving is better than taking under any conditions, absolutely. But Zarathustra gives from wealth, from overflowing, he gives his teaching as the bee gives honey. He cannot help teaching, it is his necessity, without which he would suffocate. Teaching is neither a burden to him nor must its content constitute a burden to the one who receives it; rather it must supply him with something he lacks and needs. All this was left out of the Christian precept of giving rather than receiving; Zarathustra's charge against Christianity is based on this omission. Christian religion does not consider whether the giver can give or the taker needs, and thus is able to take. The other old man whom Zarathustra meets towards the end of the Prologue gives, too, and he demands that what he gives be taken. He offers bread and wine to Zarathustra and to the corpse, urging Zarathustra to make the corpse eat and drink.

> Zarathustra answered: "My companion is dead, I shall hardly be able to persuade him." "That is nothing to do with me," said the old man morosely. "Whoever knocks at my door must take what I offer him. Eat, and fare you well!"

And it should be remembered that Zarathustra left the old man he first met in the Prologue without making him the gift of the doctrine of the superman since such a gift would have presupposed informing the old man of God's death, and hence would have meant taking something away from the old man without giving him anything in return. All of man's virtues and vices are subject to reassessment by Zarathustra. Whether they are affirmed or denied in themselves is beside the point. What is important is that

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they are diagnosed with the knowledge of God's death and with the knowledge that it was man who created God; they are assessed in terms of their source. Take, for example, what Zarathustra says about selfishness, a vice:

> . . . a bestowing love must become a thief of all values; but I call this selfishness healthy and holy.
>
> There is another selfishness, an all-too-poor, a hungry selfishness that always wants to steal, that selfishness of the sick, the sick selfishness.

Each such reassessment amounts to a re-justification of virtue and vice in naturalistic terms. But this naturalism denies only the existence of transcendent values. It does not deny them as values even though their source is now seen to be in man now, and their reassessment is guided by responsibility to this source. And, indeed, the doctrine of the superman would be both unnecessary and impossible had Zarathustra not taken into account man's natural idealism, his longing for perfection. In the speech, "On the Blissful Islands," Zarathustra says: "Once you said 'God' when you gazed upon distant seas; but now I have taught you to say superman."

The teaching of the superman was central in the first part. In the second another doctrine is hinted at, which deals with problems arising out of the setting provided by the first. A diagnostic attack on some of the effects of Christianity is part of its content. The speeches "Of the Compassionate," "Of the Priests," "Of the Virtuous," "Of the Rabble," and "Of the Tarantulas," are designed to explore Christian values, or values derivative from them, justifiable in terms of Christian beliefs. Zarathustra's diagnosis results in revealing them to be expressions of the will to power of the weak. Their demasking and debunking are to provide for the emergence of a new morality to be located in a deeper and more authentic layer of man's mind. A further element in the second part relates the will to creativity and reassesses the role of the will. Man was ruled by God and had to obey his commands; but man's will had to be free. Living under this demand, man discovered that the will was not free. Since God is now dead, neither alternatives can be accepted. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* the traditional problem of the freedom of the will is thus resolved: the will is not free but makes free.

Although the doctrine of eternal recurrence is related to the previous teachings—the death of God, the superman, the will to

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power—Zarathustra presents it only in the form of self-instruction. The doctrine, although earlier hinted at, is first fully announced in the thirteenth speech of the third part. It was clearly referred to in part two when Zarathustra raised the question of why he "speaks differently to his pupils—than to himself," of why the doctrine of eternal recurrence is not given to his pupils. The speech in which it is fully announced is preceded by a summary of all his teachings under the title, "Of Old and New Tablets." This is the longest of all the speeches. The old tablets, which contained knowledge regarding Good and Evil, are shattered. But God is dead; with him the justification for what was engraved on the tablets is gone, as are all the conceptions of morality derived from them. Destroyed also are those conceptions that from the point of view of the tablets were anti-moral and, from their own viewpoints, presented themselves as new and superior moralities—the moralities of utility and of pleasure, as well as even that last and seemingly most complete denial of all morality, the gratuitous act, that deed in which the individual not only denies morality but asserts himself in an act against morality or against God. For in that act God is still not quite dead. If God is truly dead, and his creation, the heaven of values, has been abolished along with the demands it made upon us and the commands God gave us, then no new interpretation and no mere denial of morality will be of avail. In no such manner can we gain a new world and a new knowledge of good. "Nobody yet knows what is good and evil—unless it be the creator." Therefore Zarathustra can be instructed no further and awaits the hour of his return to men, of his hour: "Meanwhile I talk to myself, as one who has plenty of time. No one tells me anything new; so I tell myself to myself." Creativity remains as the basis for life: it was the creator who knew what good and evil was; after his death, it is again the creator who knows what good and evil is. Before, man had been given norms, but when man became aware of God's death, he became aware that he was the sole creator and that his creativity, his freedom, was his necessity, his necessity of creating, only, however, if one is "overflowing," is like Zarathustra. But no longer does one create out of nothing. One creates the future out of the past. The past, man's past, is a fact. What man did cannot be undone; yet on the other hand the past now—with God's death—appears arbitrary, a series of chance occurrences that might have been different. To understand that which was, to make us understand its necessity and

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thus to redeem the past—that is Zarathustra's task. He is the redeemer of chance; he redeems what was by creating what will be. So in the third section of "Of Old and New Law-Tablets," we read:

> To redeem that past of mankind and to transform every "It was," until the will says: "But I willed it thus! So shall I will it—"
>
> this did I call redemption, this alone did I teach them to call redemption.

Zarathustra thus provides for man's possibility to overcome himself. There is no particular path for this overcoming: "*the* way—does not exist," Zarathustra had said at the end of the previous speech, "Of the Spirit of Gravity." And in the next sections: "There are diverse paths and ways to overcoming: just look to it! But only a buffoon thinks: 'Man can also be *jumped over*!' " This is indeed other than the leap that is demanded by existentialism as expressed in the formula that *existence* comes before *essence*! That leap is in the buffoon's mind.

Zarathustra redeems through "the most abysmal thought," a thought involving a new conception of time, which arises as the result of the realization of God's death and as the subsequent demand for the overcoming of man in the superman. An essential ingredient of what Nietzsche called "the moral view of the world" was its dualism, its separation of the world into the sensual and the supersensual; it was in the latter that ideals resided. It had been in heaven that man's life, when ended on this earth, was to be continued. The image of man in his world can be traced in the way-of-life demanded not only in religion, but also in various secular ideals, such as that of pleasure given to others or to oneself. Zarathustra substitutes for the entire scheme in which these moralities are justified one in which a new conception of time is central. If in the old scheme time was linear and life was conceived as going on and on, then in the new time is conceived of as circular. Zarathustra's animals tell him:

> Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally and we ourselves with them, and that we have already existed an infinite number of times before and all things with us.

This new scheme embodied in the vision of eternal recurrence has the role of keeping man from wasting his life, from relegating man's powers to a Beyond for whose existence there is no longer support. It drives home the fact that one's life is not an interim period of waiting for heaven, and at the same time counteracts the skepticism towards, and despair of, life to which the practice of letting

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

oneself go is tied. The weight of the question, "Is this such that I wish to repeat it?" precludes attitudes expressed in the words, "if there is no God then everything is permitted" as well as "if there is no God then nothing is permitted." The doctrine of eternal recurrence exercises this role, but Nietzsche also wanted the support of science. Hoping to convert his vision into thought that could be presented as theory, he wanted to go to Paris or to Vienna to study the physical sciences for ten years. The argument by means of which Nietzsche attempted to relate the doctrine of eternal recurrence and the findings of physics may be stated as follows: If the number of centers of energy (atoms) is finite in the universe, and if time is infinite, then every possible state of the universe—every constellation of centers of energy (atoms)—that is yet to come must have occurred already. How can we conceive of physics supporting a doctrine that emerges as the end-result of the meditations of a Zarathustra? Surely such support must be conceived of in a very special manner. One might conjecture that the doctrine of eternal recurrence yields a view of the universe that is identical with the view afforded by the scientific facts of physical theory. Nietzsche's motivation for establishing such connection may have been that he wanted to teach and thus communicate with people who could understand and respond, and he perhaps thought scientists to be such people. The scientific spirit as the spirit of questioning and of critique must have appeared to him as the spirit most likely to understand him. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Zarathustra is either not heard at all or he is misunderstood, so that he must repeatedly reject his own disciples. It is possible to take Nietzsche's work as an existential statement by its author, who says of himself that he never knew what a merely intellectual problem was, who said of himself that he wrote with his blood, and whose thinking and writing appeared to him as both a necessity and as a self-sacrifice. Dedicated to himself, in his work he was dedicated to the human race, which he saw as confronted with the alternative: ultimate man or superman. After finishing the third part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* Nietzsche wrote to his friend Overbeck:

> I must now devote myself to the study of a number of disciplines since I decided to spend the next five years in working out my "philosophy" for which I built an entrance hall with my Zarathustra (April 7, 1884).

The building was never completed, but the materials and the blueprints of how they were to be used in the construction of this

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

building remained. Part of them have been published posthumously in what is known as *The Will to Power*. From this work, as well as from other writings that have been edited and published posthumously, the purpose of the thought that Nietzsche hoped to erect into a philosophy can be gathered: to master the situation that had arisen out of God's death—to overcome the meaninglessness, the nihilism of life, by means of an examination of its genesis, and, by exhibiting what is and what was as a necessity, to liberate the future from the tyranny of the past. This preserving effort consisting in a transvaluation of all values was the task that Nietzsche set. He thought of himself as a philosopher, but he also said that the philosopher was a rare plant. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is not addressed to the philosopher; it is addressed to everyone and no one. "A Book for Everyone or No One," that is the subtitle. In the reading one gathers that it is addressed to the higher man, and that it excludes as public the ultimate man. The "ultimate man," according to our author created simultaneously with the type "superman," is the kind of man who makes up what is referred to as the mob in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the type that may perhaps be visualized as the untroubled bourgeois. More realistically we might say, then, that the book is addressed to the higher man in us, and that it excludes the ultimate man in us as audience. The latter has no use for *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, because for him Nietzsche fails to realize the satisfaction that comes from the life enjoyed by the ultimate man or the ultimate man in us. If the issue between Zarathustra and the ultimate man is to be decided for anyone, it can be only if one takes his life as datum. In deciding this issue one must always oneself have the first as well as the last word.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Notes on Contributors

DANIEL BELL was born in New York City in 1919, and is presently professor of sociology in Columbia University and chairman of the department in Columbia College. An associate editor of *Dædalus* and member of the editorial board of the *American Scholar*, he served as managing editor of *The New Leader* from 1941 to 1944, taught at the University of Chicago 1945-1948, was an editor of *Fortune Magazine* 1948-1958, and was director of the seminar program of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (Paris) in 1956-1957. He was a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences during 1958-1959. His publications include *The End of Ideology* (1960) and, as editor, *The Radical Right* (1963).

STANLEY CAVELL, born in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1926, is Walter M. Cabot Associate Professor of Aesthetics and the General Theory of Value at Harvard University. He was a Junior Fellow at Harvard in 1953-1956; after that a member of the Department of Philosophy in the University of California at Berkeley. He spent the year 1962-1963 at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Soon to be published by the Clarendon Press is a recently completed volume, *The Claim to Rationality*, a study of the conflict in philosophical method created in the later philosophy of Wittgenstein.

LAWRENCE S. FINKELSTEIN, Vice President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was born in New York City in 1925. He served in the Department of State from 1944 to 1946, and in the Trusteeship Division of the United Nations Secretariat 1946-1947. He has also been associated with Columbia University, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Institute of Pacific Relations. He has contributed numerous articles on trusteeship, colonial problems, Southeast Asia, arms control and inspection, and the United Nations to journals in the fields of his special interests.

KURT RUDOLF FISCHER was born in Vienna, Austria, in 1922. The holder of degrees both in German and in philosophy from the University of California at Berkeley, his education also included study at St. John's University in Shanghai and at the University of Vienna. He has taught philosophy at the University of California in Davis and in Berkeley, and is presently at Mills College in Oakland, California. During the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

academic year 1964-1965 he will be a visiting lecturer on philosophy at Harvard University. He is the translator, with Roderick M. Chisholm, of Franz Brentano's "On the Concept of Truth," published in *Readings in the Theory of Knowledge* (ed. John V. Canfield), 1964.

ROGER FISHER, born in 1922, is a professor in the Harvard Law School, where he is currently teaching courses in international law and in legal method in international disputes. He served as Assistant to the General Counsel, Economic Cooperation Administration, Paris, engaged in the practice of law in Washington, D. C., and was (1956-1958) Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice. He was the editor of *International Conflict and Behavioral Science—The Craigville Papers* (1964), from which "Fractionating Conflict" is taken. He is also the author of many articles on international law and arms control appearing in such journals as the *Harvard Law Review*, the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *Science*, and others.

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH, born in 1920 in Remsen, New York, is director of the International Communism Project in the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he is also a lecturer in political science. He is in addition professor of Soviet diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Tufts University. His publications include *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (1963), and *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (1964). A volume, *The East European Thaw, 1953-1956*, is forthcoming from the M.I.T. Press. He has also participated in a number of collaborative works, and has made numerous contributions to learned journals in the area of international communism in the Far East and Europe.

HUDSON HOAGLAND, born in 1899, is co-founder and executive director of the Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, where he and his colleague, Dr. Gregory Pincus, direct some 350 persons engaged in various aspects of research in the basic biological and medical sciences. Dr. Hoagland has taught at Cambridge, Clark, and Harvard Universities; he currently holds an appointment as professor of biological psychiatry at Boston University. In May of this year, he completed a term as president of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The Summer 1959 issue of *Dædalus* carried a paper by him on "Population Problems and the Control of Fertility"; he was guest editor, also, of the Summer 1961 issue, "Evolution and Man's Progress." He has published many papers in neurophysiology, adrenal physiology, and on studies dealing with biochemical aspects of schizophrenia.

JEAN MAYER, associate professor of nutrition and lecturer on the history of public health in the School of Public Health in Harvard University, was born in Paris in 1920. At the time of the outbreak of the war, a Fellow of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, he served through the years 1939-1945 as an officer of the Free French forces, a service signalized by his receipt of the Legion of Honor, the Resistance Medal, and the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Croix de Guerre. A Rockefeller Fellow at Yale University, he served later as Nutrition Officer with the Food and Agriculture Organization. Some 200 research and review articles on various topics in experimental and human nutrition attest to the range of his studies. Recently the A. Cunning Lecturer in the Royal Australasian College of Physicians, he has been a member of several FAO-WHO missions to various African countries.

HEINZ POLITZER has, since the outset of his career, shown an extraordinary gift for transmitting the news of Kafka's wayfarer at the gates of the Castle to Coleridge's seafarer at the church door among the wedding guests. Co-editor, with Max Brod, of the first edition of *Franz Kafka's Collected Works* (Berlin, Prague, 1935), his *Franz Kafka: Parable and Paradox* (1962), as well as an "Inner Biography" of Franz Kafka, will be published next year in Frankfurt. Born in Vienna in 1910, and presently a professor of German in the University of California at Berkeley, he is at work on an intellectual history of Austria. A volume of his poems, *Die gläserne Kathedrale,* was published in Vienna in 1959.

KENNETH N. WALTZ, born in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in 1924, is currently preparing a manuscript on politics and foreign policy in the United States and Great Britain, a project on which he has been engaged during the past year while at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. For this period he has been on leave from Swarthmore College, where he is a professor of political science. He is the author of *Man, the State, and War* (1959).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Issues of *DÆDALUS* in Print

These may be ordered from the *Dædalus* Subscription Office, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 280 Newton Street, Brookline Station, Boston, Massachusetts 02146 postpaid. Back issues of *Dædalus* are priced at $1.75 each. Back issues of double numbers are priced at $3.50 domestic and $4.00 foreign.

The Woman in America (*Spring 1964*)

Contributors: Lotte Bailyn, Jill Conway, Carl N. Degler, Erik H. Erikson, Joan M. Erikson, Esther Peterson, David Riesman, Alice S. Rossi, Edna G. Rostow.

A New Europe? (*double issue, Winter 1964*)

Contributors: Alchille Albonetti, Raymond Aron, Frank Bowles, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Fabio Luca Cavazza, William Clark, Michel Crozier, Ralf Dahrendorf, Charles Frankel, Oliver Franks, Stephen R. Graubard, Alfred Grosser, Stephane Hessel, Alexander King, Max Kohnstamm, Eric Larrabee, Seymour Martin Lipset, Richard Mayne, Alessandro Pizzorno, Ernesto N. Rogers, Manlio Rossi-Doria, Alain Touraine, Eric Weil.

The Professions (*Fall 1963*)

Contributors: William Alonso, Bernard Barber, John J. Beer, John Conway, Paul A. Freund, James M. Gustafson, Everett C. Hughes, Samuel P. Huntington, W. David Lewis, Kenneth S. Lynn, James Howard Means, Alma S. Wittlin, Norman E. Zinberg.

Themes in Transition (*Summer 1963*)

Contributors: S. A. Barnett, Amitai Etzioni, Joseph Goldstein, H. Scott Gordon, Jay Katz, George A. Kelly, William Letwin, Robert Jay Lifton, Bruce Mazlish, Agnes Mongan, Krister Stendahl, Overton Hume Taylor.

Perspectives on the Novel (*Spring 1963*)

Contributors: Peter Brooks, Brewster Ghiselin, Albert J. Guerard, Robert Kiely, Lawrence Kohlberg, Simon O. Lesser, Harry Levin, David Littlejohn, Andrew Lytle, Thomas Moser, Claire Rosenfield, David L. Stevenson.

The American Reading Public (*Winter 1963*)

Contributors: Marshall A. Best, Leo Bogart, Reuben A. Brower, Benjamin DeMott, Jason Epstein, John Hollander, Dan Lacy, Henri Peyre, Leonard Shatzkin, Edward Shils, Roger W. Shugg, Thomas J. Wilson, and others.

American Foreign Policy—Freedoms and Restraints (*Fall 1962*)

Contributors: Raymond Aron, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Bernard Brodie, Richard E. Caves, Herbert Feis, Stanley Hoffmann, Ernest R. May, John N. Plank, Roger Smith, Peter Paul Stender.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CURRENT WORK AND CONTROVERSIES—2 (*Summer 1962*)

Contributors: William Dray, Paul Friedrich, Edward Grant, David Hawkins, Richard Hofstadter, G. A. Kursanov, Seymour Slive, William P. Travis, Morton White, and others.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (*Spring 1962*)

Contributors: Raymond Aron, Eric Ashby, Gordon S. Brown, Gerald Holton, Aldous Huxley, Lawrence S. Kubie, W. Arthur Lewis, Frank E. Manuel, Robert S. Morison, Walter J. Ong.

YOUTH: CHANGE AND CHALLENGE (*Winter 1962*)

Contributors: Bruno Bettelheim, Reuel Denney, S. N. Eisenstadt, Erik H. Erikson, Kenneth Keniston, Robert Jay Lifton, Kaspar D. Naegele, Talcott Parsons, George Sherman, Laurence Wylie.

EXCELLENCE AND LEADERSHIP IN A DEMOCRACY (*Fall 1961*)

Contributors: D. Wilfred Abse, James MacGregor Burns, Henry Steele Commager, John Conway, Lucie Jessner, David C. McClelland, Robert S. Morison, Henri Peyre, Don K. Price, Adam Yarmolinsky.

EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PROGRESS (*Summer 1961*)

Contributors: Ralph W. Burhoe, James F. Crow, Hudson Hoagland, Hermann J. Muller, Henry A. Murray, Walter A. Rosenblith, Demitri B. Shimkin, B. F. Skinner, Julian H. Steward, and others.

ETHNIC GROUPS IN AMERICAN LIFE (*Spring 1961*)

Contributors: Kenneth D. Benne, Joshua A. Fishman, Milton M. Gordon, Oscar Handlin, Peter H. and Alice S. Rossi, Ozzie G. Simmons, J. Milton Yinger, and others.

THE FUTURE METROPOLIS (*Winter 1961*)

Contributors: Edward C. Banfield, Karl W. Deutsch, John Dyckman, Aaron Fleisher, Oscar Handlin, Gyorgy Kepes, Kevin Lynch, Martin Meyerson, Lloyd Rodwin, Raymond Vernon, Morton and Lucia White, and others.

THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA (*Summer 1960*)

Contributors: David Burg, Boris Elkin, Leopold H. Haimson, Max Hayward, David Joravsky, Leopold Labedz, Martin Malia, Julián Marías, Richard Pipes, Leonard Schapiro, Benjamin Schwartz, Gustav Wetter, and others.

MASS CULTURE AND MASS MEDIA (*Spring 1960*)

Contributors: Hannah Arendt, James Baldwin, Ernest van den Haag, Oscar Handlin, H. Stuart Hughes, Stanley Edgar Hyman, Randall Jarrell, Leo Rosten, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Edward Shils, Frank Stanton, James Johnson Sweeney, and others.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Issues of *DÆDALUS* out of Print

See hard-cover books based on these issues, listed on following pages.

Arms Control (double issue, *Fall 1960*)

Contributors: A. Doak Barnett, Kenneth E. Boulding, Robert R. Bowie, Donald G. Brennan, Harrison Brown, Saville Davis, Paul M. Doty, Bernard T. Feld, William T. R. Fox, Erich Fromm, William R. Frye, Hubert H. Humphrey, Herman Kahn, Henry A. Kissinger, Arthur Larson, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Thomas C. Schelling, Louis B. Sohn, Edward Teller, Jerome B. Wiesner, Christopher Wright.

The Visual Arts Today (double issue, *Winter 1960*)

Contributors: James S. Ackerman, John E. Burchard, Maya Deren, Felix Deutsch, Robert Gardner, James J. Gibson, Sigfried Giedion, E. H. Gombrich, Boris Kaufman, Gyorgy Kepes, Le Corbusier, Margaret Mead, Paul Rand, W. J. H. Sandberg, Eduard F. Sekler, Andreas Speiser, Edward Steichen, Paul Weiss, Rudolf Wittkower, and others.

Current Work and Controversies—1 (*Summer 1959*)

Contributors: Solomon Barkin, John C. Bennett, P. W. Bridgman, Edith Cobb, John Dewey, René J. Dubos, A. Hunter Dupree, Hudson Hoagland, Seymour Martin Lipset, Lewis Mumford, Howard Simons, Sumner H. Slichter, John L. Thomas, and others.

Quantity and Quality (*Fall 1959*)

Contributors: Karl W. Deutsch, Robert Frost, John G. Kemeny, Lawrence S. Kubie, Harold D. Lasswell, Wassily Leontief, Clarence Morris, Renato Poggioli, S. S. Stevens, Victor F. Weisskopf.

The American National Style (*Spring 1958*)

Contributors: Niels Bohr, P. W. Bridgman, Abraham Kaplan, George F. Kennan, Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray, Linus Pauling, W. W. Rostow, Edward Teller.

On Evidence and Inference (*Fall 1958*)

Contributors: Raymond Aron, Martin Deutsch, Erik H. Erikson, Jacob Fine, Henry M. Hart, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Daniel Lerner, John T. McNaughton, and others.

Science and the Modern World View (*Winter 1958*)

Contributors: P. W. Bridgman, Harcourt Brown, Jerome S. Bruner, Philipp Frank, Henry Guerlac, Howard Mumford Jones, Charles Morris, Robert Oppenheimer, Giorgio de Santillana, and others.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books Published from Issues of *DÆDALUS*

Virtually all the issues of *Dædalus,* in expanded form, appear also as books in hard covers. Inquiries about these books should be directed to their respective publishers.

The American Reading Public, edited by Roger H. Smith (based on the Winter 1963 issue of *Dædalus*), R. R. Bowker Company, 1964. $7.95

Youth: Change and Challenge, edited by Erik H. Erikson (based on the Winter 1962 issue of *Dædalus*), Basic Books, 1963. $6.50

Excellence and Leadership in a Democracy, edited by Stephen R. Graubard and Gerald Holton (based on the Fall 1961 issue of *Dædalus*), Columbia University Press, 1962. $5.00

Evolution and Man's Progress, edited by Hudson Hoagland and Ralph W. Burhoe (based on the Summer 1961 issue of *Dædalus*), Columbia University Press, 1962. $4.50

The Future Metropolis, edited by Lloyd Rodwin (based on the Winter 1961 issue of *Dædalus*), George Braziller, Inc., 1961. $5.00

Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, edited by Donald G. Brennan (based on the Fall 1960 issue of *Dædalus*), George Braziller, Inc., 1961. $6.00

The Russian Intelligentsia, edited by Richard Pipes (based on the Summer 1960 issue of *Dædalus*), Columbia University Press, 1961. $4.50

Culture for the Millions?, edited by Norman Jacobs (based on the Spring 1960 issue of *Dædalus*), D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961. $4.95

Continued

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE VISUAL ARTS TODAY, edited by Gyorgy Kepes (based on the Winter 1960 issue of *Dædalus*), Wesleyan University Press, 1960. $8.50

QUANTITY AND QUALITY, edited by Daniel Lerner (based on the Fall 1959 issue of *Dædalus*), The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961. $4.50

MYTH AND MYTHMAKING, edited by Henry A. Murray (based on the Spring 1959 issue of *Dædalus*), George Braziller, Inc., 1960. $6.00

EDUCATION IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE, edited by Brand Blanshard (based on the Winter 1959 issue of *Dædalus*), Basic Books, 1959. $4.50

EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE, edited by Daniel Lerner (based on the Fall 1958 issue of *Dædalus*), The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1959. $4.00

SYMBOLISM IN RELIGION AND LITERATURE, edited by Rollo May (based on the Summer 1958 issue of *Dædalus*), George Braziller, Inc., 1960. $5.00

THE AMERICAN STYLE, edited by Elting E. Morison (containing material published in the Spring 1958 issue of *Dædalus*), Harper and Brothers, 1958. $5.00

SCIENCE AND THE MODERN MIND, edited by Gerald Holton (based on the Winter 1958 issue of *Dædalus*), Beacon Press, 1958. $3.95

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED